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Over the past thirty years, a silent societal transformation has 
taken place across Europe: homeownership rates have increa-
sed rapidly, and the meaning of owning oneʼs home has chan-
ged. The upswing of homeownership rates in continental Europe 
is the result of government interventions and deregulations of 
mortgage- and housing markets, which encouraged (lower-inco-
me) households to enter homeownership at a younger age. 
Whereas housing was previously mainly defined by its shelter 
function, the market-driven expansion has increased the impor-
tance of its investment function, both for households and the 
economy at large. The significance of housing for the socio-eco-
nomic stratification has increased, but is still under-researched. 
This dissertation seeks to explain how institutional configurations 
generate or mitigate housing wealth inequality from an interna-
tional-comparative perspective. It gives insights in the impact of 
housing market dynamics on the organization of the life course 
and the consequences for housing wealth accumulation. Ultima-
tely, it presents an alternative view on one of the major political 
challenges of contemporary Europe
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CHAPTER 1
Societal Trends and 
Housing Wealth Inequality: 
an Introduction




October 1992. My parents were in their mid-thirties when we moved 
from a social rental apartment in De Pijp, one of Amsterdam’s famous 
working class neighborhoods, into an owned home in a brand new 
neighborhood at the western edge of the city. As a three year old child, 
this was the place where I could go to school and play in a clean and safe 
environment. However, the home came with a price: it costed around 
72.000 euro (including the land lease) and the mortgage payments 
were almost unbearably high for a couple depending on a one-and-
a-half income, working in health care. Twenty-five years later, my 
parents are still paying-off the initial mortgage, although the home 
is worth nearly 300.000 euro. Their former neighbors, with similar 
incomes – who stayed in their rental home – do not even come close to 
having one tenth of that amount on their savings account. However, 
the young urban professionals that en masse bought apartments in 
the neighborhood right after my parents left, made far larger capital 
gains on the housing market. For my parents, it could have been 
worse. Their new neighbors divorced in the beginning of the new 
millennium, after which the remaining husband maximized equity 
release to buffer his rocky labor market career. When he moved out in 
2016, his outstanding mortgage was still 260.000 euro. Retrospectively, 
one could conclude that my parents spectacularly improved their 
position in socio-economic terms by moving from one housing tenure 
into another at the right moment, staying employed and married. My 
parents are not alone in their experience. 
Over the past thirty years, a silent societal transformation has 
taken place across Europe: homeownership rates have increased 
rapidly, and the meaning of owning one’s home has changed. The 
upswing of homeownership rates in continental Europe is the result 
of government interventions and deregulations of mortgage- and 
housing markets, which encouraged (lower-income) households to 
enter homeownership at a younger age  (Angelini et al., 2013; Doling et 
al., 2003). Whereas housing was previously mainly defined by its shelter 
function, the market-driven expansion has increased the importance 
of its investment function, both for households and the economy 
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at large. Housing wealth (the value of the home minus outstanding 
residential debts) expresses the value of housing-as-investment. 
In other words, the significance of housing for the socio-economic 
stratification has increased, but is still under-researched (Dewilde, 
2011). This observation is the starting point for the HOWCOME-project, 
where this dissertation is part of. There are two reasons to assume that 
the inequality in terms of housing wealth among owner-occupiers has 
increased during the expansion of homeownership. First, the social 
profile of homeownership has diversified when owner-occupation 
came within the reach of the lower middle class (Doling et al., 2003). 
It is unlikely that those with a lower social status accumulate similar 
amounts of housing wealth compared to those with a higher social 
status, since they are not able to invest similar amounts. Second, 
(residential) real estate has functioned as a sponge, absorbing capital 
from the financial sector, which has resulted in inflated and volatile 
house prices (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 
2008). In such a context, the location and timing of home-buying 
heavily impact upon the accumulation of capital gains and losses. 
Different European countries have pursued homeownership in a 
different fashion, based on a different ideology (Doling and Ronald, 
2010; Ronald, 2008; Watson, 2009). As a result, there are cross-country 
variations regarding the impact of homeownership on stratification.
In this dissertation, I analyze housing wealth inequality between 
social classes and age cohorts on the basis of (interactions between) 
individual life courses and the institutional context, following 
an internationally-comparative perspective. The life story of my 
parents and their former and new neighbors shows that it is always 
a combination of both factors that explains how the housing market 
affects one’s social position. Without housing policies that increased 
the attractiveness of homeownership, my parents would not have 
started accumulating housing wealth at all, whereas they would have 
accumulated far less if they would have needed to release equity due 
to a period of unstable employment or when they would have been 
forced to sell the home as the result of a divorce. 
Housing wealth is on its way of becoming one of the major 
cleavages in contemporary societies. I will give four examples that 
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illustrate that housing wealth is increasingly determining the socio-
economic status and life chances for people with a different social 
background.  First, in the UK, there are fears for the emergence of a 
‘generation rent’ due to a house price boom, combined with a stagnant 
income development among young people in the lower- and middle 
class. Because existing homeowners have easier access to housing 
finance, sub-letting a second property to youngsters who cannot obtain 
a mortgage is very profitable (Lund, 2013). Second, in Spain, an anti-
eviction movement (Plataforma de afectados por la hipoteca) defends 
households that face eviction and residual debts in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis of 2007. Those who bought their home in the 
run-up to the crisis fall at the wrong side of the increasing cleavage 
between housing-haves and housing-have-nots when they are forced 
to sell the home due to a spell of unemployment in their labor market 
career (Cano Fuentes et al., 2013). Third, in the Netherlands, were real 
house values tripled between the 1970s and the beginning of the global 
financial crisis in 2007 (OECD, 2014), both private rental housing and 
homeownership has become increasingly unaffordable in the last 
decade. In Amsterdam, starters on the housing market increasingly 
need their parents’ housing wealth as a collateral for a mortgage 
loan, and use their social- and cultural capital to find a place of their 
own (Hochstenbach and Boterman, 2015). Fourth, the other side of 
the ‘housing wealth cleavage’ grows in Europe’s capital cities that are 
well-embedded in global production chains. In cities like London, 
Paris, Amsterdam and Berlin, the sale of penthouses for amounts up 
to 25 million euros shows that real estate has become an absorber of 
international capital (Fernandez et al., 2016). It is this context in which 
European citizens, who generally do not have a speculative motive 
(Smith et al., 2009), navigate through the housing market. Although 
the cleavage might have increased across Europe, which groups are 
better- or worse-off is determined by national housing, spatial and 
economic policies. These institutional differences form the core of 
most of the empirical work of this doctoral thesis.
In this introduction, I first position housing wealth in the two 
fields this dissertation aims to make contributions to: stratification 
research and housing studies. Second, I will present a theory of 
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housing wealth accumulation. Here, several mechanisms of housing 
wealth inequality are highlighted that are tested in the empirical 
chapters of this dissertation. Third, I will describe the socio-economic 
and socio-spatial trends that form the stage for the unfolding 
increase of housing wealth inequality. These major trends are often 
described as the consequence of neo-liberal policy regimes that 
were set in motion across Western Europe from the 1980s onwards. 
Instead of ascribing all distributive developments in recent history 
to a ‘neoliberal project’, I point at various policies that increase or 
mitigate socio-economic and socio-spatial inequality. In this way I 
attempt to shed light on the country-specific policies, regulations and 
characteristics that impact upon housing wealth inequality. They can 
be considered as the mechanisms that exacerbate or mitigate housing 
wealth inequality. If housing wealth inequality is considered to be a 
social problem, then these mechanisms are the buttons politicians can 
push to alter its distribution in favor of certain groups. Finally, I will 
discuss the research questions and the research design, after which 
this introduction finishes with an outline of the entire dissertation.
A multi-disciplinary approach
The concept of housing wealth is located at the margins of the fields 
of sociology, economics and geography, but is situated right at the core 
of their intersection. In this dissertation, I therefore aim to contribute 
to ongoing debates in two multidisciplinary domains: stratification 
research and (European) housing studies. I will highlight how 
the understanding of housing wealth inequality contributes to 
progression in both fields. 
The sociological domain of stratification research traditionally 
deals with status differences between individuals based on their 
occupation (Erikson et al., 1979). When the male breadwinner model 
began to erode and occupational stability started to decrease the focus 
on occupational inequality did no longer capture the relevant form 
of inequality in society, especially due to the rise of more complex 
household arrangements, such as the one-and-a-half and dual earning 
household. The introduction of economic concepts in stratification 
research resulted in a focus on income inequality (Alderson and 
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Nielsen, 2002; Harrison and Bluestone, 1990). Across the western world, 
income inequality decreased during the heydays of the welfare state 
(1945-1975), but increased rapidly after the 1980s due to globalization, 
welfare state restructuring and increasing female labor force 
participation (Alderson et al., 2005). Only recently, wealth is recognized 
as an equally important dimension of socio-economic stratification, 
alongside income (Spilerman, 2000). The influential work of Piketty 
shows that the amount of capital relative to the national income 
has increased from less than 300% in the 1950s to more than 600% in 
the first decade of the new millennium in Western countries such 
as France and the US (Piketty, 2014). The wealth stock started to grow 
after the welfare state restructuring of the 1980s that coincided with a 
wave of financial deregulation, which has increased corporate profits 
at the expense of workers’ wages.  This makes some commentators 
conclude that the reduced incomes at the bottom deciles of the 
income distribution end up as wealth in the hands of those at the top 
of the distribution. However, Piketty’s graphs show, notwithstanding 
cross-country differences, that the enormous growth of the total stock 
of wealth since the 1980s is mainly the result of the rise of housing 
wealth (Piketty, 2014). Whereas Piketty mainly overlooks this point, 
Fernandez et al. (2016) consider the gradual financialization of housing 
as one of the main engines of rise of financialized capitalism in the last 
three decades. The liberalization of finance has created an enormous 
stock of footloose capital looking for investment, which is absorbed 
by real estate. In this way, housing assets have become a backbone 
of the global financial system (Aalbers, 2008). This dissertation aims 
to contribute to a next step in stratification research, going beyond 
wealth as something monolithic, and to reveal the distribution and 
drivers of housing wealth in different institutional contexts. 
The distributional outcomes of housing policies lay at the core 
of the field of housing studies. Early contributors to the academic 
debate around European housing systems have tried to incorporate 
housing in theories of welfare state divergence. In the early days, the 
focus has mainly been on the availability, affordability and nature 
of social rental housing. Jim Kemeny for example, distinguishes 
between two types of rental markets: unitary (cost-rental open to the 
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entire population) and dualist (a means-tested social segment), of 
which the former generates much smaller levels of stigmatization 
and segregation (Kemeny, 1981). When studying Europe, the field of 
housing studies has been preoccupied with the entry of households 
into homeownership. Cross-country differences are explained 
by differences regarding the political economy of the respective 
countries. The term housing regime was coined to describe the 
system of provision, allocation and consumption of housing since its 
distributional outcomes cut through Esping-Andersen’s (1990) famous 
welfare state typology (Torgersen, 1987). Whereas the democratic class 
struggle is the engine under the emergence of welfare state regimes, 
housing researchers have tried to establish the concept of housing 
classes to explain the emergence of different housing regimes. The 
democratic class struggle is the process in which political parties, 
representing certain social class backgrounds, form alliances and 
shape the scope and generosity of social benefit- and social insurance 
systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The idea behind the existence and 
centrality of housing classes was fueled by the house price boom 
in the UK in the 1970s, which created a cleavage between asset-rich 
and asset-poor, cutting through the traditional class society (Rex and 
Moore, 1967; Saunders, 1984; Thorns, 1981). Although homeowners 
can be expected to have different interests than tenants (and vote 
differently – see André and Dewilde [2016]) the focus has shifted to 
the interaction between housing outcomes and other forms of socio-
economic inequality. Economic theory has been incorporated in 
housing studies to quantify the impact of housing on socio-economic 
inequalities by expressing the benefits of housing as an addition to 
the income (a flow measure). First, the concept of imputed rent shows 
the difference between the housing costs and the costs of renting 
the same dwelling on the free market. The housing costs are usually 
lower than this and can therefore be seen as an addition to the income 
(Frick et al., 2010; Yates, 1994). Second, the user-costs of housing express 
the rent for tenants and the monthly mortgage interest payments 
minus house price appreciation / depreciation for homeowners. Both 
measures provide an indication of the possibility for financial- and 
housing wealth accumulation as a result of the housing situation, but 
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do not express it as a stock measure (the total accumulated housing 
wealth at a certain time) (Haffner and Heylen, 2011; Quigley and 
Raphael, 2004). Recently, housing scholars have argued that housing 
wealth holdings constitute a connection between housing regimes 
and welfare states: housing wealth can be used as a collateral for asset-
based welfare. In such a system, households use their own wealth 
holdings to cater for individual welfare needs in times of income loss 
due to unemployment, sickness or retirement from the labor market 
(Doling and Ronald, 2010). The distribution of housing wealth across 
social classes and age groups, determining whether it can function as 
a safety net for different social groups, never received much attention 
due to conceptual fuzziness as well as data limitations.
Defining housing wealth
In most studies, housing wealth is defined in a rather simple, 
straightforward way: it is the value of the owned home, minus 
outstanding mortgage debts. In other words: it is the cash flow to 
the household after selling the home. However, (housing) wealth is 
different from other measures of socio-economic inequality since 
it is accumulated over the life course (Spilerman, 2000). A dynamic 
conceptualization can capture the mechanisms that are at play 
during the entire period of accumulation. DiPrete and Eirich (2006) 
argue that the accumulation process of wealth should be regarded 
as a process of cumulative causation, in which the current stock 
of wealth is the result of the initial input and the rate of return. 
By conceptually disentangling six dimensions of housing wealth 
(three static and three dynamic), it becomes clear how life courses 
and institutions affect the nature of housing wealth inequality in a 
country. A schematic representation of the constituents of housing 
wealth inequality is presented in Figure 1.1.
Let us start with defining the three static dimensions of housing 
wealth – the only dimensions that are relevant at the moment of 
purchase. These are the dimensions that shape the relative position of 
the new homeowner relative to other members of the society. First of 
all, there is the ownership dimension, separating homeowners from 
tenants. It is exactly therefore that homeownership is celebrated as a 
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mechanism behind the democratization of wealth (Turner and Luea, 
2009). Housing wealth is logically reserved to homeowners. Second, 
there is the dimension ‘purchase price’, separating those who bought 
more expensive homes from those who bought cheaper homes. This 
is what DiPrete and Eirich (2006) would call the input of the process 
of cumulative causation. Partly, this dimension shows the potential 
for housing wealth accumulation, since many homeowners buy their 
home with a repayable mortgage loan. Third, I distinguish the ‘size of 
the mortgage’ as separate dimension. The size of the mortgage and the 
purchasing price are connected to the affordability of homeownership. 
House prices increase when interest rates decrease, since a larger 
credit can be obtained from the bank on the basis of the same income. 
The actual housing wealth at the moment of purchase is nothing 
more than the price of the dwelling, minus the outstanding mortgage 
debt. In the case of a first-time homebuyer, this is the down-payment 
for the mortgage. In countries such as the Netherlands, where loan-
to-value ratios often exceeded the value of the house, homeowners 
might start their housing career with negative housing wealth (CBS, 
2015).
Three dynamic dimensions of housing wealth cause a change in 
the housing wealth holdings when time unfolds. The first dynamic 
dimension of housing wealth is the ‘mortgage amortization’. Paying-
off one’s mortgage, increases the housing wealth gradually over time, 
until it has the same value as the initial size of the mortgage (typically 
between 15 and 30 years). Moreover, investments in the home that 
enhance or maintain its value should be placed under this header 
(considered as part of the user-costs of housing as well [Haffner and 
Heylen, 2011]). The second dynamic dimension consists of ‘capital 
gains and losses’. Local housing market dynamics determine price 
increases and decreases and reflect directly on the housing wealth. 
This is what DiPrete and Eirich (2009) would call the ‘rate of return’.
Finally, the number of moves might negatively impact upon housing 
wealth holdings due to the transaction costs that are linked to 
residential mobility. In short, the six dimensions of housing wealth 
can be quantified in the following equation of housing wealth: housing 
wealth = homeownership * (purchase price – mortgage + mortgage 
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amortization + house price gains – historical transaction costs). Other 
costs of homeownership (maintenance costs, depreciation costs etc.) 
are left out of the equation since tenants pay for them through their 
rents. Furthermore, in this way, housing wealth is a very clear and 
tangible resource: the amount to receive after the sale of the home.
The different dimensions of housing wealth are affected by social-, 
economic- and housing policies separately (see Figure 1.1). These 
policies might even have outcomes on individual dimensions that 
counterbalance each other. To mention a few, housing grants for 
low-income households reduce the price they pay for their home 
(dimension purchase price), whereas generous systems of mortgage 
interest tax deduction decrease the attractiveness of paying-off the 
mortgage (dimension mortgage amortization). The deregulation of 
the mortgage market increases loan-to-value ratios and impacts upon 
different dimensions simultaneously. When the people are granted a 
higher initial mortgage loan (dimension initial size of the mortgage), 
they are able to invest more in housing (dimension purchase price) 
at an earlier stage of their life course. A similar argument can be 
made for a reduction of interest rates. It allows households to take 
out larger loans due to lower monthly costs, which drives up house 
prices. If a local government invests in the spatial quality of certain 
neighborhoods, or in urban restructuring, homeowners in that area 
will profit from rising house prices (dimension capital gains and 
losses).  
From the economists’ side, the concept of housing wealth is 
sometimes criticized for being an ‘illusionary resource’. Bonnet et 
al. (2014) argue that increasing rent prices are a more appropriate 
way to measure housing market outcomes in terms of wealth, since 
they represent the possible flow of capital that can be realized by the 
ownership of the home. In line with research on the intergenerational 
transmission of homeownership (e.g. Helderman and Mulder, 2007), I 
argue that housing wealth contributes to socio-economic inequality, 
even when it is not liquidated or expressed as a flow-measure. First, 
for new entrants to the market for owned homes, accumulating 
housing wealth becomes ever more expensive when house prices 
increase (Lund, 2013). Second, uneven price cycles on local housing 
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market might result in windfall gains and losses when moving 
between neighborhoods or regions at the right moment (Hamnett, 
1999). Third, the housing wealth stock turns into a very real source 
of inequality when it is transferred from one generation to another. 
Migrants and lower class citizens often do not have relatives that 
reside in homeownership and can help them to get on the housing 
ladder with their housing wealth.
Figure 1.1. Conceptual model with core concepts used in the empirical chapters.
The meaning of housing wealth
As a consequence of a dialectic between cultural- and institutional 
factors, housing wealth has a different meaning in different 
contexts. First of all, it represents different levels of housing quality. 
More importantly, housing wealth itself has a different meaning 
in different contexts. This has serious consequences for the 
interpretation of housing wealth inequality. Whereas quantitative 
cross-country comparisons mainly have overlooked this point, some 
conclusions can be drawn from qualitative studies on the meaning of 
homeownership in different countries. I try to capture the meaning 
of housing wealth by answering two questions. First: to what extent 
are the homeowners entitled to their housing wealth? Second: to what 
extent can the housing wealth be converted into financial capital? 




The degree of ownership determines to which extent homeowners 
can cash their housing wealth. The degree of ownership is the result 
of the way in which property rights are defined (institutional factor) 
and the role of the family in housing provision (cultural factor). 
The degree of ownership displays large variation across European 
countries. In the Mediterranean countries, but especially in the post-
socialist states, property rights are not always well-defined due to 
informal construction and incomplete privatization and restitution 
processes. The absence of regulatory spatial plans, or the limited 
capability of governments to enforce these plans, functions as an 
incentive for people to opt for informal self-construction. Especially 
in the post-socialist countries on the Balkans, informal settlements 
have been an important element of the housing system after the fall 
of the communist regimes (In Albania up to 30% of the housing stock) 
(Gabriel, 2007; Tosics and Hegedüs, 2002; Tsenkova, 2008). However, 
there are different degrees of informality. Some informal settlements 
are built on land on which the builders have a legal claim, whereas 
others build on communal lands. In most post-socialist states, efforts 
have been made to regulate and legalize informal settlements. Even 
in the case of legal construction, property rights are not always clearly 
defined in these countries. Due to absent or incomplete property 
registers as well as incomplete processes of restitution (e.g. transfer 
of housing to the owner before nationalization), property rights are 
often insecure. In the case of incomplete privatization processes, only 
the use rights can be bought and sold. Moreover, the ownership status 
of collective indoor and outdoor spaces remains unclear (Palacin et 
al., 2005; Pichler-Milanović, 1999; Tsenkova, 2008). Altogether, there 
is a ladder of informality that impacts upon house values, and the 
opportunities one has to sell the home. In other words: informality 
limits housing wealth and reduces its accessibility. 
In most of Western Europe, housing wealth is a characteristic of an 
individual or a couple. The person who buys the house, also decides on 
the sale and cashes the benefits. Therefore, only the buyer and spouse 
(depending on the partnership contract) can claim the housing wealth. 
In countries where the family plays a larger role in the provision of 
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welfare, the individual entitlement to housing wealth is blurred. 
On the basis of qualitative observations, Ronald (2004) notes that “[e]
ven the privately owned house or home constitutes a physical and 
institutional basis of collectivism and welfare and is thus emphasized 
as a space of ‘family privatism’ rather than privatism in itself” (p. 57). 
Other authors, dealing with the role of the family in Southern Europe, 
stress that family support for the purchase of a house translates in 
expectations and obligations towards these family members. The 
decision to buy or to sell a dwelling should be portrayed as a family 
decision. The extended family plays a more important role than 
the nuclear household: they help with physical labor constructing a 
home, or help financing it (Allen, 2006; Ferrera, 1996). The stronger 
interdependency between members of the extended family leads 
to a situation in which some family members are in terms of their 
welfare dependent on the property of a family member from another 
household. The sale of a house (the liquidation of its housing wealth) 
affects therefore individuals outside the nuclear family. Even if the 
nuclear family is the legal owner of the home, housing wealth should 
be portrayed as a family resource. An index that positions all European 
countries on an axis between familialism and individualism (Allik 
and Realo, 2004) clearly shows in which countries housing wealth 
can be expected to be an individual resource (United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, etc.), or a family resource (Portugal, Bulgaria, 
Romania).
Degree of liquidity
The degree of liquidity determines to what extent homeowners can 
use their housing wealth as an economic resource. The degree of 
liquidity is the result of policies that allow a conversion of housing 
wealth into financial wealth (institutional factor) and the willingness 
to do so (cultural factor).
In its purest form, housing wealth is very illiquid, since it is 
locked up in the bricks of a dwelling. Contrary to the accumulation of 
financial wealth in the form of savings, bonds and stocks, the decision 
to buy or sell a house is based on a combination of consumption- and 
investment motives, while transaction costs are high. Especially in 
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countries with a social-democratic or liberal welfare state (with a high 
degree of ownership) there are financial products available that allow 
homeowners to use their housing wealth as financial wealth: in-situ 
and ex-situ equity release schemes. In-situ mortgage products allow 
homeowners to extend their mortgage when the value of the house 
increases to finance renovations, whereas ex-situ mortgage products 
function as equity withdrawal schemes to finance consumption, by 
using capital gains from housing as collateral. In-situ and ex-situ 
equity release fueled consumption in countries like the Netherlands, 
where house prices increased rapidly from the 1990s to the financial 
crisis in 2008 (Klyuev and Mills, 2007; Ong et al., 2013). Extensive capital 
release schemes have existed in Australia, Canada, the US, the UK, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden (Chiuri and 
Jappelli, 2010). A special form of equity release is a ‘reversed mortgage’, 
which is an alternative pension arrangement for homeowners. 
The monthly pension payment is in fact an enlargement of the 
mortgage loan, whereas the interest payments are added up to the 
debt, covered by the value of the home. In case financial products 
allow a transformation of housing wealth into financial wealth, 
housing wealth inequalities translate into inequalities regarding 
the housing quality and living standard. Housing equity withdrawal 
allows households to maintain the high housing quality that is 
generally accompanied by high housing wealth, whereas it increases 
the living standard of the household since it provides people with a 
supplementary income stream. Those with lower levels of housing 
wealth live in less comfortable dwellings and have smaller housing-
related pensions, whereas households with higher levels of housing 
wealth have higher housing quality and a larger housing-related 
income flow, 
In most countries, people seem to be reluctant to liquefy their 
housing wealth in later life in order to supplement their pension. 
People hold on to their housing wealth because of bequest- and 
precautionary reasons. Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) estimate for the 
US that 50% of the housing wealth that is transferred to the next 
generation after the death of the last partner, is accumulated with the 
intention of transferring it to the children (bequest motive). However, 
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the intergenerational transmission of housing wealth is affected 
by housing market circumstances as well (Helderman and Mulder, 
2007). Elsinga et al. (2008) argues that the acceptance to release housing 
equity differs between countries, and that this is mainly the result 
of institutional differences. In the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
homeowners view their homes more often as wealth, which paves the 
way for equity release as a pension supplement strategy. In Southern 
Europe, the home has a more central place in the `family project´ and 
homeowners feel a stronger attachment to their homes (Elsinga et al., 
2008).
Demographic and socio-economic trends
The organization of the life course has changed tremendously since 
the beginning of the 20th century. Mayer (2004) distinguishes three 
periods since the year 1900, which all signify a different organization 
of the life course. Although the timing of the beginning and end of 
several periods differs between European countries, the strength 
of this periodization lays in the fact that all European countries 
went through the same stages. The industrial period (1900-1955) is 
characterized by a life cycle of poverty. Both men and women with a 
working class background enter the labor market at a young age after 
a very short spell of compulsory education. Whereas a young working 
couple earns enough to sustain itself, it regularly falls back in poverty 
after child birth. During this period average fertility declined since 
families were forced to delay childbirth. Old-age is even so associated 
with poverty due to the existence of very low pensions. The Fordist 
period (1955-1973) comprised the golden era of the welfare state. It is 
characterized by a standardization of the life course. Both men and 
women enjoy compulsory primary and secondary education. Men 
face life-long employment (typically at the same firm), whereas 
women remain largely outside the labor force after child birth. The 
male breadwinner model is backed by the ideology that the male 
income should be sufficient to sustain the family. The expansion of 
social insurance and pensions greatly reduced the risk of poverty. The 
current, post-industrial phase is characterized by a de-standardization 
of the life course. People prolong their time in the schooling system 
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and enter the labor market on variegated ages. The female labor force 
participation has grown, and dual earnings are in many countries 
necessary to sustain the family. Meanwhile, the risk of unemployment 
has increased. The family life course has become more instable too, 
as marriage has become less common and divorce rates went up 
simultaneously. In other words, life courses have changed when the 
pre-WWII-generation is compared to the post-WWII-generation 
since they (1) collectively prolong education and postpone marriage 
(Mayer, 2004), and (2) show much larger variation on the individual 
level regarding the experience of all kinds of disruptive life events 
(Brückner and Mayer, 2005).
 
Globalization and welfare state restructuring
The rise of the de-standardized life course is generally understood 
from being a consequence of increasing levels of individualization, 
globalization and welfare state restructuring. As Mayer and Schoepflin 
(1989) rightfully note, the state “successively created conditions that 
single out the individual both as the object of state activity and as a 
distinctive, self-reliant actor” (p. 193, italics in original), which can 
be considered as a necessary condition to economic and cultural 
globalization. Bonoli (2005) argues that the de-standardization of the 
life course has resulted in the emergence of New Social Risks (NSR’s), 
such as divorce, single parenthood, unstable occupational careers, 
et cetera. These NSR’s are either ‘old’ (class-based) social risks that 
have been spread to the larger population (like returning spells of 
unemployment) or risks that are traditionally less class-related like 
the occurrence of disruptive life events. During the golden age of 
the welfare state (1945-1975), most Northwestern European countries 
established social insurance schemes to cover the old social risks. New 
social risks were covered less extensively and had therefore much 
larger financial consequences. 
The reorientation of most European welfare states since the 
1980s is widely debated (Mau, 2015; Pierson, 2001). It is argued that 
the fragmentation of the classical support base of the welfare state 
(traditionally the industrial workers) made it more difficult to resist 
the pressure to retrench the welfare state and shrink budgets for 
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traditional forms of social security such as unemployment and 
sickness benefits. Especially for low-skilled workers, globalization 
has resulted in de-standardized careers, since industrial employment 
moved to Eastern Europe or Asia. A career with many temporary 
contracts and gaps of unemployment in between results in lower 
pensions and higher risks of old-age poverty. Therefore, the groups 
that face classic social risks and NSR’s overlap. The social-democratic 
left-wing parties that lost power in the 1980s when their classical 
support base fell apart, and took the opportunity to return to power in 
a majority of EU states (12 out of 15) in the 1990s by orienting themselves 
towards buffering the financial consequences of new social risks. The 
key example is the British Labour party that followed a ‘third way’ 
aimed at achieving ‘classical socialist goals’ by making use of market 
forces. In many countries, social-democratic parties aligned their 
interests with employers by reducing classic social security systems 
with active labor market policies, and the introduction of schemes that 
financially relief new social risks. Vandecasteele (2011) confirms that 
life course risks generally add up to classical social risks and result in a 
situation of cumulative disadvantage. In the period after partnership 
dissolution, child birth or job loss, those from lower socio-economic 
strata are far more likely to enter poverty. Whereas post-modernists 
like Beck (1992) foresee the end of the class society and a replacement 
of class-based social risks by contingent individual life course risks, 
Vandecasteele (2011) illustrates the presence and importance of both 
drivers of inequality.
Variegated outcomes across Europe
Most European countries did not engage in a neo-liberal ‘race to the 
bottom’ regarding employment conditions during the shift from the 
industrial-based welfare state to a post-industrial one with active 
labor market policies, as was expected by Angelo-Saxon commentators 
(Pierson, 2001). Different welfare states have dealt differently with 
globalization and developed their own country-specific solution (Mills 
et al., 2008). This results in cross-country variations regarding both 
the occurrence and the consequence of disruptive life events. DiPrete 
(2002) argues that the level of protection against the consequences of 
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disruptive life events forms an incentive to experience an event. For 
example, the occurrence of social mobility is suppressed in Germany 
by the status-preserving nature of the welfare state, and divorce is 
discouraged by means of strong tax benefits for married couples. In 
Sweden, social mobility is encouraged by the universalist nature of 
the social security and schooling system. Contrary to Germany, social 
benefits mitigate the risks of partnership dissolution in Sweden. In 
the UK, a representative of the liberal welfare state regime, social 
mobility is market-dependent. The fiscal orientation of the state does 
not actively discourage the occurrence of disruptive life events such 
as divorce, and neither does it mitigate its risks (DiPrete, 2002). 
Welfare states across Europe deal also differently with 
unemployment-related new social risks that have spread to a wider 
population in the wake of a post-industrial society. Across the board, 
there is a trend towards increasing levels of income inequality since 
the 1980s. Whereas the incomes at the bottom have been stagnant or 
decresed, the salaries at the top have increased rapidly (Alderson et 
al., 2005; Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Harrison and Bluestone, 1990). 
Barbieri (2009) argues that countries with extensive labor regulations 
and a low tolerance towards income inequality, such as Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Denmark are faced with a large insider-outsider 
problem, since a large share of the population is ‘unemployable’ on 
these terms in the post-industrial economic order. Instead, Barbieri 
argues, these countries allow for an increase of flexible employment 
and short-term contracts in order to create a ‘flexible shell’. This 
allows companies to adjust (1) their number of employees, (2) their 
wage level, (3) the number of hours they work, and (4) the content 
of their jobs. Hence, flexible employment became the norm among 
low-qualified young people, women and migrants, whereas the high-
skilled are still fairly well protected against the risks of the market. 
This polarizes the life course risks faced by higher and lower-skilled 
individuals. Countries with a higher tolerance towards income 
inequality, such as the UK and the US, allow for the emergence of a 
very low-paid underclass, which has to engage in forms of unstable 
(and sometimes informal) employment as well.
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Consequences for housing wealth accumulation
The above-described demographic- and socio-economic trends that 
have occurred since WWII have an impact on the distribution of 
housing wealth. First, the income growth in the decades after WWII, 
that came accompanied by government support for homeownership, 
has resulted in an earlier entry into homeownership for many 
people, especially from the middle and lower-middle class. This has 
resulted in an upswing of homeownership rates until the outset of 
the global financial crisis in 2007. As a consequence, the number of 
people possessing housing wealth has increased. Second, the collapse 
of the male breadwinner model and the rise of the dual (or one-and-
a-half) earning household has increased the purchasing power of 
these households on the housing market. This is one of the causes of 
house price inflation in recent decades. When house prices rise, this 
capitalizes in the hands of those who already owned their home before 
this price surge started. Furthermore, this increases the inequality 
between single and dual earning households.  Third, since the 
1980s, (temporary) spells out of homeownership have become more 
common due to a higher likelihood of the occurrence of disruptive life 
events (NSR’s). Due to cutbacks in welfare states systems, the financial 
consequences of partnership dissolution or unemployment are not 
fully buffered. In the period people reside outside homeownership, 
the accumulation of housing wealth stalls. Especially in a period 
of rising house prices, this hampers the accumulation of housing 
wealth. Finally, the upswing in income inequality since the 1980s has 
an impact on the borrowing capacity of households, the demand of 
housing and consequently house prices in different segments of the 
housing market. The upswing in income inequality can therefore be 
expected to translate into housing wealth inequality in a direct way.
Socio-spatial trends
The increasing amount of wealth relative to the national income 
in most Western countries since the 1980s, is mainly the result of 
capital flowing into the built environment. Real estate grew in 
importance relative to productive forces (shares in companies etc.) 
as destination for (global) investments. The emerging relationship 
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between investments in the built-environment and investments in 
the productive forces of the economy was initially elaborated upon by 
Harvey in The urbanization of capital (1985). In this work Harvey argues 
that capital is switched from the primary circuit of capital accumulation 
(production) to a secondary circuit of capital accumulation (the 
built environment) when supply of goods and services overshoots 
its demand. Capital switching cannot prevent an economic crisis to 
happen, but is able to postpone it. The occurrence of capital switching 
at the onset of economic crises is widely debated (see e.g. Beauregard, 
1994). More interestingly, Piketty’s (2014) work provides evidence that 
capital switching has taken place on a much longer term, and a much 
larger scale. The composition of wealth holdings in France and the US 
has changed since the 1980s, when the capital to income ratio started 
to increase. Housing wealth increased rapidly relative to investments 
in the productive forces in the economy (business and agricultural 
investments). This is a sign that capital switching is not just a sign of 
an approaching crisis, but demarcates a shift to a financialized form 
of capitalism in which housing wealth plays a pivotal role (Aalbers, 
2015). One contested argument is that capital switching has increased 
since the beginning of a stagnant phase of the long-term economic 
Kondratiev wave in the economy of Western Europe (Mason, 2016). In 
this dissertation, I will not focus on the causes behind this increase of 
investments in the built environment, but rather on how this flow of 
money has changed the way our cities look and feel, where people live 
and for which price.
The way in which the built environment is unlocked for capital 
investments differs from country to country. Below I present a 
periodization describing the phases that the European countries 
with the most financialized housing sector (the UK, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden) went through. 
Increasing homeownership
In the first phase (1973-1990), policies that marketized the provisioning 
of housing are the main engine that unlocked real estate for capital 
investments (Rolnik, 2013). Subsidies for housing construction, 
that were common in most (North) Western European countries 
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since the end of WWII were reduced or abolished (Donner, 2000). In 
some countries, the privatization of social housing entailed a more 
aggressive strategy to open up real-estate for financial markets (for 
example in the UK, and later in the post-socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe) (Forrest and Murie, 1988; Yemtsov, 2007). At the 
same time, a market- and credit-based housing provisioning was 
facilitated through the easing of regulations on the financial- and 
mortgage market. First, this made new non-traditional mortgage 
lenders entering the market. Second, due to financial innovations 
and the high leverage in the wider economy, interest rates were 
low and relatively stable (often referred to as the Great Moderation) 
(Aalbers, 2015). This undermined the position of the state to subsidize 
housing construction, since these subsidies were in part based on the 
lower interest rates for states on the international market for credit. 
In turn, it made mortgages available and affordable for the middle 
class. For the mortgage lenders, the risks remained limited since the 
default risks were low due to the fact that the middle class (still) had a 
relatively high and stable income. 
During this first phase, the locational preferences of different 
social groups started to change in favor of central urban locations 
close to cultural facilities and meeting places. In the wake of a post-
industrial society, a new urban life style emerged, based on social 
interactions, fueled by the idea that staying tuned in the ‘local buzz’ is 
beneficial for innovation (Bathelt et al., 2004; Ley, 1997). Lees et al. (2013) 
describe this as one of the causes of the first wave of gentrification. In 
this wave, individuals with low economic-, but high cultural capital 
(artists, bohemians, LGBT community) move into decayed central 
urban neighborhoods with a predominantly working class population 
and renovate their properties. The second wave of gentrification is 
no longer led by individuals, but by investors, looking to maximize 
their profit in neighborhoods with a ‘rent gap’ (Smith, 1979). A rent 
gap occurs in under-invested but centrally located neighborhoods 
in the proximity of neighborhoods with high property prices. The 
first waves of gentrification are widely and heavily criticized for 
displacing working class families, disconnecting them from their 
local support network (Marcuse, 1985), but are also described as an 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   31 18-09-17   10:20
Chapter 1
32
opportunity to create more socially mixed neighborhoods, which 
would eventually benefit the lower classes by providing a safer and 
cleaner environment with more opportunities for education and 
labor market participation (Veldboer and Bergstra, 2016).
Increasing house prices
In the second phase (1990-2007) policies contributing to rising house 
prices are the engine that unlocked real estate for capital investments. 
Fernandez and Aalbers (2016) describe how the real, productive, economy 
is, from the end of the 1980s onwards no longer able to meet the demand 
for High Quality Collaterals (HQC) from the financial sector, fueled by the 
increased corporate savings and pension savings. Although mortgage 
loans are generally considered as HQC’s, they could not be traded due to 
strict financial regulations. Governments had however a large incentive 
to expand mortgage markets in order to include outsiders (especially 
young people and lower income groups) into homeownership. This 
would give groups that were previously expensive for the welfare state 
access to the allegedly (eternal) financial gains of owner-occupation. 
The liberalization of housing finance allowed financial institutions 
to take more risks and externalize these risks to third parties, which 
led to higher loan-to-value rates for prospective homebuyers, and to 
an increase of interest-only mortgages (especially in the Netherlands 
and Sweden). The liberalization of housing finance “temporarily 
allowed political elites to overcome capitalist contradictions: boosting 
corporate profits by lowering the wage share while increasing private 
consumption and achieving fiscal surpluses” (Fernandez and Aalbers 
2016, p. 14). The liberalization of housing finance is one of the causes of a 
surge in house prices in most European countries in the period between 
1990 and 2007 (OECD, 2014). Since the extension of the housing stock has 
been limited, the increased borrowing capacity resulted in the fact that 
people started bidding more for the same dwellings. Meanwhile, the 
rising prices reduced the risk of expanding mortgage finance to lower 
socio-economic groups that would under different circumstances 
not have been able to afford homeownership. Hay (2009) argues that 
many states are locked into a situation in which they can only support 
measures that further drive up house prices, in order to compensate 
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for the loss of real income. Rolnik (2013) concludes: “As long as housing 
prices continued to rise, the expectation that price increases would be 
greater than the discrepancy between housing costs and incomes kept 
everyone happy” (p. 1062).
During this second phase, state- and market-led gentrification 
paved the way for further capital investments in the built environment. 
Whereas gentrification in the 1970s and 1980s was mainly people-led 
or investor-led, in the 1990s the government stepped in more often to 
facilitate investments in neighborhoods with rent gaps that were not 
recognized by the market (for example due to large shares of public/
social housing). Public-private growth coalitions reduce the risks 
for private parties and enlarge the public budget that is available for 
regeneration (Lees et al., 2013). These state-led regeneration projects are 
generally legitimized by two arguments. First, the demolition of low-
income housing creates a more safe and attractive neighborhood and 
contributes to socially mixed neighborhoods. The displacement of a part 
of the former population is taken for granted. Second, the establishment 
of a vibrant consumption milieu in central neighborhoods is expected 
to attract high-end knowledge workers. Inspired by Florida’s (2005) 
influential work, cities compete with each other internationally to 
attract a ‘creative class’, in the hope employers will follow. In the latter 
case, the displacement of low-income residents is not just a necessary 
outcome, but a means to reach economic objectives (Peck and Tickell, 
2002). The changing role of the local government has led to what Hall 
and Hubbard (1996) call ‘entrepreneurial cities’: cities where the local 
administration have its interests lined up with business.
The increasing speed of gentrification processes is mirrored by 
the downgrading of neighborhoods elsewhere in the same urban 
region. Between 1990 and 2007, the sorting of individuals across urban 
space has become more market-based. Tammaru et al. (2015) show 
that in nearly all European capitals, socio-economic segregation has 
increased spectacularly already since the 1980s. They point out that this 
is the result of (1) an ever more polarized income distribution and (2) 
housing market processes that sort people in a different way over the 
urban space. These housing market processes entail the privatization 
of social housing, state-led gentrification and public investments in 
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city marketing and ‘pockets of richness’ (Baeten, 2012; Hackworth and 
Smith, 2001), fueled by the enlarged purchasing power of the higher- 
and upper-middle class after the deregulation of housing finance 
(Damen et al., 2016).
Increasing inequality
In the third and current phase (2007-present), governments focus 
on attracting investments in the built environment, although 
their position is weakened after the global financial crisis. The 
post-crisis environment generates a different socio-spatial dynamic 
than previously. The crisis of 2007 has shown that the influx of capital 
in the built-environment, fueled by overall house price increases, 
reached its boundaries. However, several scholars argue that a new 
wave of capital flowing into real estate is on its way. Especially elitist 
estates and neighborhoods in predominantly capital cities form a new 
safe heaven for capital (Fernandez et al., 2016). Whereas previously 
physical restructuring was key for capital to enter certain areas, 
now social restructuring has taken over this role. Centrally located 
neighborhoods with a high-educated, well-earning population are a 
safer and more profitable destination for capital. The redistribution 
of people across urban space therefore becomes a necessary condition 
for economic growth. This can be conceptualized as an urban form 
of revanchism, embedded in the broader tendency of revanchism, in 
which the economic elite wins (back) control over the state in order to 
increase the profitability of their investments (Harvey, 2007; Fainstein, 
2010; Sharkey, 2012).
Whereas urban revanchism is generally described as a situation 
in which the white middle class ‘takes back’ certain neighborhoods 
in the city (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008), Slater (2016) describes 
it as a financial logic taking over the city by displacing individuals 
that are less profitable. The eviction of tenants with a relatively low 
value creates fictitious capital (a claim on expected future gains) since 
the rent gap increases for other units when population with a higher 
socio-economic status moves into the evicted dwellings. In Sweden, 
the role of the state in the creation of socio-spatial inequality that is 
necessary for capital to flow into the built environment is even more 
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active. Baeten and Listerborn (2015) conclude that the removal of an 
unwanted population (those on benefits, migrants and those with 
a low socio-economic status) from a location with a high economic 
potential has been one of the driving forces behind the regeneration 
of central neighborhoods. They speak of a shift from gentle to brutal 
gentrification. Upgrading by displacement is more or less a zero-sum 
game: those who move out reduce the value of the neighborhood 
they move into, whereas they increase the value of the neighborhood 
they move out of. The increased levels of socio-economic segregation 
since the 1980s in most European cities leave us with a distributional 
question: who profits, and who loses?
Consequences for housing wealth accumulation
Socio-spatial trends that occurred since the 1980s have impacted 
upon the distribution of housing wealth in at least three ways. 
First, the increasing levels of segregation in Europe’s larger cities 
reinforced inequalities between those who bought into upgrading 
and downgrading neighborhoods. Empirical evidence shows that 
house prices have risen more in neighborhoods with a higher socio-
economic status, which increases the opportunity for housing wealth 
accumulation in these locales. Moreover, in most European countries, 
the larger cities experienced larger house price surges than the 
smaller ones, which has an impact on the distribution of housing 
wealth – especially in countries where the higher classes find their 
way into the larger metropolitan regions (Bellini et al., 2013). Second, 
the possibilities for social mobility through house price gains became 
larger since the 1980s. The widespread phenomenon of gentrification 
(people-led, investor-led or state-led) has created opportunities 
for real estate owners to profit from the house price boom in the 
neighborhoods with the most rapid price surge (Lees et al., 2013). It is 
however up to debate whether the ‘original population’ is able to reap 
the benefits from this spatial development. Third, the financialization 
of housing, comprising generous mortgage lending has resulted in 
more volatile house price cycles and an overall upswing in house 
prices (OECD, 2014). This increases the importance of the moment of 
home-buying on the accumulation of housing wealth. Sparse evidence 
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suggests that the timing of the inclusion in mortgage finance differs 
between social groups. Whereas higher-income groups have access 
to mortgage finance throughout the house price cycle, the lower 
class is more likely to obtain a mortgage when the housing market 
is overheated and risks are high (Shlay, 2006). However, the surge in 
house prices that many European countries experienced since the 
beginning of the 1990s, has a large impact on the possibilities for 
housing wealth accumulation for different birth cohorts. Those who 
enter the market for owned homes at a later moment in time, have 
smaller opportunities to accumulate large capital gains. Furthermore, 
the experience of disruptive life events that often result in postponing 
moves into owner-occupation might have stronger negative effects in 
times of rapid house price inflation.
Research questions 
The above-described demographic, socio-economic and socio-spatial 
trends all have an impact on the accumulation of housing wealth by 
different social groups. Interestingly, the accumulation of housing 
wealth is increasingly seen as a ‘game changer’ in the political 
economy: a mechanism that sets in motion further changes in the 
orientation of the welfare state (Ansell, 2014; van Gent, 2010). This 
dissertation aims to explain housing wealth inequality between 
social classes and birth cohorts on the basis of (interactions between) 
individual life courses and the institutional context, following an 
internationally-comparative perspective.
The complexity of this doctoral thesis lays in the fact that several 
mechanisms that shape the distribution of housing wealth might 
counteract each other. Moreover, the importance of these mechanisms 
is affected by the above-outlined socio-economic and socio-spatial 
trends. Initially, housing wealth inequality might originate from 
differences in the purchasing power on the housing market between 
social classes: the working class generally buys cheaper properties 
than the managerial elite. However, the variation within social classes 
can be expected to be large due to period effects and location effects. 
For example, a working class household that bought the home at the 
beginning of an upward house price cycle might accumulate more 
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housing wealth than an upper class household that bought at the 
beginning of a downturn. Second, a working class household might 
accumulate more housing wealth than an upper class household if it 
owns a property in a gentrification neighborhood that experiences a 
house price surge. 
In this dissertation, I take important life course events and cohort 
effects into account, alongside social class as a determinant of housing 
wealth inequality. More importantly, the focus of this doctoral thesis 
is on the effect of institutional arrangements on the accumulation in 
housing wealth. As a result of different approaches to housing policy, 
social policy and economic policy, the socio-economic and socio-spatial 
trends that have been discussed, differ between countries. The effect 
of institutional arrangements on the accumulation of housing wealth 
will be elaborated upon on the basis of these cross-country differences.
The most general question this dissertation seeks to answer is:
What does the housing wealth distribution look like in European 
countries with different housing regimes, which mechanisms shape this 
distribution, and how can cross-country differences be explained from 
(an interaction between) life course factors and (historical) institutional 
factors?
In this dissertation, inequality is explained by (an interaction of) 
micro and macro factors. Disruptive life course events and someone’s 
social class position are micro-level explanations, whereas housing 
policies or welfare state policies are macro-level indicators. While 
someone’s social class position is a micro-level indicator, the social 
class structure should be regarded as a macro-level indicator since it 
is the outcome of the democratic class struggle in a country and since 
it affects the price-setting on the housing market. A similar argument 
can be made for residential mobility, which can be considered a micro-
level variable, whereas the level of segregation in an urban region (the 
result of thousands of residential moves) is a macro-level indictor 
since it is the outcome of local and national urban strategies. As a 
macro characteristic, it determines the profitability of investments in 
housing at different locations. 
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Four sub-questions approach the main question from four different 
angles. The first sub-question takes into account social class 
differences and cohort differences in terms of homeownership levels 
(one dimension of housing wealth) and housing wealth (the outcome 
of the housing wealth accumulation process). 
1.  How is housing wealth distributed among social classes and birth 
cohorts, and can differences between countries be explained by 
housing policies?
The second sub-question takes accumulated housing wealth (the 
sum of all dimensions) as outcome variable. Contrary to sub-
question 1, housing wealth inequality is explained on the basis of 
marital trajectories. Partnership dissolution can be regarded as the 
most common life course event with large economic consequences, 
especially for women. By distinguishing two divorce cohorts, this sub-
question sheds light on the effect of changing policies over time.
2.  To what extent do negative life course events, like divorce, impact 
upon the accumulation of housing wealth in different institutional 
settings? And how has this effect evolved over time?
The third sub-question approaches housing wealth from a dynamic 
point of view, and takes into account its accumulation process. The 
realization of capital gains is the output variable of this longitudinal 
study. It explains inequality in terms of capital gains on the basis of 
social class background and events in the housing pathway, such 
as moves between different housing tenures and moves between 
neighborhoods with a different social status (development).
3.  What is the social background and housing career of those who 
gain and those who gain and lose on the housing market in a 
period of increasing socio-economic polarization?
Finally, the fourth sub-question broadens the scope from housing 
wealth to net worth. This is the sum of financial wealth holdings 
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and housing wealth holdings. On the basis of sub-question 1 to 3, it 
is not possible to conclude how housing wealth inequality among 
homeowners with a different social class background impacts on 
inequality regarding net worth since housing wealth holdings might 
be counterbalanced with financial wealth holdings. Sub-question 4 
investigates in which institutional contexts the gap between tenants 
and homeowners regarding net worth is larger. It researches to what 
extent differences regarding the housing system and the welfare state 
can explain these ‘tenure wealth gaps’.
4.  To what extent do housing wealth and financial wealth function 
as communicating vessels in countries with different institutional 
characteristics?
Research strategy
Throughout this dissertation, a quantitative approach is used to 
study the mechanisms shaping the distribution of housing wealth in 
different institutional contexts. Ideally, all European countries would 
be taken into account. However, the number of countries that is studied 
in the separate chapters is limited due to the incomplete coverage of 
internationally-comparative data sources on housing and wealth. 
Three studies are based on survey data collected by various European 
institutions (the Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe [SHARE] 
and the Household Finance and Consumption Survey [HFCS] of the 
European Central Bank [ECB]), whereas one study is based on Swedish 
tax register data on persons and properties. In different chapters the 
accumulation of housing wealth over the life course is approached 
by making cohort comparisons, studying disruptive life events and 
investigating housing pathways of individuals over time. Together, 
the four empirical chapters shed light on the more accurate definition 
of housing wealth proposed in the introduction by approaching 
housing wealth from different angles (moves into homeownership, 
accumulated housing wealth in old-age, capital gains). In three out of 
four empirical chapters, an international comparison is conducted to 
study the effect of institutional arrangements on the accumulation 
of housing wealth. Whereas housing wealth accumulation regimes 
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are formulated in the first empirical chapter to provide an intuitive 
feel of differences between groups of countries with similar policy 
preferences, regression analyses with country-fixed effects are used 
to single out the effect of several institutional characteristics in two 
other studies (see ‘Outline’ for an overview of the empirical chapters 
in this dissertation).  
In this dissertation, three data sources are used. The first two 
empirical chapters are based on the SHARE. This is an internationally-
harmonized panel survey, conducted in maximum 21 countries, 
containing individual information on socio-economic status, housing 
situation, health, life histories and family networks. Figure 1.2 shows 
which countries are included in which chapter. Between 2004 and 
2013, five waves have been carried out (not all countries are included 
in all waves). The sample of the SHARE exists of individuals aged 50 
or older (in total more than 123.000). This dissertation mainly makes 
use of information from the third retrospective wave (2009), and 
the fourth wave (2011), enriched with data from the previous waves. 
In Chapter 2, 16 European countries that represent various welfare 
regimes and housing regimes are included: Austria, Germany, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Estonia. In Chapter 3, less countries are taken into account since 
retrospective information on life histories is not available for all of 
the countries that have participated in the SHARE. Chapter 3 includes 
10 countries only: Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland and Belgium. The SHARE is 
one of the few data sources containing international-comparative 
information on housing wealth holdings. Furthermore, it is unique 
since it covers the life courses of elderly persons retrospectively and 
is representative of a wide range of welfare regimes and housing 
regimes. Chapter 4 is based on longitudinal Swedish register data 
(GeoSweden), collected at the individual level and the property level. 
It is possible to trace back the lives of nine million Swedes from 1995 
until the present. It contains information on the occupational status, 
educational attainment and income of all residents in every year. On 
the property level, it contains information on physical characteristics 
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and an estimation of the property value. The sample used in Chapter 
4 consists of 70.000 inhabitants of Sweden’s three metropolitan areas 
and its ten next-largest cities, born between 1970 and 1975. A large 
advantage of the use of register data is that the information is based 
on evaluations of the tax agency instead of self-evaluation, and the 
absence of missing information. Chapter 5 uses the HFCS data from 
the ECB. The survey is conducted in 16 Eurozone countries in 2010/11, 
of which only 15 are included in the study: Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovakia and Finland. Item-non-response is dealt 
with by the inclusion of multiple imputations. These data give unique 
insight in all financial aspects of life in the Eurozone countries, from 
housing wealth to financial wealth, income and various forms of 
consumption. Furthermore, it contains a younger population than 
the SHARE. In the fourth empirical chapter, the sample is restricted to 
non-retired people between the age of 30 and 67. 
Figure 1.2. Map of countries included in the empirical chapters.




This introduction is followed by four empirical chapters that are the 
backbone of this PhD dissertation. The four chapters presenting the 
empirical results can be read as independent contributions to the 
scholarly debate. Therefore, the theory sections of these chapters 
show a certain degree of overlap. They differ, however, in terms of 
their framing since they approach housing wealth inequality from a 
different angle. In this way, they make a different link to the general 
conceptualization of housing wealth, its dimensions and drivers. 
The empirical backbone of this dissertation is the result of thorough 
cooperation with co-authors (Dr. Philipp Lersch and Dr. Lina 
Hedman) and my PhD supervisor, Dr. Caroline Dewilde. Furthermore, 
it has benefitted tremendously from discussions with Stéfanie André, 
Christa Hubers, Bo Bengtsson, Matz Dahlberg, Jorn Koelemaij and 
Dominic Teodorescu.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of tenure inequality and housing 
wealth inequality between different occupational classes in two birth 
cohorts (born 1930-1949 and 1950-1962). This chapter sets the scene 
for the entire dissertation by linking tenure inequality to housing 
wealth inequality. Within the field of housing studies, much research 
has been conducted to evaluate the impact of housing policies and 
spatial policies on homeownership rates. This chapter demonstrates 
that the expansion of homeownership has differential outcomes in 
terms of housing wealth. More specifically, it shows under which 
circumstances lower or higher homeownership rates coexist with 
smaller or larger levels of housing wealth inequality. Moreover, this 
chapter presents a new typology of housing regimes in Europe, based 
on the impact of the institutional arrangements on the distribution 
of housing wealth. The regimes presented here, are rooted in the 
historical political-economy configurations in these countries. For 
example, two clusters of post-communist countries are not merged 
with other countries, to investigate the impact of historic policies on 
the eldest of the two cohorts studied (born 1930-1949).
In the third chapter, the financial consequences of one of the most 
common and critical life course events is studied: the effect of divorce 
on the accumulation of housing wealth. This chapter places the first 
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chapter in perspective by providing an addition to the previously 
presented perspective on inequality between occupational classes and 
birth cohorts. Whereas the regime approach used in Chapter 2 gives 
an indication of a tangle of policies (conceptualized as a consistent 
regime), the analytical strategy used in Chapter 3 is able to tease out 
the effect of individual welfare state arrangements and housing 
policies on the effect of partnership dissolution, and re-partnering 
afterwards. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with accumulated 
housing wealth among a population that is aged 50 and older, while 
focusing on a different driver of housing wealth inequality. 
In Chapter 4 the accumulation process of housing wealth plays a 
central role. This Chapter focuses therefore on a younger population 
than the previous two, namely those who are born between 1970 and 
1975. It tracks the residential mobility of people living in Sweden’s 
largest 13 cities, while taking into account individual characteristics as 
well as characteristics of the properties in which they have lived. The 
dependent variable in Chapter 4 is therefore, contrary to the previous 
chapters, capital gains on the housing market. Whereas in Chapter 2 
and 3 no explicit distinction is made between the different dimensions 
of housing wealth (purchase price, capital gains, size of the mortgage, 
mortgage amortization), in Chapter 4 capital gains are presented as 
a major individual-level explanation of housing wealth inequality 
between those with a lower and higher social status, and between 
those with an intact marriage and those who experienced a divorce. 
In Chapter 4, instead of a cross-country comparison, the housing 
market dynamics that determine capital gains and losses are taken 
into account as an important contextual factor. In the case of Sweden, 
the upswing in segregation levels and the speeding of gentrification 
processes is (partly) policy-induced, and can therefore be connected to 
the cross-country comparisons carried out in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Chapter 5 places the three other empirical chapters in perspective 
by providing information on financial wealth holdings alongside 
housing wealth holdings. In order to draw conclusions on the impact 
of housing wealth inequality on the magnitude of overall wealth 
inequality, or on the socioeconomic stratification in the society, it is 
necessary to take into account financial wealth, since both forms of 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   43 18-09-17   10:20
Chapter 1
44
wealth might counterbalance each other. In Chapter 5, information 
on the size of a ‘tenure wealth gap’ is presented. The tenure wealth gap 
is the difference in net worth (total wealth holdings) between tenants 
and homeowners with similar social characteristics, in one country. 
Whereas tenants accumulate financial wealth only, homeowners 
accumulate both financial wealth and housing wealth. When 
homeownership receives a preferential treatment through taxation 
and government policies, the tenure wealth gap can be expected to be 
larger. Chapter 5 outlines how the orientations of the housing system 
and the welfare state are associated with differences in the size of the 
tenure wealth gap. 
The conclusion makes up the balance sheet of the empirical 
results of the previous four chapters. It provides an overview of 
housing wealth inequality in European countries between social 
classes and birth cohorts and summarizes the role of life course factors 
(disruptive life events, residential mobility) and institutional factors 
(housing policies, welfare state arrangements) in the emergence 
of housing wealth inequality. Moreover, this chapter deals with the 
political implications of the nature of housing wealth inequality in 
Europe. Which trends can be expected? And what are feasible ways 
for governments to deal with increasing levels of housing wealth? 
Finally, I will prelude on further research that needs be done in this 
direction. 
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CHAPTER 2
The Distribution of Housing Wealth 
across occupational classes and age 
cohorts in 16 European Countries: 
Accounting for Institutional Differences




Housing wealth is the largest source of household wealth, but we know 
little about the distribution of housing wealth and how institutions 
have shaped this distribution. Subsidies for homeownership, 
privatization of social housing and mortgage finance liberalization 
are likely to have influenced the distribution of housing wealth in 
recent decades. To examine their impact, we describe housing wealth 
inequalities across occupational classes for two birth cohorts aged 
fifty and older. The analysis is conducted across 16 European countries 
with divergent welfare states and housing systems using the fourth 
wave of the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE; 
2011/2012). Our results indicate that the expansion of homeownership 
in a market-based housing system is associated with a more unequal 
distribution of housing wealth across occupational classes, as an 
increasing number of ‘marginal’ owners is drawn into precarious 
homeownership. Such a pattern is not found in housing wealth 
accumulation regimes with a less market-based provision of housing. 
When the state or the family drive homeownership expansion, a de-
coupling of labor market income and housing consumption results in 
a more equal distribution of housing wealth.
A slightly different version of this chapter was published as: Wind, B., 
Lersch, P., and Dewilde, C. (2016). The distribution of housing wealth in 
16 European countries: accounting for institutional differences. Journal 
of Housing and the Built Environment, (Online First), 1-23.
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Introduction
Between the end of World War II (WWII) and the early 1980s, European 
countries could be classified in three homeownership promotion 
regimes: 1) societies with low homeownership rates and high state 
support for rental housing; 2) countries with relatively large (social) 
rental sectors and large more de-commodified homeownership 
sectors due to generous state subsidies; and 3) homeownership societies 
with almost universal homeownership due to self-provisioning by 
the family (Barlow and Duncan, 1994). Before the 1980s, subsidies for 
homeownership or tolerance towards semi-legal self-provisioning 
drove up homeownership rates, whereas since the 1980s the sale 
of social housing (privatization) and the loosening of borrowing 
constraints (housing finance liberalization), have resulted in an 
upswing of homeownership rates in most countries (e.g. Angelini et 
al., 2013). However, countries that followed different policy paths have 
experienced different house price trajectories. Due to the differential 
use of the above-mentioned strategies across European housing 
systems, institutional differences across the continent has increased. 
The outcomes of changes in the political economy of housing on the 
wider socio-economic stratification, are under-researched (Dewilde, 
2011). Therefore, we address the following research question: How 
is housing wealth distributed across occupational classes across 
European countries with a different political economy of housing, 
and how did this distribution change between two birth cohorts of 
homeowners that were differently affected by privatisation and 
liberalisation? In this way, we are able to grasp how housing wealth 
inequality impacts upon other forms of inequality in society. 
In this chapter, we evaluate housing wealth inequality for 
homeowners across occupational classes within and between two 
birth cohorts in 16 European countries, clustered in seven housing 
wealth accumulation regimes. Housing wealth is defined as the 
value of one’s owned home, minus mortgage debts. Housing wealth 
accumulation regimes are based on the 1960-1980 state-promotion 
of homeownership (rental societies, homeownership expansion 
societies, and homeownership societies), and the 1980-2010 changes 
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in the political economy of housing (privatization and liberalization). 
Within- cohort inequality is conceptualized as differences in housing 
wealth across four occupational classes (low/ middle / high / self-
employed). A comparison between two cohorts (1930-1949 / 1950-1962) 
allows for an exploration of the consequences of the above-mentioned 
policy changes for the distribution of housing wealth. The older 
cohort has generally bought their first home when the 1960-1980 
housing wealth accumulation regimes were dominant, whereas the 
younger cohort has almost certainly bought the first home in a period 
where privatization and housing finance liberalization started to 
take off. Housing wealth of occupational groups across both cohorts 
was furthermore differentially affected by house price developments. 
The arguments we develop in this chapter are supported by means 
of descriptive analyses on homeownership rates, housing wealth 
holdings, and residential debts.
This research advances previous studies in four ways. First, it 
advances studies that investigated unequal access to homeownership 
and housing outcomes (Dewilde and De Decker, 2016; Dewilde and 
Lancee, 2013), by looking at housing wealth inequalities instead of 
tenure inequalities. In the past, it might have been sufficient to look at 
housing tenure (owning or renting) as an indicator of socioeconomic 
status. However, after the proliferation and diversification of 
homeownership, housing wealth is a more adequate measure. 
After all, the expansion of homeownership to the lower and middle 
classes reduces tenure inequality, but does not necessarily reduce 
housing wealth inequality between social classes. Differentiation 
among homeowners in terms of housing wealth might be the result 
of differently sized (1) initial investments in housing, (2) mortgage 
debts, and (3) capital gains and losses. Second, it generates a new 
international-comparative perspective on the relation between 
social class and housing (Kurz, 2004). Individuals in the same social 
class generally share a comparable housing situation due to their 
comparable position in the labor market and consequently similar 
purchasing power on the housing market. However, since the 1970s 
it has been argued that the housing market might be a structural 
driver of social class inequalities, since house price increases favor 
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‘housing market insiders’ (Saunders, 1984). However, the expansion 
of (low-quality) homeownership to low-income groups resulted in 
a differentiation in terms of housing wealth gains and losses, and 
consequently the line between insiders and outsiders has become 
blurred (McKee et al., 2010). Third, it advances studies on wealth 
inequalities (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2011; Semyonov and Lewin-
Epstein, 2013), by taking housing wealth into account as a separate 
dimension of wealth inequality. When housing wealth is analyzed 
alongside other forms of wealth, it often remains unclear how it 
differs from other types of wealth in terms of its role and (institutional) 
drivers. Finally, this chapter advances country studies on housing 
wealth inequality (e.g. Appleyard and Rowlingson, 2010; Thomas and 
Dorling, 2004) by providing a comparative analysis of 16 European 
countries. Without such an international-comparative perspective, it 
is hardly possible to study the impact of different sets of institutional 
characteristics on the distribution of housing wealth.
Housing wealth accumulation regimes
For this study, we identify seven housing wealth accumulation 
regimes, based on the political economy of housing in the period 
1960-1980 and 1980-2010. Table 1 gives an indication of the expansion of 
homeownership during both time periods, and of current practices 
regarding housing finance, since the latter affect the profitability of 
housing investments made in the past. Housing wealth accumulation 
regimes determine which social groups have access to homeownership, 
at which age, for which price, and to which extent they experience 
capital gains and losses. Whereas the first three dimensions refer 
to the period of purchase, capital gains and losses are affected by 
changes in the housing regime up until the present. We proceed 
with a discussion of housing wealth accumulation regimes, with the 
promotion of homeownership until 1980 as point of departure. 
Rental societies
Until the 1980s, rental housing was the dominant tenure in some 
European countries in Western Europe (Germany, Switzerland, 
and Austria) and communist Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
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Poland and Estonia). Table 2.1 shows that homeownership rates in 
the German-speaking rental societies were very low in 1960 (29% 
and 38%). Homeownership rates in the communist rental societies 
ranged between 26% and 53% in 1980 (no earlier data available). 
Whereas regulated private rental housing was dominant in the 
German-speaking countries, social rental (state/public) housing was 
common in the communist rental societies. The political economy 
of housing favored in both groups of countries rental housing over 
homeownership. First of all, the entry into homeownership was 
difficult due to a restricted housing finance system. Loan-to-value 
and loan-to-income ratios were fairly low, and relatively large down-
payments needed (Donner, 2006; Matznetter, 2002). Second, the large, 
non-stigmatized rental housing segment constituted a good and 
affordable alternative for homeownership (Bourassa and Hoesli, 2010). 
In rental societies, homeownership is especially represented in rural 
areas. German evidence shows that demand subsidies stimulated 
self-construction on the countryside after WWII, which resulted in 
relatively high homeownership rates among working-class families 
in that period (Kurz, 2004).
The German-speaking rental societies constitute the regulated 
rental regime and saw little change in their political economy of 
housing since the 1980s. Compared to other countries, their housing 
finance system remained conservative. Loan-to-value ratios and 
loan-to-income ratios remained low and large down-payments were 
needed (Table 2.1). The availability of Bausparen-schemes, i.e. long-
term saving schemes coupled to attractive loans, underscores the 
conservative orientation of the housing finance system (Matznetter, 
2002). Homeownership rates grew to around 50% in 2010, but 
homeownership is far more socially selective than in other countries. 
Furthermore, in the last three decades, house prices have been more 
stable than elsewhere in Europe (OECD, 2014). When we consider 
homeowners only, we therefore expect housing wealth inequality 
between occupational classes to be smaller than in other housing 
wealth accumulation regimes. Hence, the small group of lower- 
and middle-class households that is able to enter homeownership 
is likely to rely on other resources than the household income (e.g. 
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family transfers, savings), since labor market earnings are often not 
sufficient to obtain homeownership. Furthermore, we expect lower 
average housing wealth holdings among the lower class in the 1950-
1962 cohort than in the 1930-1949 cohort, since homeownership became 
more selective due to a decline of self-construction (Kurz, 2004).
The Central European rental societies constitute the privatized 
rental regime. They experienced a massive shift in the political 
economy of housing since the fall of communism. Homeownership 
became almost universal in the 1990s, when a majority of the tenants 
acquired homeownership via ‘give-away’ privatization schemes 
(Stephens et al., 2015). In 2010, these former rental societies have among 
the highest homeownership rates of Europe, ranging from 79% in 
the Czech Republic to 86% in Estonia (Table 2.1). The privatization 
of former social housing turns the socio-spatial inequalities that 
already existed under communism into material inequalities (see 
Stephens et al. 2015 for a discussion of state legacy welfare). Andrusz 
et al. (2008) argue that the allocation of housing under communism 
was in the first place based on loyalty to the ruling party, instead of 
on labor market income. Such an allocation mechanism weakens 
the link between occupational class and housing consumption. 
Since housing functioned as shock-absorber for the economic 
turmoil after the collapse of the Soviet-Union (Stephens et al. 2015) 
and most households were able to buy their former rental home, 
we expect housing wealth inequalities among the oldest cohort not 
to be based on their occupational class position. We expect housing 
wealth inequalities between occupational classes to be larger among 
the 1950-1962 cohort, since a larger share of respondents entered the 
housing market after the fall of communism. Under the new market 
circumstances a stronger link between labor market income and 
housing consumption can be expected. 
Homeownership expansion societies
A group of North-Western European countries with low 
homeownership rates at the end of WWII (Denmark, Sweden, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and France) has encouraged people to own 
their home as part of their post-war reconstruction. At the same time, 
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most of these countries have invested in the construction of social 
rental housing as part of an inclusive welfare state. In the Nordic 
countries, homeownership was promoted in a non-financialized way 
(object subsidies and preferential tax treatments) in order to grant 
different social classes access to homeownership (Donner, 2000). In 
the Netherlands and France, the growth of homeownership has been 
restricted to the middle and higher classes. For the lower-income 
groups, these countries channeled funds into the construction of 
affordable social housing (Priemus and Boelhouwer, 1999). In both 
Belgium and France, lower-income homeownership is stimulated 
through targeted schemes in the form of demand subsidies or 
tax deductions (Donner, 2000). The subsidy-driven expansion of 
homeownership in this group of countries has resulted in an upswing 
of homeownership rates between 1960 and 1980 (Table 2.1).
Belgium and France constitute the regulated expansion regime, in 
which the political economy of housing only slightly changed since 
the 1980s. Annuity mortgages remained a common way to finance 
homeownership, but are not widely available, which makes them 
selective towards higher-income groups. Moreover, family-help, 
savings and inheritances are an important driver of homeownership 
in the countries in this regime (Mulder and Billari, 2010). However, 
due to the fairly regulated housing finance system (moderate down-
payments and amortization requirements), the lower class often 
needs state support to enter homeownership. A further increase of 
homeownership rates between 1980 and 2010 (Table 2.1) is likely to be 
the result of slightly eased mortgage requirements and a continuation 
of targeted homeownership schemes, like the French pret-à-taux-
zero (Donner, 2000). We expect housing wealth inequality between 
occupational classes to be larger in this regime than in most others 
since labor market income is decisive for housing consumption in 
this market-based system of housing provisioning. Due to small policy 
changes over time, we expect comparable outcomes for the younger 
and the older birth cohort.
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands are part of the liberal 
expansion regime. All three countries abandoned their system of object 
subsidies in the 1980’s and embraced liberal housing finance. In this 
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system, banks were allowed to pass on risks to third parties in the form 
of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS). This translated 
into easier access to capital. Loan maturities of 40 years, and loan-to-
value ratios of over 100%, became common at the beginning of the 21st 
century. In the Netherlands, interest-only mortgages even became 
the most popular form of financing housing (Scanlon et al., 2008). As a 
consequence, countries in this regime have the highest mortgage debt-
to-GDP ratios in Europe (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that the liberalization of housing finance led to 
more volatile and inflated house prices at central urban locations 
(OECD, 2014). However, only when occupational classes live spatially 
segregated, this might affect housing wealth inequalities across 
occupational classes (Hamnett, 1999). We expect that the liberalization 
of housing finance leads to an expansion of homeownership among 
the lower and middle class because it lowers monthly fixed costs 
by reducing the necessity to amortize the loan. Advanced mortgage 
products (e.g. interest-only mortgages) however hamper housing 
wealth accumulation, whereas upward price mobility benefits 
housing wealth holdings of those who bought previously. A larger 
take-up of loans by the lower and middle class thus increases housing 
wealth inequality between occupational classes. Since the 1950-1962 
cohort has a larger likelihood of having bought the first home after 
the start of the liberalization of housing finance in the 1980s, we 
expect housing wealth inequality between occupational classes to be 
larger among the younger cohort (1950-1962), compared to the older 
cohort (1930-1949). 
Homeownership societies
Many Southern- and Central-European countries have a long 
tradition of homeownership, whether they have a capitalist (Italy, 
Spain and Portugal) or a communist history (Hungary and Slovenia). 
In Southern Europe, state involvement in the sphere of housing has 
always been limited (Allen, 2006). In the communist countries in 
Southern Europe, social housing has been less prominent than in the 
Northern-European communist states, but more pronounced than in 
the Mediterranean countries with a market economy (Tsenkova, 2008). 
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In the Mediterranean countries with a market economy, most social 
housing had already been privatized in the decades following WWII 
(Donner, 2000). Due to the lack of spatial planning, a very conservative 
housing finance system and the tolerance of illegal self-construction, 
the family became the most important actor in the provisioning of 
housing (Allen, 2006). 
The family-oriented model of housing provision remained intact 
in Italy and Portugal. In the family ownership regime, homeownership 
rates grew from around 50% in 1980 to 75% in 2010 (Table 2.1). 
Meanwhile, the housing finance system remained under-developed 
(low loan-to-value rates and variable loan maturities). Recent 
evidence shows that the entry into homeownership became more 
problematic for the younger generation because illegal construction 
became more difficult (Allen, 2006) and residential loans did not fill 
this gap (Mulder and Billari, 2010). Since only the poor are housed in 
rental housing and homeownership is the housing tenure for ‘the 
masses’, we expect small tenure inequalities between occupational 
classes. We envisage two possible, but opposed, consequences of these 
small tenure inequalities for the distribution of housing wealth. First, 
we expect larger housing wealth inequalities among homeowners 
when homeownership is universal. When rental housing is largely 
unavailable, lower-class households select themselves into the lower 
end of the market for owned homes. On the other hand, we expect 
that the family as allocation mechanism for housing reduces housing 
wealth inequalities, since labor market income becomes a less 
important determinant of housing consumption.
After the political turmoil due to the fall of communism, housing 
systems in Hungary and Slovenia became more alike to those in the 
neighboring Mediterranean countries with a market economy. This 
privatized ownership regime can be characterized by a withdrawal of 
(the already limited) government interventions in the housing market 
since 1990. A large share of social rental housing has been privatized 
(Pichler-Milanović, 1999). Some surpassed the under-developed 
housing finance system by taking out loans in foreign currencies, 
but in most cases the family kept its central role in the provisioning 
of housing. Due to the absence of spatial planning policies during 
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Country Homeownership rate in 










Germany 29% 30% 53% 70 - 80%* 20-30
  Switzerland 34% 30% 44% 65% 15-20
  Austria 38% 52% 57% 70 -85%* 25
Privatized 
rental
Estonia x 26% 86% 70-75% Up to 30
  Poland x 36% 81% 80 - 100% 5-32,5
  Czech Republic x 53% 79% 70 - 85%* 20
Regulated 
expansion
Belgium 50% 59% 72% 80 - 90% 20
  France 42% 47% 62% 66 - 100% 15-20
Liberal 
expansion
Denmark 40% 56% 67% 80% 30
  Sweden 47% 58% 56% 85 - 95% 30-45
  Netherlands 30% 42% 67% 95 - 100%** 30
Family 
ownership
Italy 46% 59% 72% 55 - 80%** 5-20
  Portugal 45% 52% 75% 80 - 90% 30-40
Privatized 
ownership
Slovenia x 69% 78% 50%* 10
  Hungary x 71% 90% 70% 5-35
Liberal 
ownership
Spain 53% 73% 83% 80 - 100%** 15-20
  *  =  Bausparen important 
element of finance
          ** =  RMBS important element 
of housing finance
Source: Atterhög and Song, 2009; De Decker, 1990; Dol and Haffner, 2010; Donner, 2000; Miles and 
Pillonca, 2008; Oswald, 1999; Warnock and Warnock, 2008.
the transformation period, new construction often took the form of 
self-help (Stephens et al., 2015). We expect tenure inequalities in the 
privatized ownership regime to be even smaller than in the family 
ownership regime, since rental housing has never been a stigmatized 
housing tenure for the poor under communism (Andrusz et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, we expect housing wealth inequality to be smaller 
among the 1930-1949 cohort than among the 1950-1962 cohort, since the 
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former obtained their housing in a time in which there was a weaker 
link between labor market income and housing consumption. 
Spain is the only country classified in the liberal ownership 
regime. In the 1990s, Spain took a radical different turn than the other 
Mediterranean countries by liberalizing its housing finance system. 
Mortgage securitization allowed banks to offer loans with a loan-to-
value ratio of up to 100% (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). This increased 
the borrowing capacity of households and fueled a construction boom 
(Cano Fuentes et al., 2013). The role of the family in the provision and 
allocation of housing has largely been taken over by the market. This 
change in the political economy of housing resulted in an upswing 
of homeownership rates from 73% in 1980 to 83% in 2010 (see Table 
2.1). Families that could not afford homeownership in the familialistic 
system, have been able to enter homeownership due to the eased 
capital restrictions. We therefore expect tenure inequality to be lower 
in the younger (1950-1962) than in the older cohort (1930-1949), that is 
likely to have bought the first home before 1980. We expect that housing 
wealth inequality between occupational classes is larger among the 
younger cohort than among the older cohort because liberal housing 
finance allows especially lower- and middle-class households to enter 
homeownership without accumulating housing wealth (due to large 
mortgages with long maturities).
Data and method
Data
Our analysis is based on the fourth wave of the Survey of Health and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This is an international longitudinal, 
ex-ante harmonized survey, carried out in 16 countries (Austria, 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Estonia) in 2011/12. Contact, cooperation and retention 
rates are high (around 90, 60 and 50%), but differ considerably between 
countries (Malter and Börsch-Supan, 2013). Information from the 
second (2006) and the third wave (2008) is used to enrich the data from 
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the fourth wave. In this way, we are able to link information from 
spouses and other family members who passed away or dropped out 
before the fourth wave to those who participated in wave four. The 
use of the SHARE-data has three major advantages. First, it is one of 
the few international comparative datasets containing information 
on (housing) wealth. Second, SHARE has a large sample size in all 16 
countries that are included. In total, 59,599 respondents participated 
in wave four, with a minimum of 1,623 in Germany, and a maximum 
of 6,828 in Estonia. Germany, Poland and Sweden have relatively few 
participants in this wave, because no refreshment sample has been 
added. The third advantage of the SHARE is that countries belonging 
to various welfare regimes and housing systems are represented.
Sample
One record is kept for each household, containing information on 
both partners or the relevant partner for that respective variable, as 
our most important variable is measured at the household level. Two 
sample restrictions are imposed. First, for clarity of presentation, we 
focus on two birth cohorts, 1930–1949 and 1950-1962 (further described 
below). Second, widowed female-headed households in which the 
husband died before wave three are excluded. It is likely that the 
occupational status of these households will be underestimated as the 
husbands’ occupational status is often higher than the wife’s. These 
sample restrictions reduce the sample by 20%.
Variables
Housing wealth, the variable of main interest, is measured at the 
household level. Housing wealth is the market value of the first 
dwelling and potentially a second property (gross housing wealth) 
minus the residential debt. The current market value is derived from 
self-evaluation by the respondent. Previous studies using the same, 
admittedly subjective measure have proven its reliability (Ansell, 2014; 
Mulder et al., 2015). Top-coding at the 99.8-percentile is used to remove 
outliers. Home-owning households with no information on their 
housing wealth receive a missing value. To facilitate comparisons 
between countries with different currencies and levels of economic 
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affluence, housing wealth is calculated as a percentage of the average 
housing wealth holdings of all homeowners in a country. Residential 
debt is included as a separate variable, as one of the drivers of housing 
wealth. It is calculated as percentage of the value of the house, to 
evaluate the role of housing finance in different housing wealth 
accumulation regimes.   
Occupational class is measured with a four-category classification 
of occupational class based on the ISCO-code, additionally 
distinguishing the self-employed. Elementary occupations, plant and 
machine operators, and skilled agricultural or fishery workers are 
classified as ‘low’. Crafts and related trade workers, service workers 
and shopkeepers and clerks are classified as ‘middle’. Technicians, 
associate professionals, professionals and legislators, senior officials 
and managers are classified as ‘high’. The self-employed are treated 
as a separate category, as they are often less protected by welfare 
arrangements, and the owned home forms part of their means of 
production (Kurz, 2004). For retired, sick or unemployed respondents, 
information about the last job held, is used. For those who are still 
working, we use information about the current job. The highest 
occupational class status in the household is allocated to all members, 
since they are assumed to pool resources.
Two birth cohorts are distinguished to investigate how the 
distribution of housing wealth across occupational classes developed 
over time.1 The older cohort includes those who were born from 1930 
to 1949, the younger cohort those who are born from 1950 to 1962. We 
exclude respondents who are born after 1962, since they do not belong 
to the sample of the fourth wave of SHARE (aged 50 and older in 2012). 
We exclude respondents who are born before 1930 because their 
number is too small. The distinction between an ‘older’ and a ‘younger’ 
cohort is based on the average age of entering homeownership in 
1 A cohort-comparison to assess developments over time is based on the assumption 
that occupational classes have a similar size and meaning in the two cohorts. The 
proportional size of social classes barely differs between the two cohorts. We assume 
that the meaning of these broad occupational classes shows larger cross-country than 
cross-time variation. Furthermore, the stability and comparability of occupational 
structures has been demonstrated in a large body of research on occupational 
stratification since the 1960s (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). 
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the countries in our sample, assuming that people generally enter 
homeownership between the ages of 30 and 35 (although there is 
some cross-country variation: see Angelini et al. 2013). This assumption 
would imply that nearly all members of the 1950-1962 cohort have 
bought their first home after the changes in housing regimes that 
were introduced in the 1980s, whereas a majority of those in the 
1930-1949 cohort has entered the market of owned homes during the 
period of government-sponsored expansion of homeownership - 
before the onset of trends towards privatization and housing finance 
liberalization in the 1980s. Respondents are assigned to the cohort of 
the oldest household member (mostly the male partner).
Method
We present a descriptive overview of average homeownership rates, 
housing wealth holdings and mortgage debts relative to the national 
mean for each of the four occupational classes (low / middle / high / 
self-employed) in an older (1930–1949) and a younger (1950–1962) 
birth cohort, pooled in seven housing wealth accumulation regimes. 
Homeownership rates indicate how many people are eventually able 
to accumulate housing wealth. Average housing wealth holdings shed 
light on the financial consequences of residing in homeownership. 
Residential debts in later life, finally, show the share of people that 
has been unable to accumulate housing wealth even though they 
entered homeownership. We focus on housing wealth inequality 
among homeowners only, since the mechanisms explaining tenure 
inequality would distort the image when tenants would be included. 
We compare the homeownership rate, housing wealth holdings 
of homeowners and mortgage debts of homeowners for different 
occupational classes across the seven housing wealth accumulation 
regimes. Furthermore, we compare these indicators across the two 
birth cohorts to evaluate the outcomes of policy changes. We present 
our descriptive statistics along with 90%-confidence intervals. 
This allows us to draw conclusions with regard to the statistical 
significance of the above-mentioned intra-cohort differences between 
occupational classes and inter-cohort comparisons indicating change 
over time. The choice for a 90%-confidence level is justified by the 
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argument that change over time is often slow, which makes it harder 
to detect significance.
Results
Tenure and housing wealth inequality – considered along the lines of 
occupational classes – take on a different form in the seven housing 
wealth accumulation regimes, and these differences seem to be 
associated with the political economy of housing (Table 2.1). First, we 
discuss differences between housing wealth accumulation regimes 
on the basis of housing wealth holdings of homeowners in the 
older birth cohort (1930-1949). Second, we discuss the consequences 
of policy changes over time in each of the regimes by comparing 
the housing wealth holdings, homeownership rates and residential 
debts of two birth cohorts (1930-1949 and 1950-1962). The results are 
graphically presented in Figure 2.1 (see Table 2.3 for precise figures), 
and summarized in Table 2.2. Throughout our discussion of results, 
‘differences’ and ‘changes’ are only discussed when they are statistically 
significant.
Figure 2.1. Tenure, housing wealth and residential debt for different occupational classes 
in housing wealth accumulation regimes.
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Note: results are displayed for the 1930-1949 birth cohort only. Source: Share wave 2,3,4 (own 
computation).
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Housing wealth inequality across accumulation regimes in the oldest 
cohort (1930-1949)
Differences between housing wealth accumulation regimes are 
evaluated on the basis of cross-regime comparisons of homeownership 
rates and housing wealth inequality (among homeowners) between 
social classes in the 1930-1949 cohort (Figure 1). The outcomes for 
the seven regimes are discussed separately, while pointing out the 
mechanisms that shape these distributions.
Regulated rental regime
The countries in the regulated rental regime (Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria) have low homeownership rates due their large, non-
stigmatized and broadly accessible rental sectors (Hoekstra, 2009). 
Our findings suggest that especially among the lowest occupational 
class, homeownership rates are lower than in any other regime. 
Figure 2.1(a) shows that the lowest occupational class in the 1930-1949 
birth cohort has a homeownership rate of 32%, compared with 71% 
for the highest occupational class. The expectation that the smallest 
expansion of homeownership during the period 1945-1980 co-occurs 
with the smallest housing wealth inequalities only partly holds. As 
shown in Figure 2.1(b), the housing wealth holdings of the lowest 
class in the 1930-1949 cohort are 67% of the national mean, compared 
to 108% for the highest occupational class. Only the liberal expansion 
regime (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands) is characterized by a 
clearly smaller difference between the lowest and the highest classes 
in terms of housing wealth in the 1930-1949 birth cohort. A slightly 
smaller difference in housing wealth holdings between the highest 
and lowest occupational classes can be found in the privatized rental 
regime (Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia). All three regimes with 
limited housing wealth inequality among the 1930-1949 cohort had 
large rental sectors until the 1980s. 
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In the countries in the privatized rental regime (Czech Republic, 
Poland and Estonia), homeownership rates among all occupational 
classes are very high due to the privatization of the large stock of 
public housing after the fall of communism. Figure 2.1(a) shows that 
70% of the lower-class households in the 1930-1949 birth cohort are 
homeowners, whereas 84% of the higher-class households in this 
cohort are homeowners. The high homeownership rates are not 
mirrored by large housing wealth inequality between occupational 
classes. For the oldest cohort, housing wealth differences between the 
lower and higher occupational classes are smaller than in most other 
regimes (Figure 2.1[b]). For the 1930-1949 birth cohort, housing wealth 
holdings of the lowest occupational class are 72% of the national mean, 
whereas housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational class 
are 108% of the national mean. Since most households in this cohort 
bought the rental dwelling they were living in under communism, the 
heritage of state redistribution in the sphere of housing materialized 
as housing wealth in the hands of the 1930-1949 cohort, at least when 
looking from a relative, within-country perspective.
Regulated expansion regime
In the regulated expansion regime (France, Belgium), homeownership 
is stimulated in a state-market nexus, with subsidies and loans, 
which is associated with higher homeownership rates among the 
lower and middle classes than in the German-speaking countries 
in the regulated rental regime, or the countries in the liberal 
expansion regime (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands). In the 1930-
1949 birth cohort, 67% of the households in the lowest occupational 
class are homeowners, compared to 88% of the households in the 
highest occupational class. Housing wealth inequalities between 
occupational classes in the 1930-1949 birth cohort are larger than 
in most other regimes (except the liberal homeownership regime 
Spain), which can be expected on the basis of the relatively large and 
market-based expansion of homeownership. Figure 2.1(b) shows that 
housing wealth holdings of a lower-class household in the 1930-1949 
cohort are more than sixty percentage points lower than those of a 
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higher class household (respectively 70% and 132% of the national 
mean). We suggest that the market-based provisioning of housing, 
in which a combination of down-payments and loans are needed to 
acquire homeownership, reinforces the inequality originating from 
the labor market, as the latter determines purchasing power in the 
housing market.
Liberal expansion regime
The countries in the liberal expansion regime (Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands) have a large non-stigmatized rental sector, combined 
with liberal housing finance for homeowners. Before the housing 
finance liberalization, policies in this regime encouraged (especially 
lower- and middle-class) homeownership with state subsidies. A 
comparison with the regulated rental regime in the German-speaking 
countries (which had a similar starting point regarding tenure 
balance after WWII) shows that state support for homeownership 
is indeed associated with higher homeownership rates among the 
lower- and middle classes (Figure 2.1[a]). In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, 
the homeownership rate of the lowest occupational class is 45%, 
relative to 79% of the highest occupational class. However, for the 
oldest birth cohort housing wealth is distributed more equally than 
in any other regime. Figure 2.1(b) shows that housing wealth holdings 
of the highest class are only slightly higher than those of the lowest 
occupational class (respectively 106% and 83% of the national mean). 
Apparently, housing wealth and housing wealth gains of homeowners 
are distributed more equally among social classes in these countries, 
which are also more strongly wedded to social-democratic principles 
of equality and redistribution, exemplified by subsidies for housing 
construction.
Family ownership regime
The Mediterranean countries who belong to the family homeownership 
regime (Italy and Portugal) have a long tradition of homeownership 
due to family provision and a lack of rental housing. This results in 
relatively small tenure inequality between occupational classes. The 
homeownership rate among the lowest class in the 1930-1949 birth 
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cohort is 80%, whereas it is 92% for the highest class in this cohort (see 
Figure 2.1[a]). Housing wealth inequalities are more pronounced than 
tenure inequalities. As shown in Figure 2.1(b), housing wealth holdings 
of the lowest class in the 1930-1949 cohort are 72% of the national 
mean, whereas housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational 
class in this cohort are 113%. However, inequalities are smaller than 
in regimes where access to homeownership is strongly market-based 
(regulated expansion regime, i.e. France and Belgium) or where the 
inclusion of lower-class households in homeownership resulted in a 
low housing wealth holdings for this class (liberal homeownership 
regime - Spain). We envisage that the strong role of the family in the 
provisioning of housing entails the pooling of resources, and often a 
redistribution from richer to poorer family members.
Privatized ownership regime
The post-communist Southern-European states in the privatized 
homeownership regime (Hungary and Slovenia) have slightly higher 
homeownership rates than their Mediterranean counterparts 
(the family ownership regime). The homeownership rate among 
the lowest social class is 88% in the 1930-1949 birth cohort, and 90% 
among the highest social class. When the older cohorts of the 
family ownership regime and the privatized ownership regime are 
compared, it is visible that especially among the lowest social class, 
homeownership rates are higher in the countries with a communist 
legacy. The privatization of public housing enabled members of the 
lower class in particular to become homeowners. Housing wealth 
inequality for the 1930-1949 birth cohort is smaller in the privatized 
homeownership regime than in the regulated expansion regime 
(France and Belgium), but larger than in the family homeownership 
regime (Italy and Portugal). In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, whose 
members obtained their homes generally under communism, 
housing wealth holdings of the lowest occupational class are 77% of 
the national mean, whereas housing wealth holdings of the highest 
occupational class are 125% of the national mean. We suggest that the 
legacy of state-involvement in the rental sector under communism, 
and the subsequent give-away privatization has resulted in a more 
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equal distribution of housing wealth among occupational classes 
than in the regulated expansion regime, where the entry into 
homeownership is more limited and market-driven. The larger 
difference between the lowest and the highest occupational classes in 
terms of housing wealth in the privatized homeownership regimes 
compared to the family homeownership regime may perhaps be 
explained by larger differences in the quality of housing in the 
former. Housing wealth inequality for the 1930-1949 birth cohort is 
larger in the privatized homeownership regime than in the privatized 
rental regime (also with a communist legacy). This may be due to the 
link between income and housing consumption being traditionally 
stronger in the privatized ownership regime, given a long tradition of 
self-construction under communism, instead of the construction of 
large rental estates. 
Liberal ownership regime
In the liberal homeownership regime (Spain), a long tradition of 
self-provisioned homeownership, succeeded by the liberalization of 
housing finance has resulted in almost universal homeownership. 
Therefore, tenure inequality between occupational classes is very 
limited. For the older birth cohort, the homeownership rates 
amounts to 92% for the lowest occupational class, compared to 99% 
among the highest occupational class (Figure 2.1[a]). The low level of 
tenure inequality is however mirrored by very large housing wealth 
inequality. As shown in Figure 2.1(b), housing wealth holdings of the 
lowest class in the 1930-1949 cohort are 65% of the national mean, 
whereas housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational class 
in this cohort amount to 159%. In other words, the lower class in 
the older cohort was able to enter homeownership, but at the price 
of lower housing wealth holdings. Although this large difference in 
housing wealth holdings between social classes for the older cohort 
may reflect housing quality differences rather than the effect of 
housing finance liberalization, we see that differences in this regime 
are larger compared with differences in the family ownership regime. 
We derive from this that housing finance liberalization also affected 
the older birth cohort to quite a large extent. 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   69 18-09-17   10:20
Chapter 2
70
Housing wealth inequality across cohorts
Developments within housing wealth accumulation regimes are now 
evaluated on the basis of a comparison between the housing wealth 
holdings of different occupational classes in the 1930-1949 and 1950-
1962 cohort (Figure 2.2). Changes in housing policies since the 1980s are 
expected to shape the difference between the older and younger cohort 
in terms of housing wealth since it is likely that they bought their first 
home under different circumstances, and are thus differently affected 
by house price developments. The outcomes for the seven regimes are 
discussed separately, while pointing out the dominant mechanism(s) 
shaping changes in the distribution of housing wealth over time.
Figure 2.2. Tenure, housing wealth and residential debt inequality for four occupational 
classes in housing wealth accumulation regimes for two birth cohorts
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Note: results are displayed for four occupational classes in the 1930-1949 birth cohort and the 
1950-1962 birth cohort. Source: Share wave 2,3,4 (own computation).
Regulated rental regime
In the regulated rental regime (Germany, Switzerland, Austria), 
the expansion of homeownership is associated with higher 
homeownership rates among the middle and higher classes in the 
1950-1962 cohort. Homeownership rates increased from 58% to 63% 
for the middle class, and from 71% to 80% for the highest class (see 
Figure 2.2[a]). Due to the relatively low homeownership rates among 
the higher class, the potential for expansion has been large. For 
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mortgage-lenders, this form of expansion entails smaller financial 
risks than expansion to the lower or middle classes. The selective 
expansion among the higher social class has resulted in an increase 
in tenure inequality in this regime. When the younger cohort is 
compared to the older cohort, housing wealth holdings of the middle 
class fall from 99% to 69% of the national mean. The relative decline 
of housing wealth holdings among the lowest occupational class 
is not significant. The lower- and middle-class households in the 
regulated rental regime experience one of the sharpest upswings 
in terms of residential debt. Among the lowest occupational class, 
residential debts increased from 9% to 25% percent of the house value, 
whereas debts increased from 3% to 15% among the middle class. It 
is likely that households in the lower socioeconomic strata in the 
younger cohort are increasingly dependent on mortgage finance to 
enter homeownership (e.g. due to the reduction of self-construction). 
Therefore, we suggest that the increased housing wealth inequality is 
mainly the result of an increased take-up of mortgage debt.
Privatized rental regime
In the privatized rental regime (Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia), 
the homeownership rate for the middle class increased with five 
percentage points to 81%, and with five percentage points to 89% 
for the higher class. The self-employed display the largest increase, 
from 65% to 90%.  In the transition from a socialist to a free-market 
economy, the number and social position of entrepreneurs (often part 
of the old party nomenclatura) increased. Although tenure inequality 
between social classes is smaller than in most other regimes, the 
lower homeownership rates among the lower class may indicate that 
they have been less able to profit from the privatization of public 
housing. When the housing wealth holdings of the younger cohort 
are compared with the older cohort, the middle and higher classes 
improve their position. Figure 2.2(b) shows that housing wealth 
holdings of the middle class rise with 22 percentage points to 108%, 
and housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational class rise 
with 21 percentage points to 129% of the national mean in the 1950-1962 
birth cohort. We suggest that the larger housing wealth inequality 
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between occupational classes is the result of the stronger link between 
labor market income and housing consumption at the moment the 
younger cohort bought their first home (more often after the fall of 
communism). 
Regulated expansion regime
The regulated expansion regime (France, Belgium) shows slightly 
lower homeownership rates in the younger cohort (75%), compared to 
the older cohort (79%). The overall upswing in homeownership rates 
since 1980 (Table 2.1) is likely to have materialized for the younger 
cohorts (the current middle-aged), which are not included in our 
analysis sample. The distribution of housing wealth became more 
equal for the 1950-1962 cohort. As shown in Figure 2.2(b), housing wealth 
holdings of the middle class dropped from 90% to 79%, and housing 
wealth holdings of the highest occupational class dropped from 
132% to 104% of the national mean. We envisage that this may simply 
be explained by an increasing age of entry into homeownership, 
leading to later amortization of mortgages. Although this mechanism 
is relevant for all our housing wealth accumulation regimes, for 
the regulated expansion regimes it is likely the only mechanism 
at work. The stable position of the lower class may be the result of 
targeted homeownership stimulation and protection schemes in 
these countries, e.g. pret-à-taux-zero schemes. The low mortgage debts 
among both cohorts (Figure 2.2[c]) show that mortgages are however 
generally amortized in later life (due to the stricter loan criteria).
Liberal expansion regime
The liberal expansion regime (Denmark, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands) displays rising homeownership rates among the lower, 
middle and higher occupational classes, when the 1950-1962 birth 
cohort is compared to the 1930-1949 cohort. The largest increase can 
be found in the middle class, from 64% in the oldest cohort to 75% 
in the youngest cohort. The increase among the lowest occupational 
class is considerable, but has a fairly large confidence interval. It is 
worth remarking that the liberal expansion regime is the only regime 
in which homeownership rates increased among the lower class. 
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We suggest this is the result of the liberalization of housing finance, 
which reduced borrowing constraints for prospective homeowners. 
However, housing wealth holdings of the lower class are strikingly 
lower in the younger cohort than in the older cohort. Their housing 
wealth holdings drop from 83% of the national mean in the 1930-1949 
birth cohort, to 52% in the 1950-1962 cohort (Figure 2.2[b]). The high 
loan-to-value ratios, and the long loan maturities that came with the 
liberalization of housing finance, allowed especially the lower classes 
to enter homeownership. As a result, mortgage debts are far larger in 
the liberal expansion regime, than in any other regime. Figure 2.2(c) 
shows that residential debts are between 16% and 21% of the market 
value of the home in the 1930-1949 birth cohort, and between 29% and 
43% of the market value of the home in the 1950-1962 birth cohort. 
The large residential debts among the population aged 50 and over 
imply that for many (those with interest-only mortgages) their entire 
housing wealth is based on capital gains. Therefore, we suggest that 
the upswing in housing wealth inequality between the lower and 
higher occupational class is mainly the result of a larger take-up of 
mortgage debt.
Family homeownership regime
In the family homeownership regime (Italy, Portugal), homeownership 
rates fall among the lower class, whereas housing wealth drops among 
the middle class. We point at three possible explanations behind the 
drop of homeownership rates among the lower class (from 80% to 
72%). First, the working-class housing strategy of self-construction 
became less accepted over time (Allen, 2006). Second, housing finance 
was not available to fill this gap (Mulder and Billari, 2010). Three, 
access to a secure labor market position has become increasingly 
difficult for young people in these countries, resulting in later ages 
of nest-leaving (Aassve et al., 2001). Thus, lower class-members in the 
younger generation are less likely to be in homeownership. While 
this is not the case among the middle class, middle class-members of 
the younger cohort have lower housing wealth holdings compared 
to the older cohort. The housing wealth position of the middle class 
decreases to 87% of the national mean in the 1950-1960, compared to 
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104% in the 1930-1949 cohort. We argue that the increase of precarious 
labor in the Mediterranean countries forces households to either rent 
(lower class), or to buy properties with family help (middle class). 
However, these properties are less valuable that those bought by the 
older cohort due to the rising prices as a consequence of a lack of 
housing supply (Poggio, 2012).
Privatized homeownership regime
In the privatized homeownership regime (Hungary, Slovenia), 
homeownership rates dropped for the lowest occupational class. 
In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, 88% of the households in the lowest 
class resides in homeownership, compared to 82% in the 1950-1962 
birth cohort. We suggest that a drop in labor market income of the 
lower class obstructed the entry into the post-communist ownership 
market for the younger cohort. The housing wealth holdings of the 
lowest occupational class are lower among the 1950-1952 cohort (67%) 
than among the 1930-1949 cohort (77%). In the privatized ownership 
regime, it has become increasingly difficult for the lower class to enter 
homeownership, and when they do, they accumulate less housing 
wealth. This finding matches previous research, indicating that the 
lower socioeconomic strata are hardest hit by the political-economic 
transition after the fall of communism (Heyns, 2005). The increased 
economic hardship among the lower class can be illustrated by rising 
residential debts as well (1% for the 1930-1949 cohort, 6% for the 1950-
1962 cohort).
Liberal homeownership regime
In the liberal homeownership regime (Spain), a decreasing 
homeownership rate is visible among the lower and the higher 
occupational class when the younger cohort is compared with the 
older cohort. For the lower occupational class, homeownership rates 
decreased from 92% to 83%, for the higher occupational class rates 
dropped from 99% to 94% (see Figure 2.2[a]). We suggest that for the 
lower class the decreasing popularity of self-provisioning as route 
into homeownership could not be compensated fully by a larger 
take-up of mortgage finance for the 1950-1962 cohort. In the 1950-
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1962 birth cohort, housing wealth inequality between occupational 
classes is smaller. The lowest occupational class displays a significant 
increase of 29 percentage points, to 94% of the national mean. The 
increasing housing wealth holdings of the lowest occupational class 
are associated with decreasing homeownership rates. This indicates 
that the lower-class respondents entering homeownership may have 
become increasingly selective over time, likely in terms of the type 
of housing (higher value) and perhaps also in terms of the resources 
they brought with them in the first place. We not however that Spain 
is a highly specific case, in which a debt-funded construction boom 
has reshaped dynamics on the housing market since the mid-1999s. 
Figure 2.3. Map of tenure and housing wealth inequality in different housing wealth 
accumulation regimes
Source: SHARE (wave 2, 3, 4), own computation.
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Conclusion
Since WWII, homeownership rates increased across Europe as a 
consequence of policy efforts to make this tenure more attractive 
relative to rental housing. One of the core arguments underpinning 
the expansion of homeownership is the belief that residing in this 
tenure contributes to the wealth accumulation of households. Since 
more people got access to homeownership, housing wealth became 
a more important dimension of socioeconomic stratification. The 
opportunity for different social classes to accumulate housing wealth 
is however determined by the political economy-nexus in which the 
expansion of homeownership takes place. We capture cross-national 
differences in the political economy of housing by the introduction 
of seven housing wealth accumulation regimes. These regimes are 
based on the combination of: (a) the expansion of homeownership 
until 1980, and (b) changes in the political economy of housing since 
the 1980s. Especially the sale of social housing (privatization), and the 
liberalization of housing finance – making homeownership accessible 
for more and more lower-income households, have influenced the 
opportunity for housing wealth accumulation. For these regimes, we 
investigate to what extent households from different occupational 
classes in two birth cohorts (1930-1949 and 1950-1962) are able to enter 
homeownership (tenure inequality), and to what extent they are able 
to accumulate housing wealth if they enter homeownership (housing 
wealth / residential debt inequality). Our findings confirm that 
different housing wealth accumulation regimes are associated with 
variegated distributional outcomes in terms of housing wealth. These 
variegations are driven by several different mechanisms, which are 
summarized in Table 2.
The expansion of homeownership is generally associated with 
larger housing wealth inequality between occupational classes. It 
attracts households with a lower socioeconomic status into this 
tenure, and their lower purchasing power translates into lower 
average housing wealth holdings. This process is partly driven by the 
liberalization of housing finance, since it allows lower-class households 
to enter homeownership, without amortizing their mortgage loan. In 
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the liberal expansion regime (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands), 
an explosion of mortgage debt, and the prolongation of these debts 
into old-age (up to 43% of the house value for the lower class in the 
1950-1962 birth cohort), seems to be the main explanation behind the 
increasing housing wealth inequality between occupational classes.
Our results however also indicate that the expansion of 
homeownership may also result in a more equal distribution of 
housing wealth when the political economy of housing decouples 
housing consumption from labor market income. First, we find that 
a family-based provision of housing is associated with less housing 
wealth inequality (familiarization). In the family ownership regime 
(Italy, Portugal), a long tradition of self-construction and resource 
pooling within the (extended) family is associated with a more equal 
distribution of housing wealth. Second, our results suggest that the 
privatization of public rental housing is associated with less housing 
wealth inequality among the generation of former tenants. In the 
privatized rental regime (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic), the give-
away privatization to sitting tenants after the fall of communism 
materialized the specific allocation preferences of the communist 
system and is associated with a more equal housing wealth distribution 
among the older cohort (1930-1949). Such a pattern is less evident in 
the other regime with a communist legacy, the privatized ownership 
regime (Hungary, Slovenia). Third, we find that state subsidies for 
homeownership might reduce housing wealth inequality between 
occupational classes. In the liberal expansion regime (Denmark, 
Sweden, Netherlands), the post-war social-democratic governments 
subsidized affordable homeownership, which is associated with a 
more equal distribution of housing wealth in the older cohort, which 
bought its first home under the heydays of these schemes. 
To conclude, the expansion of homeownership may have led to an 
increase in housing wealth inequality between occupational classes 
in market-based systems of homeownership provision, whereas it 
reduced housing wealth inequality between occupational classes in 
systems of homeownership provision in which labor market income 
is de-coupled from housing consumption. Since the 1980s, market-
based systems of housing provision are politically promoted in order to 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   78 18-09-17   10:20
2
The Distribution of Housing Wealth in Europe
79
increase the opportunities for wealth accumulation among the lower 
and middle class. Ironically, they are less suited to reach this objective 
than some of the ‘older’ systems of homeownership provision – in 
particular family pooling and (communist) state redistribution – that 
preceded the market-based expansion of homeownership.
To grasp in more detail how housing wealth inequalities are 
shaped, further research should overcome at least three shortcomings 
of our study. First, it is important to broaden the scope to younger 
birth cohorts. With the current data we are not able to grasp the 
effects of housing finance liberalization on the group that is arguably 
affected most. Among younger generations, the combination of 
innovative mortgage products and price developments have had 
more detrimental effects than for the cohorts that we studied. Second, 
future research would benefit from studying the interaction between 
housing wealth and financial wealth as drivers of socioeconomic 
stratification. For instance, small housing wealth holdings could be 
complemented by large financial wealth holdings. Finally, we have 
only elaborated upon the link between occupational class and the 
outcome of a housing wealth accumulation process, whereas the 
process itself is not captured by our analysis. Future research might 
elaborate on the role of housing careers and occupational- and family 
life courses as determinant of housing wealth inequality between 
occupational classes.
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CHAPTER 3
Homeownership and Housing 
Wealth of Elderly Divorcees in 
Ten European Countries




Recent research shows that divorce reduces the likelihood of residing 
in homeownership. Even in later life, ever-divorced men and women 
display lower homeownership rates than their married counterparts. 
There is however a lack of knowledge about the consequences of divorce 
for a majority of divorcees: those who remain in homeownership, or 
move back into homeownership after an episode in rental housing. 
This chapter investigates the economic costs of divorce by focusing on 
the housing wealth of ever-divorced homeowners in later life (age 50 
and over), against the background of changing welfare and housing 
regimes. The empirical analysis is based on data from 10 European 
countries that participated in the third and fourth wave of the Survey 
of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE 2007/8 – 2011/2). 
Our analyses suggest an association between divorce experience and 
lower housing wealth holdings for men and women who remain in 
homeownership after a divorce, or re-enter homeownership after 
a spell in rental housing. This means that a divorce has negative 
housing consequences for a broader range of individuals than thus 
far assumed. In countries with a dynamic housing market and a 
deregulated housing finance system, ever-divorced homeowners are 
worse off than their married counterparts. In these countries, more 
elderly individuals with a weaker financial situation are able to 
remain in or regain access to (mortgaged) homeownership, but at the 
cost of lower housing equity.
A slightly different version of this chapter was published as: Wind, B., 
and Dewilde, C. (2016). Home-ownership and housing wealth of elderly 
divorcees in ten European countries. Ageing & Society, (Online First), 
1-29.
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Introduction
Since the 1970s, divorce has become more common across the Western 
World, although there is considerable international variation. In 
Europe, the highest divorce rates can be found in the Nordic countries 
(around 50%), whereas the Mediterranean countries have the lowest 
rates (Eurostat, 2015). Sociologists have studied the rise of divorce in two 
ways. First, there are studies that explain the rising divorce rate and its 
determinants as part of the wider de-standardization of the life course 
(Fogli and Veldkamp, 2011). Second, there is a large body of research on 
the social and economic consequences of divorce. Divorce is found 
to impact negatively upon the wellbeing of children, the economic 
situation of women, the social situation of men and the likelihood of 
intergenerational transfers (Gruber, 2004; Kalmijn, 2007; Uunk, 2004). 
Housing researchers have pointed out that many of the negative 
effects of divorce pertain to the housing situation. After a divorce, 
moves from homeownership (the former marital home) to rental 
housing are very common. Time stress and financial stress after 
a divorce are the main motivators why divorcees move down the 
housing ladder in terms of tenure (Dewilde, 2008). However, the 
severe housing consequences of divorce pertain in the long run. 
Even in later life, many years after the marital dissolution, (especially 
female) divorcees are found to have a far larger chance of residing 
in rental housing than homeownership due to a decayed economic 
position, combined with reduced possibilities for income-pooling 
(unless someone re-partners), which excludes them from financial 
and other benefits of homeownership. Institutional arrangements 
are found to mitigate the consequences of divorce for the housing 
situation: generous welfare payments, female employment and the 
availability of (mortgage) credit reduce the odds of moving into the 
rental sector after a divorce (Dewilde and Stier, 2014). By focusing on 
the tenure consequences of divorce, previous research assumes that 
home-owning divorcees in later life did not experience any negative 
housing consequences.
This chapter focuses on the majority of all divorcees that is 
overlooked by previous studies: those who remain in homeownership 
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or re-enter this tenure after a spell in rental housing (60-70% in most 
countries). We compare the housing wealth holdings of divorced 
homeowners with non-divorced homeowners in later life to 
demonstrate that divorce affects the socio-economic position of a wider 
group than thus far assumed. Housing wealth is operationalized as the 
current market value of the owned home, minus any mortgage debts. 
It is likely that divorced homeowners display lower housing wealth 
holdings than couples with an intact first marriage, due to downward 
moves on the property ladder, temporary episodes in rental housing, 
or increased mortgage debt. In an international- comparative study 
on the tenure consequences of divorce, it is shown that institutional 
factors (e.g. welfare and housing regimes) might mitigate or reinforce 
the tenure gap between first-time married couples and divorcees. A 
housing wealth gap between first-time married couples and divorcees 
might be affected by different institutional arrangements. We focus 
on (divorced) homeowners only to tease out the mechanisms that are 
associated with the housing wealth gap between first-time married 
couples and divorcees, without focusing on the mechanisms that 
explain the tenure gap between these groups. 
Studying the housing wealth-effect of divorce is urgent because 
(1) divorce rates are expected to remain high, and (2) housing wealth 
plays an increasingly important role in the provision of welfare. First, 
although there is large international variation, divorce rates have 
increased across Europe (González and Viitanen, 2009). Some scholars 
argue that divorce rates will fall again, because an increasing number 
of people cohabit rather than marries (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). 
However, the complex tangle of living arrangements is here to stay, 
and by researching the consequences of divorce, conclusions can 
be drawn about the broader economic implications. Second, a shift 
towards asset-based welfare becomes politically more attractive now 
that a large share of the elderly possesses housing wealth, which can 
be used in order to cater for welfare needs (Livsey and Price, 2013). 
The large share of elderly with housing wealth is mainly the result 
of a continuous policy focus on the promotion of homeownership in 
most European countries since the Second World War (Angelini et 
al., 2013). The relative upswing in house prices since the 1980s, which 
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accompanied the liberalization of housing finance (OECD, 2014), 
resulted in financial gains for housing market insiders. Especially the 
baby boom cohort has been able to profit (Cowell et al., 2012). When 
disruptive life course events like divorce impede the accumulation 
of housing wealth into later life for more people, asset-based welfare 
strategies however need to be reconsidered.
This chapter investigates housing wealth holdings of elderly 
homeowners with divorce experience, relative to couples with an 
intact first marriage in the same age group. Different mechanisms 
that could result in lower housing wealth holdings for divorcees, 
are tested. Since the analysis is limited to homeowners, our results 
are partly driven by the selectivity of homeownership in different 
countries. Housing regimes and welfare regimes determine the 
selectivity of homeownership, and are tested as explanation of 
cross-country variations in the effect of a divorce on housing wealth 
holdings. The empirical work is based on the Survey of Health, Aging 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, wave 3 and 4, conducted in 2008/9 
and 2011/2). This chapter solely focuses on individuals in later life (50+ 
at the moment of data collection), which enables us to grasp the long-
term consequences of divorce.
This study adds to previous research in three ways. First, it 
investigates the housing wealth consequences of a divorce, rather 
than focusing on tenure transitions. Second, building on Dewilde and 
Stier (2014), a focus on the elderly enables us to investigate the long-
term effects of disruptive life course events in different institutional 
contexts, and how these come about. Third, it studies housing wealth 
from an international-comparative perspective, whereas most 
authors focus on single countries.
Why divorce has a price tag: the micro-level
We expect that differences in housing transitions between divorcees 
and couples with an intact first marriage result in lower housing 
wealth holdings of elderly homeowners with divorce experience. Beer 
and Faulkner (2011) describe these housing transition as “a series of 
housing decisions about whether to move or not move, the quality and 
quantity of housing to occupy, location relative to employment and 
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social networks” (p. 31). We acknowledge that financial stress might 
trigger housing decisions and divorce, but it is far more common that 
housing decisions are the result of the post-divorce financial stress 
(Andersen, 2005). We envisage three housing wealth-reducing housing 
transitions for elderly divorcees who did not permanently move out 
of homeownership at the time of the survey. First of all, moves down 
the property ladder could reduce housing wealth holdings in a direct 
way. The strong effect of divorce on residential mobility implies that 
in many cases both partners move to another dwelling (Speare Jr. 
and Goldscheider, 1987). A reduced demand for space and a weakened 
financial position often leads to moves into a segment of the housing 
market with lower prices (Feijten and van Ham, 2010). Second, 
housing wealth holdings of divorced homeowners are likely to be 
temporary or permanently lower than those of married couples, even 
when the housing consumption does not decline after the divorce. 
A larger housing loan may be needed when the ex-partner takes out 
his/her share of the housing wealth. Third, temporary moves into 
rental housing after a divorce might reduce housing wealth holdings 
when house prices increase faster than incomes. In such a situation, 
it becomes relatively more expensive to buy a home with the same 
quality as the former marital home. Therefore, moves down the 
property ladder, or larger residential debts are expected to be more 
common among those with an episode in rental housing.
Hypothesis 1: Home-owning elderly with divorce experience have 
smaller housing wealth holdings than couples with an intact first marriage.
Especially women are economically vulnerable after a divorce (Uunk, 
2004). Because of their lower labor market participation and weaker 
financial position, women have a larger chance than men to move into 
rental housing after a divorce. The financial position of women after 
a divorce is often worse than men because they re-partner less often 
and less quickly (Dewilde, 2008). We expect the effect of a divorce on 
the accumulation of housing wealth to be gendered as well. In this line 
of reasoning, lower female wages translate into smaller purchasing 
power on the housing market, and subsequently lower housing 
wealth holdings. There are however reasons to believe that women 
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with a sufficient income in certain situations have a large chance to 
remain in the marital home. In some countries it is common practice 
that the male partner keeps his pension wealth, whereas the female 
partner is entitled to the housing wealth (see Joseph and Rowlingson 
(2012) for the UK). Altogether however, we expect that the weaker 
financial position of women impacts negatively upon their housing 
wealth accumulation after a divorce.
Hypothesis 2: Home-owning elderly divorced women have smaller 
housing wealth holdings than home-owning elderly divorced men.
When re-partnering co-occurs with the establishment of a new 
shared household with a stable future perspective, possibilities for 
income pooling enable the couple to exercise more purchasing power 
on the housing market (Lersch and Vidal, 2014). In this way re-pooling 
(1) increases the likelihood of re-entering homeownership for those 
who dropped out of this tenure after the divorce, or (2) increases the 
likelihood of upward movements in the housing market for those 
who remained in homeownership after a divorce. This mechanism 
might be stronger in contexts in which economically independent 
women are considered as more attractive partners (de Graaf and 
Kalmijn, 2003), or somewhat weakened in contexts in which the lack 
of welfare support pushes women with a low socio-economic status 
into re-marriage (Dewilde, 2008). Empirical evidence shows that 
couples of which at least one of the partners has been married before 
display comparable housing transitions as couples with an intact first 
marriage (Beer and Faulkner, 2011; Feijten and van Ham, 2010). 
Hypothesis 3: Home-owning elderly re-partnered men and women have 




The later-life housing wealth consequences of divorce are expected 
to vary between countries due to institutional differences in housing 
and welfare regimes. Furthermore, we expect the institutional effect 
to vary over time due to policy changes within these countries. 
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Divorce, housing wealth and welfare regimes
The welfare state influences to what extent especially women are 
able to remain in homeownership after experiencing partnership 
dissolution.  Previous research stresses that divorced women have 
a larger chance of residing in homeownership in countries where 
the state fosters female employment (e.g. through extensive family 
policies and affordable and accessible childcare) (Dewilde and 
Stier, 2014). However, mechanisms that increase homeownership 
rates among the divorced, do not necessarily translate into larger 
housing wealth holdings. Where homeownership rates are higher, 
more divorcees have some housing wealth, whereas in countries 
with more socially selective models of homeownership, average 
housing wealth holdings among those divorcees that remained in 
homeownership can be expected to be larger. Controlling for the 
social selectivity of homeownership, we envisage two ways in which 
gendered welfare state policies affect the housing wealth holdings of 
divorced individuals. First of all, policies fostering the labor market 
participation of women might have a positive effect on the housing 
wealth accumulation of both men and women. Being active on the 
labor market increases the purchasing power on the housing market 
for divorced women. When divorced men re-partner, high female 
employment rates increase the chance of having dual incomes and 
dual earnings, which in turn gives them more purchasing power on 
the housing market. Being able to buy into more expensive housing, 
results in larger housing wealth holdings (if financed with an 
annuity mortgage). Second, legal arrangements between partners 
might impact upon the housing wealth accumulation of both former 
partners. Although all countries in our sample have no-fault divorce 
laws (González and Viitanen, 2009), Adema et al. (2009) show that the 
financial arrangements between two partners after a divorce differ 
between European countries. In more conservative welfare states 
with lower female employment rates, child maintenance payments, 
spousal support or alimony are much higher than in liberal or social-
democratic welfare states. These payments can improve the financial 
position of women considerably, without damaging the financial 
position of the male partner to the degree that it has impact on his 
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housing situation. In countries where entering the labor market 
is troublesome for women, spousal support might be essential for 
women to remain in the former marital home. 
Hypothesis 4: The negative effect of divorce experience on housing 
wealth holdings in later life is smaller in countries with a female-supportive 
welfare state.
Divorce, housing wealth and housing regimes
Housing regimes determine who are able to enter homeownership, 
at what price, and with which returns. Different institutional 
constellations might impact upon the three mechanisms that are 
conceptualized as mechanisms behind lower wealth holdings of 
divorcees (moving down the property ladder, temporary spells in 
rental housing, increasing mortgage debts). First of all, the size of the 
homeownership sector determines the possibilities for moving down 
the property ladder. In ‘rental societies’ with a more socially selective 
model of homeownership, like Germany and Switzerland, smaller 
and lower quality units can barely be found in the homeownership 
sector (Bourassa and Hoesli, 2010). In these countries it is likely 
that divorcees move out of homeownership altogether due to the 
restricted possibilities of moving down the property ladder within 
homeownership. 
Temporary spells in rental housing, and even staying put in the 
marital home might be ‘costly’ when house prices outpace inflation 
and turnover rates on the housing market are high. Morrow-Jones 
and Wenning (2005) suggest that the “Inability to move upward 
between units, or the inability to move up as other groups, can 
reinforce existing social disparities” (p. 1740, italics added). In other 
words, the relative disadvantage of divorced individuals increases 
when divorcees who stay put in the marital home or move into rental 
housing temporarily, are unable to keep up with married couples that 
are able to move up within homeownership. This is likely to be the 
case in a subset of countries that combine moderate homeownership 
rates with a ‘dynamic housing market’ (e.g. the Netherlands), where it 
has become common to ‘trade up’ on the market for owner-occupied 
housing during the life course (van der Heijden et al., 2011). In ‘static 
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housing markets’ turnover rates on the housing market are far lower 
and most households buy a dwelling for their entire life time (e.g. 
Germany and Italy).
Higher mortgage debts among individuals with divorce 
experience compared to those with an intact marriage are put forward 
as a mechanism behind their relatively disadvantaged position. The 
availability of mortgage finance shows large cross-country variation. 
More liberal housing finance systems take ‘the waiting out of the 
wanting’ by allowing individuals to loan a larger part of the value of 
the home (high loan-to-value ratio), and extending the amortization 
time. This reduces the necessity of (temporary) moves into rental 
housing or moves down the property ladder. However, the increased 
indebtedness decreases housing wealth holdings in a direct manner. 
Moreover, liberal housing finance systems are expected to strengthen 
the above-mentioned mechanisms. First of all, they allow a larger 
share of divorcees to remain in homeownership or to re-enter this 
tenure. Second, there is evidence that house price inflation and 
volatility (e.g. property booms and busts) have been more severe in 
countries with liberal housing finance systems (OECD, 2014) which 
increases the price of staying put in the marital home or temporary 
spells in rental housing.  
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of divorce experience on housing 
wealth holdings in later life is larger in countries with a larger (finance-
led) expansion of homeownership.
Data and method
Data and sample
Our analysis is based on the third and fourth wave of the SHARE (2008-
2009 / 2011-2012), an ex-ante harmonized longitudinal panel study, 
carried out in 13 European countries among the population aged 50 
and over. The third wave of the SHARE contains retrospective life 
histories, including housing careers and family transitions. We enrich 
these data with information from wave 4 about housing wealth. The 
SHARE data are valuable for at least three reasons. First, they contain 
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comparative information on housing careers and housing wealth. 
Second, the national sample sizes are large. Third, the countries in 
the dataset cover a wide variety of continental welfare and housing 
regimes. 
The analysis sample consists of elderly who have ever been married 
(or still are), and reside in homeownership at the moment of interview. 
Those who never married are not included because they have never 
been ‘at risk of divorce’. A small number of respondents (3% of the 
total sample) that entered homeownership for the first time after 
a divorce, is included in the sample. In the first models, we present 
information on the entire sample, in which tenants are assumed to 
have zero housing wealth. The later analyses are based on a sample 
of homeowners only, since the institutional mechanisms that impact 
upon tenure status and housing wealth are conceptually different. By 
including tenants in the analysis, these mechanisms would remain 
hidden. Furthermore, the moderating effect of institutions on the 
relationship between divorce and moves out of homeownership, 
is widely researched by others (e.g. Dewilde, 2008 or Feijten, 2005). 
Only respondents belonging to the main sample of the SHARE are 
included. Others living in the household, like co-resident children or 
co-resident parents, are excluded because they are likely not entitled 
to the household’s housing wealth. Furthermore, respondents born 
before 1920 are excluded because their number is too small to draw 
conclusions about cohort effects. The sample of countries is restricted 
to Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, 
Denmark, Switzerland and Belgium. We exclude the Czech Republic 
and Poland, since the transition from communism to capitalism 
dramatically changed their housing and welfare regimes, and 
macro-level indicators about the period before 1990 are unavailable. 
Furthermore, we dropped Greece, because of the low incidence of 
divorce, and the unavailability of macro-level indicators for the period 
before 1990. Altogether, the analysis sample consists of 10 countries 
with 318 (Austria) to 1595 (Belgium) respondents. The number of 
respondents in Austria is disproportionally low because of the small 
initial sample and the large share of tenants (see Table 3.2).




Net housing wealth is our dependent variable. It is calculated as the 
value of the first dwelling and – when applicable – a second home, 
minus the value of all outstanding debts. The housing wealth estimate 
is derived from self-evaluation of the market value of the house at 
the moment of the interview (2011/2012). Previous studies have proven 
such subjective evaluation of housing wealth to be reliable (Ansell, 
2014; Mulder et al., 2015). We use top coding at the 99.8 percent level 
to remove outliers in the housing wealth distribution per country. 
For reasons of international comparability, housing wealth holdings 
are calculated as a percentage of the national median. Both partners 
in a couple receive the total household’s housing wealth, because it 
represents a shared resource. This causes caution in the interpretation 
of results because it could result in a difference between the observed 
and real total housing wealth before and after a divorce. When both 
partners buy dwellings half the price of the former marital home 
after a divorce, the housing wealth to be inherited by their children 
will remain equal, whereas it will be measured as a reduction.
The complex tangle of marital pathways is summarized in four 
categories, based on the result of the first marriage (still living together, 
divorced, widowed, not living together) and the current situation for 
those who entered a new partnership (still living together, divorced, 
widowed, not living together). The fifteen trajectories that follow 
from this evaluation (see Table 3.1) are summarized in four categories. 
The first category includes all respondents who are still in their 
first marriage. Widows who never re-partnered, and those with a 
partner in a nursing home are included in this category as well. Their 
housing wealth is expected to be accumulated by two partners. The 
second category includes all respondents whose first marriage ended 
in divorce and who are currently single. The third category contains 
all respondents whose first marriage ended in divorce and who are 
currently cohabiting with a new partner. We do not differentiate 
between re-partnering and re-marrying due to the small number of 
cases. Widow(er)s of new partners, and those who are living alone 
because the new partner moved to a nursing home are placed in this 
category as well because the housing wealth is likely to be accumulated 
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by the couple. The fourth category consists of respondents that are not 
living together due to unknown reasons, and re-partnered widow(er)
s. In the remainder, we do not comment on the results of this category, 
because they fall outside the scope of this research.
Table 3.1. Classification of marital pathways
Situation first 
partner
Current state Men Women Total Classification
Living with first 
partner
“ 3,951 3,955 7,906 Intact first marriage
Widowed “ 203 798 1,001 Intact first marriage
First partner in 
care center
“ 3 2 5 Intact first marriage
Not together due to 
unknown
“ 12 13 25 Other trajectory
Divorced Not repartnered 174 258 432 Divorced and single








Partner in care 
center




Not together due 
to unknown
4 10 14 Other trajectory
Widowed Widowed again 8 22 30 Other trajectory
Widowed Repartnered 96 82 178 Other trajectory
Widowed Not together due 
to unknown
0 1 1 Other trajectory
Not together due to 
unknown
Widowed 0 2 2 Other trajectory
Not together due to 
unknown
Partner in care 
center
1 5 6 Other trajectory
Not together due to 
unknown
Not together due 
to unknown
1 4 5 Other trajectory
Total 4910 5580 10490
Three mechanisms behind a negative effect of divorce experience 
on the housing wealth accumulation of the elderly, can be tested 
directly. First, the effect of downward moves on the property ladder 
is measured by a variable indicating (1) whether someone lives 
in a house (free-standing house) or an apartment (row house/
small flat, large flat, housing for elderly), and (2) how many rooms 
the house has. Together, both variables give an indication of the 
housing quality. A reduction of housing quality as a mechanism 
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of a reduction of housing wealth is less straightforward than it 
seems. If a divorce occurs when house prices are higher than at the 
moment of purchase, it is harder for the leaving partner to find a 
home with a comparable quality for his share in the marital home. 
In that situation he/she can sacrifice space or opt for a less attractive 
location. Second, the effect of episodes in rental housing is measured 
by a variable indicating how many times someone has moved within 
the rental sector, after the first-time entry into homeownership. 
Third, the effect of increased indebtedness is measured by a variable 
indicating which percentage of the housing value is covered by a 
residential loan.
Re-partnering is hypothesized to mitigate the negative effect of 
divorce experience on the accumulation of housing wealth among 
the elderly. It is measured in terms of the above-mentioned marital 
trajectories (see Table 3.1). We use the following micro-level variables 
to control for factors that are expected to influence the odds of 
experiencing a divorce, or the housing wealth accumulation process: 
age of first marriage, age of entering homeownership, residing in 
rental housing five years after the first marriage, number of children, 
migrant status, having received a financial gift from a family member 
(5000 Euro or more), the urbanity of surroundings (rural-small town/
large town-big city), highest achieved educational level (ISCED-scores: 
no education /primary education/lower secondary education/higher 
secondary education/post-secondary education/tertiary education), 
income (lower than median/higher than median/higher than two 
times the median).
Macro variables
Macro-level indicators are measured on the country-period level, 
since the context within one country changes over time. Macro-
level variables are assigned to individuals on the basis of country 
and moment of divorce. We distinguish between respondents who 
divorced before 1985, and respondents who divorced after 1985. Since 
the middle of the 1980s, the liberalization of the economy in general 
and the housing market in particular, changed the context in which 
the divorce took place. Furthermore, both groups have an almost 
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equal size.  To assign macro-variables to non-divorcees, we use the 
‘most likely year in which a divorce would take place’. We calculate 
the average duration of a marriage before divorce in every country, 
and add this to the year of marriage. This is the context in which both 
divorcees and non-divorcees make the decision to divorce or not. Six 
macro variables, describing the welfare- and housing regime context 
at the moment of a (non-)divorce are taken into account.
Two sets of macro-level indicators are ought to capture the cross-
country variation in welfare regimes and housing regimes. The 
welfare state context is measured by the female employment rate 
and the generosity of child maintenance payments. For respondents 
who divorced before 1985, we use the average female employment 
rate of the 1980s, for those who divorced after 1985, we use the average 
female employment rate of the 2000s (Olivetti, 2014). The indicator for 
the generosity of child maintenance payments is measured as the 
relative importance of child maintenance payments in the income 
of divorced women, and based on information from the Luxemburg 
Income Study (LIS) in the year 2000 (Adema et al., 2009). The indicator 
is not available for Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.
The housing regime is operationalized by the homeownership 
rate, the turnover rate on the housing market and an index of 
housing finance liberalization. For the respondents who divorced 
before 1985, we use the homeownership rate of 1980, or the earliest 
observation available. For respondents who divorced after 1985, we 
used information from 2000 (in the case of Germany information 
from 2004) (Atterhög and Song, 2009; Dol and Haffner, 2010). The 
turnover rate on the housing market is based on an estimate from 
the SHARE, indicating the average number of homes the current 
sample has owned during the life course. The accessibility of housing 
finance is measured with an index of financialization, constructed 
by the IMF (2008). The index evaluates national mortgage systems 
on the possibilities for mortgage equity withdrawal, possibilities for 
refinancing, loan-to-value ratios, and information on the market 
for covered bonds and mortgage backed securities. Unfortunately, 
this index is not available for Switzerland. An overview of all macro-
variables is given in Table 3.2.
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liberalizations1980 2000 1980 2000
Austria 51,2% 67,5% 18,3 52% 52% 1,2 0,31
Belgium 36,4% 46,5% 14 59% 68% 1,9 0,34
Denmark 60,5% 60,9% 9,4 56% 59% 2,3 0,82
France 43,9% 50,6% 16,2 47% 55% 1,6 0,23
Germany 41,5% 51,8% 17,1 39% 46% 1,2 0,28
Italy 35,0% 37,9% x 59% 71% 1,2 0,26
Netherlands 36,8% 58,4% x 42% 53% 1,9 0,71
Spain 28,6% 48,3% x 73% 84% 1,3 0,4
Sweden 70,0% 59,7% 11,1 58% 53% 2,1 0,66
Switzerland 51,4% 75,6% 49,7 30% 44% 1,3 x
Source: Atterhög and Song, 2009; Dewilde and Stier, 2014; Dol and Haffner, 2010; Gwartney et al., 
2013; OECD, 2015b; Scruggs et al., 2014.
Methods 
For setting the scene, descriptive analyses are presented. First, 
homeownership rates among three marital categories (always 
married, divorced and single, divorced and re-partnered) are shown. 
Second, average housing wealth holdings (as percentage of the 
national median) are displayed for all three marital groups, to show 
international variations in the consequences of divorce experience 
in later life. We proceed with two country-fixed effects analyses 
(using OLS regression), focusing on the individual-level mechanisms 
behind housing wealth inequalities, controlling for all unobserved 
heterogeneity on the macro- level (Möhring, 2012). Robust standard 
errors are used to allow residuals to vary in a non-random way due to 
the structured nature of the data. One analysis investigates whether 
men and women in two divorce cohorts (before and after 1985) 
display a different effect of divorce experience on the accumulation of 
housing wealth in later life. This analysis is replaced on two samples: 
one based on homeowners only, and one based on homeowners 
and tenants. This puts analyses on the effect of divorce experience 
on the accumulation of housing wealth among home-owning 
elderly in perspective, because it shows the effect of being excluded 
from accumulation housing wealth at all. Another analysis tests to 
what extent lower housing wealth holdings among ever-divorced 
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homeowners in later life are the result of moves down the property 
ladder, temporary residence in rental housing or increased 
indebtedness. These three mechanisms are not included in the final 
model, in which cross-level interactions between institutional 
characteristics and marital categories are presented. Indeed, we 
assume that these institutional factors are the driving forces behind 
the three mechanisms associated with lower housing wealth holdings 
of divorcees, compared to those in an intact first marriage. We run 
all models for men and women separately. Main effects of macro-
level variables cannot be added in such a country fixed-effect model, 
because country-level variations are captured by the model itself.
Results
Setting the scene
A descriptive image of the data (Table 3.3) confirms that individuals 
with divorce experience have a smaller chance of residing in 
homeownership (Dewilde, 2008; Dewilde and Stier, 2014; Feijten and 
van Ham, 2010). In general, the opportunities for divorcees to live in 
homeownership are reflected by the well-known pattern of high 
homeownership rates in the Mediterranean homeownership societies 
(80%-90%), low homeownership rates in the German-speaking rental 
societies (60%-70%), and moderate homeownership rates in the rest of 
continental Europe and Scandinavia (70%-80%). Exceptions are Italy, 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands, where divorcees have a far 
smaller chance of residing in homeownership than can be expected 
on the basis of the homeownership rate among those with an intact 
first marriage.
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More importantly, the descriptive statistics show that divorce 
has negative effects beyond tenure. In nearly all countries, single 
homeowners with divorce experience have significantly lower 
housing wealth holdings than those with an intact first marriage 
(largest differences can be found in Denmark, Austria and the 
Netherlands). Divorced and re-partnered individuals take in general 
a middle position, but differences with individuals with an intact 
marriage are in many countries non-significant.
We present eight country-fixed effects analyses to (a) check 
whether the results of the descriptive analyses hold while controlling 
for co-variates, (b) account for the role of permanent moves out 
of homeownership, and (c) investigate how the effect of divorce on 
housing wealth holdings changes over time (Table 3.4). We present 
models for two genders (male/female), two divorce cohorts (before 
and after 1985), replicated them on two samples (entire sample versus 
homeowners only). First, nearly all models in Table 3.4 show a strong 
and significant negative effect of divorce experience on housing 
wealth accumulation. This effect is stronger for single divorcees than 
for re-partnered divorcees, and stronger for women than for men. 
In conclusion, the findings from the descriptive analyses are fairly 
robust while controlling for many co-variates. Second, a comparison 
of the first four models (based on the entire sample) and the last four 
models (based on a sample of homeowners only), shows that the 
negative effect of divorce experience on housing wealth accumulation 
is much stronger when drop-outs out of homeownership (resulting 
in zero housing wealth) are taken up. For example, while taking into 
account the entire sample with homeowners and tenants, women who 
divorced before 1985, have 83 percent lower housing wealth holdings 
than women with an intact first marriage. A comparison with the 
same group of women in the sample with homeowners only shows 
that this is for a large share the result of permanent moves out of 
homeownership (resulting in zero housing wealth). Single divorcees 
(women, divorced before 1985) in the sample with homeowners only 
have nevertheless 38 percent smaller housing wealth holdings than 
women with an intact first marriage. Interestingly, for those who 
divorced before 1985 and re-partnered later on, a significant negative 
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effect on housing wealth holdings can be found while analyzing 
the entire sample, whereas no significant effect can be found in the 
analysis based on the sample with homeowners only. This means that 
the entire negative effect is due to moves out of homeownership, or in 
other words: if they remained in homeownership or regained access to 
this tenure, they fared comparably well as their peers with an intact first 
marriage. Third, a comparison of the regression coefficients for both 
divorce cohorts shows that the negative effect of divorce on housing 
wealth strengthened over time for men, but weakened for women. 
Whereas the negative divorce effect for single men who divorced 
before 1985 is solely the result of moves out of homeownership, single 
divorced homeowners who divorced after 1985 show 30 percent lower 
housing wealth holdings than those with an intact first marriage 
(compare Model 1/5 and 6). A comparison of model 7 and 8 shows 
that women who remain in homeownership or regain access to this 
tenure experience a negative divorce effect in both divorce cohorts, 
but that this effect becomes slightly weaker (from -38% to -36%).  For 
both re-partnered men and women, the negative effect of divorce on 
housing wealth holdings increased. These findings match previous 
research that indicates that the economic position of divorced women 
has increased due to higher female employment rates, whereas the 
position of divorced men has declined, as one income is no longer 
enough to afford homeownership (DiPrete and McManus, 2000).
Explaining the housing wealth effect: the micro-level
The first model in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 presents the effect of different 
marital categories (couples with an intact first marriage as reference 
category) on the accumulation of housing wealth for men and women 
separately, controlling for a variety of individual characteristics. 
The analyses are based on a sample with homeowners only, since 
the mechanisms that we test are conceptualized to reduce housing 
wealth, but not necessarily to lead to moves out of homeownership. 
Not surprisingly, the results are similar to the results of Table 3.4, 
in which the same variables are used to investigate the difference 
between an earlier and a later ‘divorce cohort’. Model 1 in Table 3.5 
shows that single, elderly, home-owning men with divorce experience 
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have 26,5 percent less housing wealth then men in an intact first 
marriage, whereas re-partnered elderly home-owning men have 13,4 
percent less housing wealth than men in an intact first marriage. 
Model 1 in Table 3.6 shows that the association between divorce 
experience and reduced housing wealth in later life is stronger for 
women. Single elderly home-owning women have 37,6 percent less 
housing wealth than their counterparts in an intact first marriage, 
whereas those who re-partnered have 17,8 percent less housing 
wealth than women in an intact first marriage. The control variables 
in the model show the expected results. Higher educational and 
income levels, a more urban environment, large financial gifts, a 
higher marital age and a lower number of children, are correlated 
with larger housing wealth holdings. Altogether, Model 1 in Tables 
3.5 and 3.6 provides evidence for the first three hypotheses. First of 
all, it shows that elderly homeowners with divorce experience have 
lower housing wealth holdings than elderly homeowners in an 
intact first marriage. Second, it provides evidence for the hypothesis 
that housing wealth holdings of women with divorce experience are 
lower than those of men. Finally, the higher housing wealth holdings 
of re-partnered divorcees relative to single divorcees show that re-
partnering partly mitigates the negative effect of divorce experience 
on the accumulation of housing wealth over the life course. 
Two mechanisms behind the lower housing wealth holdings of 
elderly homeowners with divorce experience stand out: downward 
moves on the property ladder, and the increased usage of mortgage 
finance. The second model in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 shows that temporary 
spells in rental housing after the first-time entry into homeownership 
are associated with lower housing wealth holdings for elderly, 
divorced, home-owning women (only significant at the 0,10 level), but 
not for men. However, this effect becomes non-significant in Model 3, 
after the addition of variables describing the housing quality. In other 
words: women who have resided in rental housing after a divorce have 
lower housing wealth holdings than those who did not, especially 
because they moved into smaller properties when they re-entered 
homeownership. A substantial part of the lower housing wealth 
holdings among divorced elderly homeowners can be explained by 
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downward moves on the property ladder, which can be concluded 
from a comparison of Model 2 and 3 (see Table 3.5 for men, Table 3.6 
for women). Model 3 shows that living in an apartment rather than 
a house, and living in a home with fewer rooms, is associated with 
lower housing wealth holdings. The lower coefficients of the different 
marital categories in Model 3 compared to Model 2, imply that elderly 
men and women with divorce experience are over-represented in 
smaller apartments. For men, the effect of being divorced and single 
on housing wealth holdings in later life declines from -25,3 percent 
(Model 2) to -19,2 percent (Model 3) after the addition of variables 
that describe the dwelling type and size. For women, the effect of 
being divorced and single declines from -36,2 percent (Model 2) to 
-22,0 percent (Model 3) after the addition of variables that describe 
the dwelling type and size. Model 5 (Tables 3 and 4) confirms that 
elderly homeowners who have relatively larger mortgage, have lower 
housing wealth holdings than those who are outright owners. The 
lower coefficients of the divorced elderly in Model 4 compared to 
Model 3, imply that elderly men and women with divorce experience 
have larger residential debts than those in an intact first marriage. 
This finding provides evidence for the idea that housing wealth 
holdings of elderly divorced homeowners are lower due to their larger 
indebtedness. Even after the introduction of three mechanisms that 
might reduce housing wealth holdings in model 2, 3 and 4, a fairly 
strong negative association between divorce experience and lower 
housing wealth holdings in later life remains in place. Local house 
price developments are expected to explain another share of the 
variation, but could not be measured in our analysis. 
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Table 3.5. Country-fixed effects analysis, presenting the effect of marital trajectories on 
housing wealth holdings for men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Marital category
   Intact first marriage (ref.) - - - -
   Divorced and single -26,514*** -25,256*** -19,192*** -16,239***
   Divorced and re-partnered -13,414*** -10,756** -8,226* -4,65
   Non-standard trajectory -14,062 -13,036 -10,857 -7,13
Age of first marriage 0,121 0,141 -0,25 -0,167
Age entering homeownership -0,361 -0,443 -0,204 -0,15
Homeownership 5 years after marriage -5,719 -6,184 -6,602 -5,399
Number of children 0,585 0,674 -2,570** -1,882*  
Urbanity 15,711* 15,929* 28,057*** 26,164***
Received gift (5000E) 22,061** 22,126** 18,323** 15,690** 
Migrant status 2,009 2,409 6,41 4,894
Educational level
   Pre-primary (ref.) - - - -
   Primary education 27,204*** 27,387*** 29,664*** 27,683***
   Lower secondary 46,989*** 47,040*** 48,429*** 45,513***
   (Upper) secondary 50,311*** 50,402*** 50,892*** 49,841***
   Post-secondary 71,617*** 71,786*** 74,517*** 77,659***
   First stage tertiary 92,251*** 92,683*** 86,210*** 86,070***
Birth cohort
   Before 1930 - - - -
   1930-1939 8,173 8,264 5,909 8,7
   1940-1949 4,15 3,866 2,228 10,246
   1950 and later -9,791 -9,998 -12,845 1,175
Income
   Lower than median (ref.) - - - -
   Higher than median 1,675 1,947 1,897 3,71
   Higher than two * median 33,760*** 33,979*** 31,342** 33,406***
Time-out in rental housing -4,423 -2,458 -0,086
Dwelling type -29,044*** -26,926***
Number of rooms 9,751*** 9,375***
Mortgage debt
   No (ref.) -
   Low -4,382
   High -80,374***
constant 73,362*** 76,141*** 51,454*** 50,032***
R-square 0,10 0,10 0,14 0,19
Degrees of freedom 9 9 9 9
BIC 55572,7 55567,1 54020,4 53763,3
* p<.1, ** p<.05, ***, p<.01
Note: BIC: Bayesian Information Criteria. Ref: Reference category. Source: SHARE (2008/2011), 
own calculations.
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Table 3.6. Country-fixed effects analysis, presenting the effect of marital trajectories on 
housing wealth holdings for women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Marital category
   Intact first marriage (ref.) - -
   Divorced and single -37,594*** -36,167*** -22,022*** -19,711***
   Divorced and re-partnered -17,838*** -14,869*** -10,933*** -7,947***
   Non-standard trajectory -6,836 -5,686 -2,758 -2,897
Age of first marriage 1,085*** 1,126*** 0,659** 0,708***
Age entering homeownership -0,438** -0,523** -0,29 -0,196
Homeownership 5 years after marriage 0,601 0,116 1,17 1,979
Number of children 0,494 0,547 -2,859* -1,887
Urbanity 9,318 9,475 21,030* 20,275*  
Received gift (5000E) 27,358*** 27,307*** 24,958*** 21,459***
Migrant status 3,233 3,268 1,944 1,559
Educational level
   Pre-primary (ref.) - - -
   Primary education 26,663** 26,221** 27,948** 27,270** 
   Lower secondary 53,423*** 52,817*** 51,323*** 48,996***
   (Upper) secondary 60,401*** 60,025*** 56,732*** 55,381***
   Post-secondary 87,659*** 86,746*** 83,100*** 85,534***
   First stage tertiary 95,724*** 95,303*** 87,005*** 85,928***
Birth cohort
   Before 1930
   1930-1939 -7,69 -7,722 -8,135 -6,157
   1940-1949 3,552 3,281 0,51 6,459
   1950 and later -10,778 -11,358 -15,182* -2,555
Income
   Lower than median (ref.) - - -
   Higher than median -0,531 -0,444 0,022 2,053
   Higher than two * median 16,905 17,068 12,577 14,31
Time-out in rental housing -3,981** -2,141 -1,139
Dwelling type -22,178*** -21,478***
Number of rooms 12,852*** 12,791***
Mortgage debt
   No (ref.) -
   Low -3,166
   High -77,221***
constant 59,762*** 63,008*** 25,502** 22,668** 
R-squared 0,08 0,08 0,13 0,17
Degrees of freedom 9 9 9 9
BIC 64386,9 64380,5 61430,8 61169,2
* p<.1, ** p<.05, ***, p<.01
Note: BIC: Bayesian Information Criteria. Ref: Reference category. Source: SHARE (2008/2011).
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Explaining the housing wealth effect: the macro-level
The effect of divorce experience on the accumulation of housing 
wealth in later life shows considerable cross-country variations, 
as can be concluded from the significant country dummies in the 
country-fixed effects model (see Table 3.4) and the cross-country 
differences in average housing wealth holdings of elderly home-
owning divorcees (see Table 3.3). By including cross-level interactions 
between macro-level indicators and the marital trajectories to the 
previously presented country-fixed effects model, we investigate the 
influence of different institutional characteristics on the housing 
wealth holdings of single- and re-partnered divorcees. We take into 
account homeowners only, since institutional mechanisms that 
increase housing wealth holdings are conceptually different from 
those that foster moves into homeownership.
The first two cross-level interactions presented in Table 3.7 
describe the welfare state context. The second cross-level interaction 
in Table 3.7 provides evidence that more generous systems of spousal 
child maintenance payments/ alimony mitigate the negative effect of 
divorce experience on the accumulation of housing wealth for both 
single and re-partnered divorced women. Spousal child maintenance 
payments are relatively high in conservative welfare states with 
low female labor market participation. In these countries, spousal 
payments are essential to remain in the former marital home. The 
first cross-level interaction presented in Table 3.7 shows that the 
association between divorce experience and housing wealth holdings 
in later life does not vary across countries on the basis of their female 
employment rates. This result is remarkable, since previous research 
shows that higher female employment rates increase the odds of 
residing in homeownership for divorced women (Dewilde, 2008). In 
other words, the selection into homeownership is driven by different 
institutional factors than the accumulation of housing wealth. We 
suggest that it is indeed easier for previously non-working women 
to start working after a divorce in countries with higher female 
employment rates. It is however also likely that the incomes of the new 
entrants of the labor market are not sufficient for the accumulation of 
large housing wealth holdings. Spousal child maintenance payments 
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might be the crucial factor in determining whether someone is able to 
stay in the marital home. The first two cross-level interactions provide 
weak evidence for Hypothesis 4, stating that a more female-oriented 
welfare state mitigates the negative effect of divorce experience on 
the accumulation of housing wealth.  
The last three cross-level interactions presented in Table 3.7 
describe the housing regime context. Altogether, the image arises 
that it is not the proliferation of homeownership in itself, but certain 
proliferation strategies that reinforce or mitigate the housing wealth 
consequences of a divorce. The third cross-level interaction in Table 
5 shows that the result of an overall measure of the proliferation of 
homeownership, namely the homeownership rate in a country, is 
not significant. This confirms the image of the descriptive analyses 
(see Table 3.3) that showed that homeownership rates do not 
necessarily reflect the selectivity of this tenure for divorcees. For 
example, in Italy, a country with high overall homeownership rates, 
relatively many divorcees drop out of this tenure, and those who 
remain in homeownership have considerably lower housing wealth 
holding. In Sweden, a country with moderate homeownership rates, 
divorcees have a relatively large chance to remain in this tenure and 
those who remain do not have considerably lower housing wealth 
holdings. The fourth and the fifth cross-level interaction provide 
evidence for Hypothesis 5, stating that it is a financialized expansion 
of homeownership that strengthens the negative effect of divorce 
experience on the accumulation of housing wealth. In such a housing 
regime, speculation with housing is more common and turnover rates 
are higher. The result suggest that it is harder for single women with 
divorce experience to keep up with couples in an intact first marriage 
in countries with higher turnover rates on the housing market. 
Moreover, the stronger negative effect for single divorced women 
shows that their housing transitions differ more from couples in an 
intact first marriage than those of single divorced men. Our results 
suggest that re-partnered male divorcees also have relatively lower 
housing wealth holdings in countries with higher turnover rates on 
the market for owned homes. For re-partnered elderly home-owning 
women, the interaction is not significant. The liberalization of housing 
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finance has a very strong effect on the accumulation of housing wealth 
for home-owning individuals with divorce experience (Table 3.7). In 
other words, the effect of divorce experience on the accumulation of 
housing wealth in later life is stronger in countries where it is easier 
to re-enter this tenure due to liberal mortgage finance and where 
it is easier to prolong indebtedness into later life. Housing finance 
liberalizations haves a stronger impact on single women than on 
men. This means that men (1) make less use of advanced mortgage 
finance to remain in homeownership or re-enter this tenure, or 
(2) that they are better able to amortize their debt during their life 
course after a divorce than women, who find themselves in general 
in a weaker economic position. Moreover, house price inflation and 
price volatility in countries with more liberal housing finance might 
increase the relative difference between elderly homeowners with 
and without divorce experience.
Table 3.7. Cross-level interactions between marital trajectories and institutional 
characteristics for men and women
Cross-level interaction Men Women
Female employment rate * Divorced and single 0,08 -0,38
Female employment rate * Divorced and re-partnered -0,33 0,43
Generosity of maintenance payments * Divorced and single 0,16 1,63**
Generosity of maintenance payments * Divorced and  
re-partnered
0,28 -0,21*
Homeownership rate * Divorced and single 0,01 -0,1
Homeownership rate * Divorced and re-partnered -0,04 -0,24
Turnover rate * Divorced and single -9,66 -57,15***
Turnover rate * Divorced and re-partnered -15,20** 6,25
Mortgage liberalization index * Divorced and single -23,98** -81,63**
Mortgage liberalization index * Divorced and re-partnered -33,30*** -0,2
* p<,1, ** p<,05, *** p<,01
Note: the cross-level interactions are added to Model 1 in Table 3.6, controlling for age of first 
marriage, age of entering homeownership, homeownership within five years after marriage, 
number of children, urbanity of the surroundings, having received a large gift (5000 euro or 
more), migrant status, educational level, birth cohort and income. Source: SHARE (2008/2011).
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Conclusion
After a divorce, it is common that one or both partners move to a new 
home. Previous research concluded that (especially female) divorcees 
have a larger likelihood of moving into the rental sector. This might 
damage their economic position, because it excludes them from a 
common means to wealth accumulation. Although a large majority 
of the divorcees stays in homeownership, or re-enters this tenure 
at a later moment in the life course (around 60%), it has never been 
researched how a divorce impacts on the housing wealth holdings of 
those who remain in homeownership or re-enter this tenure later on. 
The results of our study suggest that housing wealth holdings 
of elderly homeowners with divorce experience are lower than of 
couples in an intact first marriage. Compared to previous research, 
we conclude that women do not only have smaller odds to live in 
homeownership (Dewilde 2008), but also have smaller housing wealth 
holdings than their male counterparts if they stay in homeownership. 
In line with DiPrete and McManus (2000) we conclude that the negative 
effect is strengthened over time for men, whereas it is weakened 
over time for women due to the latter’s increased labour market 
participation and the increased nescessity of dual earnings for home 
purchases. Furthermore, the negative effect of divorce experience on 
the accumulation of housing wealth is found to be stronger for single 
elderly homeowners than for re-partnered elderly homeowners. 
In other words: re-partnering partly mitigates the housing wealth 
consequences of a divorce. Two mechanisms behind the lower 
housing wealth holdings of individuals with divorce experience stand 
out. First, elderly men and women with divorce experience live more 
often in smaller houses and apartments than couples in an intact first 
marriage. In other words: divorce is associated with downward moves 
on the property ladder. Second, elderly men and women with divorce 
experience have larger mortgages relative to the value of their home 
than couples in an intact first marriage. Increased indebtedness, 
or prolonged indebtedness into later life, is often the only way for 
divorcees to remain in homeownership, or to re-enter this tenure.
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Figure 3.1. Map of the tenure and housing wealth gap between divorcees and first-time 
married couples
Note: For each country, the average percentage reduction of housing wealth for each country, 
is displayed on the map in a white square. Source: SHARE (2008/2011).
The negative association between divorce experience and housing 
wealth holdings of homeowners in later life is found in all 10 
researched European countries. However, there is considerable cross-
country variation in the size of this association on the basis of housing 
and welfare regime characteristics. Whereas previous research finds 
the odds of remaining in homeownership after a divorce to be linked 
to the welfare state regime (Dewilde and Stier 2014), we find that it is 
especially the housing regime that is able to reinforce or mitigate the 
effect of divorce experience on the accumulation of housing wealth 
in later life. We find evidence that the negative association between 
divorce experience and housing wealth holdings in later life is stronger 
in countries that facilitate re-entering homeownership after a divorce. 
These are not necessarily countries with high homeownership 
rates, but especially those with a liberal housing finance regime. 
Allowing increased indebtedness, and extended indebtedness into 
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later life, gives room for individuals with divorce experience to 
move down the property ladder within homeownership instead of 
permanently moving into rental housing. Furthermore, in ‘dynamic 
housing markets’ (those with liberal housing finance), trading up 
is more common among couples with an intact first marriage (van 
der Heijden et al. 2011). In these countries, divorcees are not able to 
trade up the housing market to the same extent as couples with an 
intact first marriage, which increases their relative disadvantage. 
One specific welfare state regulation is however found to mitigate the 
consequences of divorce experience on the accumulation of housing 
wealth in later life for single divorced women: generous spousal child 
maintenance payments. Especially in conservative welfare states, 
with low female employment rates, child maintenance payments are 
essential for women to remain in the former, owned, marital home.  
The question under which institutional circumstances elderly 
with divorce experience are better off, is hard to answer because 
of two reasons. First of all, we would like to stress that our results 
underestimate the total effect of divorce experience on housing 
wealth, by solely focusing on those who are able to remain in 
homeownership or regain access to this tenure later on (since 
permanent moves into rental housing result in zero housing 
wealth). However, institutional mechanisms that impact upon the 
homeownership rate of individuals with divorce experience might be 
opposite to mechanisms that impact upon housing wealth holdings 
(e.g. in case higher housing wealth holdings among divorcees are 
the result of a more socially selective homeownership sector). Since 
relatively low housing wealth holdings might be preferable over no 
housing wealth holdings at all, the distributional effect of a divorce 
on the housing market can only be speculated upon while reflecting 
the findings with the propensity of moves out of homeownership. 
Second, a large difference in housing wealth holdings between elderly 
homeowners with and without divorce experience might hide a more 
equal distribution of net worth, a variable which we did not include. 
For instance, those who move out of homeownership permanently 
might exchange their housing wealth for financial wealth. However, 
previous research found housing wealth to be the prime source of 
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wealth for most households (Cowell et al., 2012). Moreover, many 
couples divorce at a moment in the life course when they did not yet 
accumulate much housing wealth.
To conclude, divorce experience is associated with a lower 
likelihood of residing in homeownership in later life (Dewilde and 
Stier, 2014), but also with lower housing wealth holdings among those 
who remain in homeownership or re-enter this tenure again after a 
spell in rental housing. Differences between elderly with and without 
divorce experience are larger in countries that facilitate moves from 
rental housing into homeownership. To grasp in more detail in 
which way divorce experience affects the accumulation of housing 
wealth, future research needs to be directed to the interplay between 
housing wealth and financial wealth, and to the local housing market 
dynamics in which the housing transitions before and after the 
divorce take place.
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CHAPTER 4
The Uneven Distribution of Capital Gains 
in Times of Socio-spatial Inequality: 
Evidence from Swedish Housing Pathways 
between 1995 and 2010




Housing wealth is the largest source of wealth for a majority of 
Swedish households. Whereas investments in housing are merely 
defined by the income, the returns on this investment (capital gains) 
are dependent on local housing market dynamics. Since the 1990s, 
local housing market dynamics in Swedish cities are altered by the 
upswing in levels of socio-spatial inequality. The simultaneous 
up- and downgrading of neighborhoods is reflected in house price 
developments and exacerbates the magnitude of capital gains and 
losses. This chapter proposes that the selective redirection of housing 
pathways that causes an upswing in socio-spatial inequality, translates 
into an uneven distribution of capital gains as well. A sequence 
analysis of the housing pathways of one Swedish birth cohort (1970-
1975), based on population-wide register data (GeoSweden), is used to 
explain differences in capital gains between different social groups in 
the period 1995-2010 (when they were aged between 20/25 and 35/40). 
The results indicate higher capital gains for individuals with higher 
incomes and lower gains for migrants. When socio-spatial inequality 
increases, the more resourceful groups can use their economic and 








A slightly different version of this chapter was published as: Wind, B. 
and Hedman, L. (2017). The uneven distribution of capital gains in 
times of socio-spatial inequality: evidence from Swedish housing 
pathways between 1995 and 2010. Urban Studies (Online First), 1-31
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Introduction
Wealth inequality, as a separate dimension of socio-economic 
stratification, has recently attracted much scholarly attention 
(Piketty, 2014). Although housing wealth is the largest source of 
wealth for the majority of households, only a few studies focus on 
the mechanisms that shape the accumulation of this form of wealth 
over the life course (Spilerman, 2000). Country studies only show 
that housing wealth is generally more equally distributed than 
financial wealth, but less than social security wealth or income 
(Appleyard and Rowlingson, 2010). Wind, Lersch, and Dewilde 
(2016) argue that housing wealth inequality among homeowners 
originates from three drivers: (1) the purchase price, (2) mortgage 
size and amortization, and (3) capital gains and losses. A comparison 
of 17 European countries shows that housing- and welfare policies 
influence to what extent housing wealth increases with social class, 
but due to its cross-sectional set-up, the role of the drivers of housing 
wealth inequality remains unclear. 
The first two drivers of housing wealth implicate a clear link with 
the labor market, since high-income groups are likely to buy more 
expensive homes and have a higher propensity to amortize their 
mortgage. Capital gains and losses, on the other hand, are affected by 
housing market dynamics that distribute them unequally through 
time and space. Limited British and Australian evidence suggests 
that capital gains are more common among high-income groups 
(Burbidge, 1998; Hamnett, 1999). They “tend to move more frequently, 
and had moved upmarket in the 1980s”, with higher returns on their 
investments as consequence (Hamnett, 1999, p. 101) Recently, Newman 
and Holupka (2015) found that capital losses in the US during the 2000s 
have been much more severe for blacks and lower-class individuals 
than for the middle class and white population. However, research 
evidence on how the housing market rather than the labor market 
function as a mechanism behind wealth inequality is scarce. In 
this chapter we contribute to existing literature by evaluating the 
selectivity of capital gains in Sweden during a period of increasing 
socio-economic segregation. 
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In times of increasing socio-spatial inequality, capital gains and losses 
can be expected to be more pronounced (see Stein, 1995 for an econometric 
perspective). The simultaneous up- and downgrading processes that 
constitute increasing socio-spatial inequality are matched by upward 
and downward price mobility in these neighborhoods (Ley et al., 
2002). In this chapter, we propose housing pathways that coincide 
with gentrification and downgrading processes as theoretical bridge 
between increasing levels of socio-spatial inequality and increasing 
levels of wealth inequality. Contrary to ´housing ladders´ or ´housing 
careers´ (Thorns, 1981), ‘housing pathways’ do not presuppose moves 
towards homeownership and higher-status neighborhoods, but allow 
for both upward and downward moves on the housing market at 
any moment during the life course (Clapham, 2002). They show how 
residential mobility alters the social balance in neighborhoods, and 
how the profitability of residential moves is affected by the in/out-
migration of others (causing gentrification / downgrading). Like in 
most Western countries, redirected housing pathways have produced 
more polarized cities in the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial 
society as a result of globalization and welfare state restructuring 
(Sassen, 1991; Wacquant, 2007). In Sweden, this process is speeded up 
due to far-reaching liberalizations in the sphere of housing policy 
and housing finance since the 1990s (Andersson and Kährik, 2015). 
In addition, between 1995 and 2010 house prices have increased with 
243% in the country as a whole, and more than tripled in Stockholm2 
(Ekonomifakta, 2016). This makes Sweden a particularly suitable case 
to capture the consequences of the trend towards financialization 
and marketization that is prevalent all across Europe.
In the current chapter, we analyse the distribution of capital 
gains across income-, educational and migrant groups. We explain 
differences regarding capital gains based on the housing pathways 
of these groups. Using longitudinal register data covering the 
entire Swedish population, we summarize the variation in housing 
pathways of a birth cohort born between 1970 and 1975, living in the 
large and medium-sized cities, during the period between 1995 and 
2 Real estate price index for homeownership, adjusted for inflation.
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2010. We make a threefold contribution to the debate on the causes 
and consequences of wealth inequality. First, we propose housing 
pathways as a theoretical bridge between the upswing in socio-spatial 
inequality and the surge in wealth inequality. Second, we provide 
evidence on capital gains and losses in an institutional context that 
has not been studied yet. Sweden has a stronger tradition of social 
policy and spatial planning than the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
experienced a different trajectory of deregulation. Third, our results 
are based on unique register data with wide coverage instead of small-
scale surveys or aggregate statistics that are previously used to shed 
light on capital gains and losses. 
Housing pathways: linking socio-spatial inequality and capital gains
Between 1995 and 2010, socio-spatial inequality in Swedish urban 
regions increased3. This development is part of a larger trend that 
got a major upswing during the severe economic recession that hit 
Sweden in the early 1990s (Andersson and Hedman, 2016). Areas that 
were hit worst by the economic crisis and subsequently downgraded 
were to a large extent already poor before whilst areas that suffered 
less tended to be better off previously (Andersson, 1998). Hedin et al. 
(2012) suggest that this trend is reinforced by a neo-liberal turn in 
Swedish housing policy. Since the 1990s, housing subsidies are reduced 
and shifted from the supply to the demand side, public housing has 
been sold, and housing finance has been deregulated (Holmqvist and 
Turner, 2014). This reshuffled, concentrated and enlarged the capital 
flow through the built environment. 
The upswing of socio-spatial inequality took place all across the 
Western World, although its timing and drivers might differ from 
Sweden (Tammaru et al., 2015). Globalization, and the consequent 
polarization/professionalization of the labor market are mentioned 
as drivers of socio-spatial inequality (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 
1991). Moreover, the turn from an industrial to a post-industrial 
economy has increased the importance of face-to-face encounters 
3 D index in the Stockholm labour market region rose from 0.18 in 1995 to 0.21 in 2010. 
Similar developments were found in all of Sweden’s ten largest labour market regions, 
see Hedman and Andersson (2015).
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and centrality, which has boosted the demand for housing at 
central locations (Lees et al., 2013; Ley et al., 2002). Furthermore, the 
liberalization of (housing) finance has resulted in larger liquidity that 
could be invested in neighborhoods with low house prices in close 
proximity to neighborhoods with high prices (Guerrieri et al., 2013; 
Smith, 1996). The parallel up- and downgrading of neighborhoods 
and increasing socio-spatial inequality are the result of (1) increasing 
levels of income inequality enlarging the existing differences between 
neighborhoods or (2) selective migration patterns of social groups. 
In the case of Sweden, it is likely to be a combination of both. The 
magnitude of capital gains and losses is dependent on the housing 
pathway: pathways through upgrading neighborhoods are expected 
to be more profitable. In the remainder, we focus on the selectivity of 
certain housing pathways, their contribution to the increasing levels 
of socio-spatial inequality in Sweden, and the implication for capital 
gains and losses.
Income polarization as driver of neighborhood change
Residential mobility often has a reproductive role in relation to the 
distribution of social classes over urban space. Rather than changing 
existing socio-spatial inequalities, mobility patterns stabilize existing 
patterns over time. On an individual level, however, preferences for 
housing tenures, housing types or neighborhood types might vary 
across the life course. Nevertheless most residential moves take place 
between areas with a comparable social status and ethnic composition 
due to structural constrains (other locations are unaffordable) and 
cognitive constrains (other locations are unknown or undesirable) 
(Sharkey, 2012). Although income increases are found to be associated 
with moves to more expensive housing in the US, this type of mobility 
confirms the social status of both the neighborhood of departure and 
arrival (Morrow-Jones and Wenning, 2005).
An increase in income inequality results in an upswing in socio-
spatial inequality, if no residential moves occur, or if moves take 
place between areas with a comparable social status. Tammaru and 
colleagues (2015) argue that a decrease of income stability among 
the lower income strata and a decline in their relative position 
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as a consequence of welfare state restructuring, labor market 
deregulations and the shift towards a globalized post-industrial 
economy result in negative consequences for neighborhoods with 
an over-representation of these groups. At the same time, the 
strengthened position of the high-skilled service workers, followed 
by a subsequent increase in their bargaining power on the housing 
market, is a mechanism behind upgrading in neighborhoods where 
they are overrepresented. 
As a result of the deregulation of production markets, 
abandonment of state monopolies, financial deregulation and a 
general cutback in welfare (Bergh and Erlingsson, 2009), income 
inequality rose faster in Sweden than in the rest of Europe (OECD, 2014). 
On the basis of evidence from Malmö between 1991 and 2010, Scarpa 
(2015) concludes that neighborhoods with an overrepresentation of 
low income groups showed signs of downgrading as a result of the 
worsened income position of their inhabitants (especially during 
periods of crisis) (Andersson and Hedman, 2016).
Selective mobility as driver of upgrading
The upgrading of neighborhoods is often portrayed as the result of 
the selective in- migration of young and high-educated residents, 
under the denominator of gentrification. The term describes “the 
transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city 
into middle-class residential and/or commercial use” (Lees et al., 2013, 
p. XV). Whereas individuals with low economic but high cultural 
capital renovate run-down central apartments in the first wave of 
gentrification, the process becomes more speculative in later waves 
(Lees et al., 2013). Financial accounts of gentrification stress that the 
process is fueled by the existence of ´rent gaps´. Rent gaps arise in 
neighborhoods characterized by an under-investment in housing, 
but located in close proximity to locations with high house prices 
(Smith, 1996). 
Swedish evidence reveals that gentrification processes in 
Sweden are fueled by changes in the housing regime. Since the 1990s, 
public housing companies have privatized part of their stock (Roger 
Andersson & Turner, 2014). Housing pathways that contribute to 
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gentrification often flow through properties that have been converted 
from regulated public rental housing to tenant-owned cooperative 
housing4. (Millard-Ball, 2002) points out that residential mobility 
in converted properties in Stockholm is much higher than in other 
segments of the housing market, due to the initial discount and the 
increasing popularity of these centrally-located properties. It has been 
argued that tenure conversion has speeded up gentrification due to an 
influx of younger, high-educated and more prosperous households in 
these properties (ibid). 
A more market-based sorting of individuals over urban space is 
realized through the implementation of neo-liberal spatial planning 
practices. Developers are encouraged to build ´successful places´, 
where human capital can be housed. As a continuation of the former 
top-down, social-democratic modernist mode of spatial planning, 
local governments have invested in the creation of these ´pockets 
of richness´ (Baeten, 2012). The increasing role of the market in the 
sorting process has meant that the housing pathways of the poor 
are increasingly directed towards to the (downgrading) outskirts, 
whereas the housing pathways of the middle class concentrate in the 
(upgrading) central areas.
Selective mobility as driver of downgrading
Neighborhood downgrading is generally associated with the 
outmigration of middle class residents to avoid the negative 
externalities (e.g. criminality, low-quality public amenities and 
schools, stigmatization etc.) of being located in an area that is 
increasingly home to a low-SES or colored underclass (Wacquant, 
2007; Wilson, 1987). In Sweden, the most distressed neighborhoods 
are increasingly characterized also by a high share of non-western 
immigrants (Andersson and Hedman, 2016). There is also evidence 
4 Tenant-owned cooperative housing is a housing tenure in which the real estate is 
owned by all inhabitants jointly, but each tenant buys the use rights for one apartment. 
These rights are traded on the free market. Tenant-owned cooperatives most often 
consist of high-rise apartment blocks or one- or two-story row-houses. The price lev 
el for a share in a tenant-owned cooperative is generally below  pure ownership but 
direct comparisons are difficult due to differences in housing type (ownership almost 
exclusively consist of land-bound single homes). Still, these shares are very costly, 
especially in attractive parts of larger cities.
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showing that immigrants have a higher risk of remaining in these 
types of neighborhood (Tammaru et al. 2015). Ethnically selective 
housing pathways can to some extent be explained by differences 
in acquisition of different tenure forms. Although factors that are 
generally associated with moves into homeownership (marriage, child 
birth) are more present among the immigrant population (mainly of 
Finnish, Yugoslavian, Iraqi and Somali descent), they have a smaller 
chance than the native population to end up in homeownership, and 
if they do, they enter this tenure later in the life course due to a lack 
of financial resources (Abramsson et al., 2002; Magnusson et al., 2014). 
When they move into homeownership, they are also more likely to 
remain in or near immigrant-dense neighborhoods where house 
prices stagnate compared to majority white neighborhoods. Financial 
accounts of downgrading stress that investments are gradually drawn 
away from such neighborhoods when the housing stock ages and the 
affluent population moves out (Aalbers, 2011). 
Housing pathways and capital gains
In the period between 1995 and 2010, socio-spatial inequality in 
Sweden has increased, partly due to selective migration processes. 
Conventional gentrification theories stress the economic possibility 
to act upon cultural preferences regarding housing (Lees et al., 2013), 
resulting in a spatial clustering of high-educated high-income 
households. Others argue that new waves of gentrification are 
triggered by rent-seeking behavior of starters with high cultural 
capital and knowledge of the local housing market (Hochstenbach 
and Boterman, 2015). Contrary, the lack of economic capital prevents 
low-income households to move out of disadvantaged areas, making 
them ‘stuck in place’ (Sharkey, 2012). Housing pathways cover (1) moves 
between neighborhood types and housing tenures, and (2) in-situ 
upgrading and downgrading processes within the neighborhood of 
residence. The upswing in socio-spatial inequality can be expected 
to be caused by higher number of high-educated, high-income 
households moving into neighborhoods with a higher social status at 
the outset, which in turn are more likely subject to in-situ upgrading 
processes. Since house prices generally reflect up- and downgrading 
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processes (see Freeman, 2011 for a discussion on gentrification, house 
prices and displacement), capital gains and losses are expected to be 
unevenly distributed among social groups.
To sum up, individuals with an immigrant background or a low 
socio-economic status are increasingly ‘trapped’ in rental housing 
where no capital gains are made, or in ownership in downgrading 
neighborhoods. Natives and individuals with high socio-economic 
status are more likely to follow housing pathways characterized by 
moves into homeownership in upgrading neighborhoods. Hence, 
the latter groups are likely to represent the ‘winners’ on the housing 
market in terms of financial profit from their housing consumption. 
Based on this conclusion, we formulate two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Capital gains on the Swedish housing market between 1995 
and 2010 are unevenly distributed towards natives, higher-income and 
higher-educated individuals. 
Hypothesis 2: The uneven distribution of capital gains across social groups 
can be explained by differences in their housing pathways regarding 
tenure, neighborhood composition at the moment of in-migration and the 
development of the neighborhood during the period of residence.
Data and method
Data and sample 
Analyses are based on a sub-set of register data covering the entire 
Swedish population and the properties they have lived in between 
1995 and 2010 (GeoSweden). The longitudinal annual data allows us 
to follow people´s occupational career, family life course and housing 
pathway through time. We focus on individuals born between 1970 
and 1975, who resided with their parents or in rental housing in 1995 
and resided ever-since in the three metropolitan areas (Stockholm, 
Gothenburg, Malmö) or in the ten next-largest cities (Uppsala, 
Västerås, Örebro, Linköping, Helsingborg, Jönköping, Norrköping, 
Lund, Umeå, Gävle). Per household, only one individual is selected 
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(at random). This cohort is the oldest of which we can follow the 
accumulation of housing wealth from the ‘beginning’ (in Sweden, 
moves into homeownership or cooperative housing are very rare). 
Our focus is on the larger cities, since these are the main arena of 
processes of gentrification and downgrading. In total, our sample 
consists of ca. 70.000 individuals.
Variables
The magnitude of capital gains and losses on the housing market is the 
dependent variable of our analysis. First, we calculate the magnitude 
of capital gains and losses for each spell in homeownership or 
cooperative housing. This is the difference between the house value 
at the moment of purchase and the house value at the moment of sale 
(or: the value in 2010), expressed as a percentage of the housing value at 
the beginning of the spell. For tenant-owned cooperatives, for which 
we have no data on individual apartments, capital gains are based 
on the value changes of the real estate as a whole. It should be noted 
that values are based on taxation values, rather than purchase prices. 
Taxation values are based on transaction prices for similar dwellings 
in the surroundings, and updated on a bi/tri-annual basis. We expect 
to capture the longer-term value development of the dwelling since 
the methodology of calculating taxation values is unchanged through 
the years. Since any bias is directed downward (due to delayed 
tax evaluations, our variable capital gains should be regarded as a 
conservative estimate. The total capital gain over the period between 
1995 and 2010 is the sum of the capital gains realized in different spells, 
weighted by the spell length.
Income, education and migrant status are used to investigate 
the uneven distribution of capital gains. Income is measured as the 
log of the average post-tax, post-transfer revenues between 2008 and 
2010 (to filter out short-term fluctuations). Although one may argue 
that the initial income is more important since it better represents 
people’s ability to buy into the ownership segment, we argue that 
the income at the end of the observation period better represents 
social status for this cohort, given their young age at the start of the 
observation period.  The educational level is also measured at the end 
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of the observation period and is classified in four categories, based 
on the program duration: less than 12 years, 12 years, 13-14 years or 12 
and more. We consider someone a migrant when this person is born 
outside Sweden.
We control for individual characteristics and events that occur 
during the life course. First, we control for different partnering 
trajectories, because income pooling heavily impacts upon the 
possibilities one has to realize housing preferences. We distinguish 
between single, stable cohabitation-, separation-single-, and 
separation-repartnered trajectories. Note that we consider someone 
as cohabiting when married or unmarried but registered at the same 
address as another adult with shared children5. Second, we control for 
moves between areas with a different degree of urbanity in Sweden 
(e.g. from a large to a medium-sized city, or the other way around). 
The exposure to housing market fluctuations is measured by (1) the 
year of moving into homeownership or cooperative housing, and 
(2) the number of spells in these tenures. Finally, we control for 
the participation for tenure conversion from public housing into 
cooperative housing, gender and the presence of children in the 
household.
Housing pathways
Five complementary housing pathways are proposed as mechanisms 
explaining the distribution of capital gains across social groups. One 
pathway describes the tenure status of each spell (homeownership, 
cooperative or rental housing). Two pathways describe the immigrant 
composition of the neighborhood at the moment of in-migration 
and the in-situ changes of the share of immigrants during the spell. 
Moreover, two pathways describe the educational composition of the 
neighborhood at the moment of in-migration and the in-situ changes 
of the share of individuals with a university degree during the spell. 
The neighborhood composition is measured by the percentage of 
migrants (low, medium, high) and the percentage of residents with 
a university degree (low, medium, high). The boundaries between 
5 Cohabitants can only be identified in the data if they have common children. 
Cohabitants without common children are categorized as singles.
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the three groups are defined as +/-0.5SD from the mean in the period 
under observation. As for the in-situ changes, the mean is based on 
the first three spells in cooperative housing or homeownership. 
Neighborhood information is calculated on the SAMS (Small Area 
Market Statistics) level, containing between 1000 (smaller cities) and 
2000 residents (Stockholm). Note that we only calculate neighborhood 
characteristics for spells in homeownership and tenant-cooperatives 
since residence in rental housing does not produce any capital gains.
We use second generation sequence analysis to construct clusters 
of housing pathways. These clusters are based on a dissimilarity 
index, following from the (predefined) ‘costs’ of deleting/inserting 
or replacing one spell. These pathways are better suited than event-
history models to capture the longitudinal dynamic in the life course 
(Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2010). In housing studies, they are used to 
map migration chains (Stovel and Bolan, 2004) and the realization of 
housing preferences over time (Coulter et al., 2016).
The modal sequence plots in Figure 4.1 show a graphical 
representation of the ideal-typical pathways in every clustering. The 
pathways are sorted from common (high N) to uncommon (low N). 
In every clustering, the pathways differ from each other in terms of 
timing of moving into tenure forms or neighborhood types. Figure 1a 
shows that the most common tenure pathway is characterized by a long 
period in rental housing before moving into homeownership. Switches 
from cooperative housing to homeownership are less common, 
whereas moves out of homeownership constitute the least followed 
trajectories. Figure 4.1b shows that moves into neighborhoods with a 
low or medium share of residents with an immigrant background are 
far more common than those into a neighborhood with a high share 
of immigrants, due to an overrepresentation of immigrants in rental 
housing and a high degree of spatial concentration of tenures in 
Sweden (Grundström and Molina, 2016). Moreover, Figure 4.1c shows 
that it is uncommon that the share of immigrants increases in later 
stages of the pathway. The most common pathways display a stable or 
a decreasing share of migrants in the neighborhood (Early stable, Mid 
decreasing). Figure 4.1d shows that moves into neighborhood with 
a low share of higher educated residents are less common among 
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homeowners and cooperative dwellers. This is not surprising given 
the higher educational level of owner-occupiers in general. The most 
common clusters (Mid high, Early high) are characterized by a short 
or medium spell in rental, followed by a move into a neighborhood 
with a high level of education (15.000 and 10.000 individuals). As with 
immigration, we find that the most common trajectory regarding in-
situ changes is a stable pattern of modest variation (Figure 4.1e). Not 
only does the level of education tend to be high at the moment of in-
migration, but many individuals also follow pathways where the level 
of education in the neighborhood is increasing.
Methods
The social selectivity of capital gains and losses is analyzed through 
OLS-regression models ran step-wise. The initial model only contains 
the three variables that capture the social selectivity (income, 
education, migrant status). We then add (a) control variables related 
to personal characteristics and life course events, (b) characteristics 
of the housing tenure pathway, namely the length of residence in 
homeownership and cooperative housing, and the total number 
of spells, (c) the average percentage of residents with a university 
degree and migrants at the moment of in-migration across all spells, 
and the average development of the share of migrants and residents 
with a university degree across all spells. In this way, we capture the 
effect of both residential choices and in-situ changes. We proceed 
with a descriptive analysis of the social profile of the five housing 
pathways in terms of income, education and migrant status. Whereas 
the regression analysis shows which types of residential choices 
and in-situ developments are profitable, the descriptive analysis of 
housing pathways shows how common different housing pathways, 
consisting of more and less profitable elements, are among the social 
groups. Furthermore, it contextualizes the associations found in the 
regression analysis by identifying the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms 
of housing wealth. 
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Figure 4.1. Modal sequence plots of five types of housing pathway clusters
 
 
        
     






Note: Sorted from common (high N) to uncommon (low N). Source: GeoSweden (2016).
 
Results
Selective capital gains and losses
In Model 0, table 4.1, we investigate the association between four 
individual level characteristics (income level, educational level, 
migrant status and gender) and the magnitude of capital gains and 
losses between 1995 and 2010. First, we find that post-tax, post-transfer 
income is positively associated with capital gains, as is being a male. 
Education, however, is negatively associated with the magnitude of 
capital gains. Being a migrant is also negatively related. In model 1, 
control variables are included, describing the household composition, 
and partnering history. Model 1 shows that the family life course has an 
effect on capital gains. Compared to first-time married couples, being 
single is associated with higher capital gains, whereas being divorced 
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(and re-partnered) and having children is associated with lower 
capital gains. We suggest that the positive effect of singlehood is due an 
overrepresentation in small (cooperative) apartments in gentrifying 
neighborhoods. Moreover, compared to residing in medium-sized 
cities, residence in larger cities, as well as moves between cities of 
different sizes, has a negative effect on capital gains. Model 1 predicts 
21% capital gains for a low-income, lower-educated male migrant 
who is married, living with children in a large city, against 39% 
capital gains for a high-income, highly-educated native Swede (male, 
married, living with children in a large city). In Model 2, we include 
the length of residence in homeownership or cooperative housing, 
the number of residential moves, and whether someone participated 
in tenure conversion. The coefficient for the length of residence in 
homeownership or cooperative housing is strongly positive. The 
model predicts that each additional year in homeownership or 
cooperative housing is associated with an eight percentage point 
growth of capital gains. Depending on the socio-economic status of 
the individual, the model predicts between 20 and 40 % capital losses 
after one year, but 70 to 90% capital gains after 15 years continuous 
residence in homeownership. The inclusion of this variable drastically 
improves the model fit (now 33% explained variance) and results 
in a change of the effect of education, where the strong negative 
coefficient for a high level of education turns to zero. This means that 
the former negative effect of education and residence in a larger city 
has been due to shorter exposure to one of the ownership tenures. 
We argue that high-educated individuals (in the larger cities) have 
a prolonged educational career and therefore postpone moves into 
homeownership or cooperative housing. Furthermore, those living in 
larger cities enter homeownership or cooperative housing at a later 
moment in their life course due to an overrepresentation of temporary 
residence and a tight housing market. A positive association between 
residence in one of the larger cities and capital gains is unsurprising 
given the large surge in house prices in Sweden’s metropolitan areas. 
Also the gender effect disappears after including control variables. 
The number of residential moves is negatively associated with capital 
gains. 
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In Model 3, information on residential choice is added. The average 
share of migrants in the neighborhoods one has been living in 
between 1995 and 2010, at the moment of in-migration, is negatively 
associated with capital gains, as is the average share of highly educated 
residents. The inclusion of these variables slightly includes the model 
fit. We conclude that the length of residence in homeownership better 
explains capital gains than the type of neighborhood one moves into. 
Model 4 shows the effect of developments in the neighborhood 
composition during the period of residence. An increase in the share 
of migrants is associated with lower capital gains, whereas an increase 
in the share of highly-educated residents is associated with higher 
capital gains. If the share of migrants increases by one percentage 
point, capital gains will decrease by 1,2 percentage point, whereas a 
one percentage point increase of highly educated increases capital 
gains by 2,7 percentage points. After including the neighborhood 
development, the effect of being a migrant disappears, the effect of 
divorce experience becomes much lower and the effect of a higher 
education turns negative. The results indicate that migrants and 
divorcees are overrepresented in neighborhoods with an increasing 
share of migrants and/or a decreasing share of highly educated. 
Higher educated individuals are, on the other hand, overrepresented 
in neighborhoods with an increasing share of highly educated 
residents. Between 1996 and 2010, a low-income, low-educated, male 
migrant living in Stockholm (married, with children) lost more than 
half his housing wealth according to predictions by the regression 
model, whereas a corresponding individual who has a high income, 
is highly-educated and a native Swede almost doubled his housing 
wealth. 
The last two models compare the results for a sample of individuals 
who during the entire period 1995-2010 resided in the three large cities 
with those who have resided in the medium-sized cities. The non-
significant coefficient for income for inhabitants in the large cities 
together with their stronger (negative) coefficients for education 
indicate that the role of neighborhood change is more important in 
explaining capital gains in the larger cities due to higher degrees of 
socio-spatial inequality. 
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Earlier in this chapter, we presented two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 
stated that capital gains are unevenly distributed towards natives, 
higher-income and higher-educated individuals. Hypothesis 2 
stated that the uneven distribution of capital gains is the outcome 
of housing pathways regarding tenure, neighborhood composition 
and neighborhood changes. Our results confirm hypothesis 1 as 
far as income and ethnicity are concerned whereas education is 
negatively correlated with capital gains unless length of residence in 
the ownership segment is controlled for. We also find confirmation 
for hypothesis 2. Especially the length of residence in homeownership 
and changes in the neighborhood composition regarding the share of 
migrants and highly-educated individuals explains why capital gains 
are distributed unevenly. Especially in the large cities, where a fiercer 
upswing of socio-spatial inequality has occurred, capital gains are 
more unevenly distributed towards higher-income groups and native 
Swedes.
Housing pathways and capital gains
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics regarding the social selectivity 
and profitability of different pathways in each cluster. Whereas the 
regression analysis in Table 4.1 shows the impact of several basic 
features of the housing career and the overall effect of residential moves 
and neighborhood developments on capital gains, the descriptive 
analyses in Table 4.2 allow us to map the consequences of more 
complex – and realistic – sets of housing pathways. As for the tenure 
pathway (Table 4.2a), the most common pathway (“Late Ho”) is among 
the least profitable due to the short exposure to homeownership, and 
is followed by a rather diverse group in terms of income, education 
and migration status. In line with the results of the regression 
analysis in Table 4.1, we conclude that pathways characterized by a 
longer exposure to homeownership or cooperative housing are more 
profitable due to the constantly rising house prices. Higher-educated 
individuals are overrepresented in three pathways characterized 
by early moves into cooperative housing (“Early Coop”, “Early Coop – 
Mid Ho”, “Early Coop – Late Ho”). We expect that they moved into this 
urban tenure of multi-family housing during their studies or right 
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afterwards, using their moderate early-career incomes to buy a share 
in a cooperative. Those who moved into (generally more suburban) 
homeownership later on fared less well in terms of capital gains. This 
is not surprising since central areas experienced more rapid price 
increases than peripheral locations between 1995 and 2010. However, 
all three pathways belong to the top-five most profitable pathways 
in this clustering (capital gains between 39% and 62%). Low-income 
earners are overrepresented in pathways characterized by moves 
out of homeownership before the end of the observation period (the 
“Instable” and “Mid period Ho” pathway). It seems that they fall out of 
the homeownership due to their more precarious economic position. 
Especially the “Instable” pathway is unprofitable (3% capital gains). 
Two pathways stick out with a high percentage of migrants; “Instable” 
and “Late Coop”. Both pathways comprise a short exposure to the two 
ownership tenures, which strongly reduces capital gains. 
As for the pathways related to immigrant composition at the 
moment of residential mobility, the most common pathways, with 
about 15,000 individuals in each, are “Mid medium”, i.e. remaining 
in rental for a short spell and then move into a neighborhood with 
a medium share of immigrants (some also start in a neighborhood 
with a high share and the move on into medium), and “Early 
medium”, which is a similar pattern but with an earlier move into 
neighborhoods with a medium-level share (see Table 4.2b). Both 
pathways are characterized by high shares of high-income earners 
(40% and 41%) and highly educated (45% and 44%). Capital gains are 
much higher for the “Early medium” than for the “Mid Medium” 
cluster, due to a later move into homeownership or cooperative 
housing in the latter case. As could be expected on the basis of studies 
on the high degree of ethnic segregation in the Swedish context 
(Grundström and Molina, 2016), migrants move disproportionally 
often into neighborhoods with a high concentration of migrants 
(the “Late high” and “Early high” pathway). These clusters are also 
characterized by a slightly lower share of high income earners and 
highly educated but it should be noted that these shares are still high. 
Almost a third of the individuals following the “late high” pathway” 
have 15 years of schooling or more. This number is equivalent to the 
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“early low” pathway cluster, with the fewest migrants. If we compare 
housing pathways in which an early move into homeownership is 
accompanied by a move into a neighborhood with a low- or a high 
share of migrants, it is remarkable that the move into an immigrant-
dense neighborhood results in lower capital gains (53% versus 79%). 
Regarding in-situ changes in terms of the share of migrants (Table 
4.2c), we find that the most common cluster is one in which individuals 
move into a neighborhood with a certain share of migrants early 
on, whereas this share remains relatively constant during the time 
of residence (“Early stable”). This is not surprising, given the stable 
development in ethnic segregation over time and the generally low 
and stable share in ownerships areas (Hedman and Andersson, 2015). 
With capital gains of 82%, this is the second most profitable pathway 
in the clustering. The most profitable housing pathway is one in 
which individuals move into neighborhoods with a declining share 
of migrants at an early moment in the life course (“Early decreasing”). 
Comparing the “Early stable” pathway with the “Early decreasing” 
pathway, the latter is associated with higher capital gains (95%) than 
the previous (82%). The more profitable pathway cluster contains 
a slightly higher share of immigrants, but a higher share of high-
educated residents. We expect this to be the profile of gentrification 
neighborhoods, in which staying put can be a profitable option for the 
previous majority group (migrants, potentially higher-educated or 
medium-to-high income) when gentrifiers move in (high-educated 
individuals). Four of the ideal typical pathways start with a spell in a 
neighborhood that displays an increasing share of migrants, but none 
ends in such a spell. This is a sign that individuals tend to move away 
from these kinds of surroundings, and of a further concentration of 
immigrants in immigrant-dense rental neighborhoods. 
It could be expected, given the generally higher level of education 
in the ownership segment compared to rentals, that most individuals 
belong to clusters where the level of education in the neighborhood is 
high. This is also what we find: the two most common clusters, “Mid 
high” and “Late high” (with 11.000 and 9.000 individuals respectively) 
are characterized by a short or medium spell in rental, followed by a 
move into a neighborhood with a high level of education (Table 4.2d). 
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The individual post-transfer, post-tax income in the period 2008-2010 
seems to be strongly associated with the neighborhood income at the 
moment of in-migration. High-income earners are overrepresented 
in all the pathways with at least one spell in a neighborhood 
characterized with a high share of highly educated residents. Contrary, 
migrants are overrepresented in the “Late low”, “Late medium” and 
“Instable” cluster. However, large capital gains are not only realized 
by housing pathways through neighborhoods with a relatively large 
share of highly educated residents. The largest capital gains are found 
in the “Early medium” pathway (79%), followed by the “Late high” (63%) 
and the “Early low – Mid medium” pathway (59%). The larger share 
of high-income earners in the “Early medium” compared to the “Late 
medium” pathway suggest that this might be due to in-situ changes. 
Looking closer at in-situ changes (Table 4.2e), we find that 
high-income earners are overrepresented in nearly all clusters 
characterized by at least one spell in a neighborhood with an 
increasing share of residents with a high educational level, and in the 
only cluster characterized by one or more spells in a neighborhood 
with a decreasing share of residents with a high educational level 
(“Late decreasing”). By far the largest capital gains can be found in the 
“Early increasing” cluster (131%), characterized by an early move into a 
neighborhood with an increasing share of high-educated inhabitants 
during the period of residence. None of the income- or educational 
groups is overrepresented in this cluster. This might be the result 
of upgrading processes in which a formerly majority working class 
neighborhood becomes mixed in terms of income. The share of 
migrants following this housing pathway is low. The least profitable 
housing pathways comprise longer spells in rental housing and/or a 
middle spell in a neighborhood with a stable share of high-educated 
residents. Lower-income groups seem to be slightly overrepresented 
in these pathways.
Altogether, the selectivity of capital gains on the housing market 
can be largely explained by the housing pathways people follow (see 
Table 4.2). However, the most profitable housing pathways (an early 
increasing share of high-educated: 131%, an early decreasing share of 
immigrants: 95%) are mixed in terms of income and education. Both 
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residents with a lower social status who stay put, and newcomers with a 
higher social status, profit from the upgrading process. Other pathways 
that are associated with relatively high capital gains consist of moves 
into neighborhoods with low shares of migrants, high shares of high-
educated, and are selective to higher income- and educational groups. 
Moreover, capital gains among migrants and low-income earners are 
limited due to their later moves into homeownership or cooperative 
housing. Early moves into cooperative housing have contributed to 
larger capital gains among higher-educated individuals.
Conclusion
Local housing market dynamics lift up house prices in some periods 
and in some neighborhoods, whereas they lower them in others. This 
means that moving into the right/wrong area at the right/wrong 
moment in time can generate windfall profits/losses for individual 
homeowners. However, in the academic debate on housing wealth 
inequality, capital gains and losses are largely overlooked (exceptions 
include Hamnett, 1999] and Newman and Holupka, 2016). Instead, the 
accumulation of housing wealth is implicitly viewed as a function of 
income, determining the initial purchase price of the dwelling, the 
initial size of the mortgage and the mortgage amortization. In this 
line of reasoning, the increase of income inequality in Sweden (and 
across the board in Europe (Alderson et al., 2005) is the main cause 
behind increasing levels of housing wealth inequality. Such accounts 
leave out the option that the housing market itself might be an 
engine under housing wealth inequality. It is likely that the role of 
the housing market has only gained importance in recent decades 
with the increase of socio-economic segregation (Tammaru et al., 
2015), especially in Sweden which became one of the most liberal-
governed housing markets in the EU in the 1990s (Hedin et al., 2013). 
A more unequal development of house prices within urban regions 
increases the importance of making the right residential decisions. 
This chapter focuses on capital gains and losses on the housing 
market of the 13 largest Swedish cities between 1995 and 2010, for a 
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cohort born between 1970 and 1975 that entered homeownership or 
cooperative housing (in Sweden equivalent to homeownership in 
apartment buildings) around 1995. 
Our results suggest that capital gains and losses on the housing 
market are unevenly distributed towards high-income, native Swedes. 
Hence, housing wealth inequality is not just an outcome of differences 
in purchasing power on the housing market, but also of uneven 
returns on this initial investment. This finding provides evidence 
for Hamnett’s (1999) claim that capital gains increase with social 
class. Moreover, it supports Newman and Holupka’s (2016) finding, 
that capital gains are unevenly distributed towards the white high-
income population, even in a period of continuously rising prices. 
Interestingly, highly-educated individuals have initially lower capital 
gains than their lower-educated counterparts as a result of their later 
entry into homeownership or cooperative housing. However, after 
this postponed entry into homeownership or cooperative housing, 
they accumulate capital gains at a faster rate. 
The uneven distribution of capital gains can to a large extent be 
explained by the housing pathways people follow. Lower educated and 
migrants are overrepresented in housing pathways characterized by a 
late entry into homeownership or cooperative housing, or an exit out 
of these tenures which both result in less capital gains. In-situ changes 
in the neighborhood composition regarding the share of migrants 
and highly educated between 1995 and 2010 are the best predictors 
of capital gains. However, the most profitable pathways (through 
neighborhoods with a decreasing share of migrants or an increasing 
share of highly educated) are followed by people with various 
backgrounds. It concerns especially gentrification neighborhoods 
where both population that stayed put and the newcomers with a 
higher social status could profit from increasing house prices. The 
overrepresentation of highly educated in neighborhoods with a low 
or moderate share of migrants, and a high share of residents with 
a university degree, partly explains their advantageous position vis-
à-vis lower educated in terms of capital gains. Neighborhoods with 
a higher social status from the outset fared better than those with a 
lower social status. 
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Making up the balance sheet of the period between 1995 and 2010, 
native Swedes with high incomes and high educational attainments 
could cluster together, since homeownership and cooperative housing 
in neighborhoods where they were already over-represented became 
unaffordable for other social groups. Decades of market-oriented 
reforms on the Swedish housing market (privatization public 
housing, liberalization of mortgage finance etc.) have contributed to a 
more market-based sorting of individuals over urban space. Although 
this has inflated house prices across the board, low-educated, low-
income individuals and migrants have barely profited. The selective 
redirection of housing pathways that constitutes socio-spatial 
polarization enlarges housing wealth inequality between natives and 
migrants, lower- and higher educated, and lower and higher income 
groups due to divergent returns on their investments in housing. 
Both economic and cultural capital contribute to this outcome since 
only the affluent are able to buy into neighborhoods with a high 
(and increasing) status, whereas only those with knowledge of the 
urban housing market (cultural capital) know where investments 
in housing become part of a new gentrification frontier with larger 
returns (Hochstenbach and Boterman, 2015). In conclusion, the 
housing market has become a major engine under housing wealth 
inequality due to market-oriented reforms and a subsequent upswing 
in socio-spatial inequality.
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CHAPTER 5
Explaining the Tenure Wealth Gap: 
a Comparison of 14 European Countries 
with Different Housing-welfare Regimes




Previous research consistently shows that homeownership is positively 
associated with higher levels of net worth. The existence of this gap 
might in part arise from a larger appetite among homeowners for 
wealth accumulation, whereas cross-country differences regarding 
the size of the tenure wealth gap result from variegated orientations 
of their combined welfare state and housing systems. Since WWII, 
European countries have promoted homeownership by means of 
different policies, for a variety of reasons (i.e. improving housing 
shortages, housing quality, affordability and capital accumulation), 
which has an impact on opportunities for housing wealth 
accumulation. In this paper, we describe the size of the tenure wealth 
gap for 14 European countries, and explain cross-country differences 
in its magnitude with the configuration of the welfare state and the 
housing system. The empirical analyses are based on the Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). Our findings demonstrate 
that homeowners have higher levels of net worth and higher levels 
of financial (non-housing) wealth than tenants. Surprisingly, in 
countries with conservative housing finance, a non-preferential tax 
treatment of homeownership and limited house price inflation, we 
find relatively large tenure wealth gaps; this is associated with wide-
spread private landlordism in a larger, more regulated rental market. 
Countries with a financialized expansion of homeownership are 
characterized by very small tenure wealth gaps, due to wide-spread 
mortgage debts. In countries with a low coverage or generosity of its 
pension system, tenure wealth gaps are moderate, since tenants need 
to compensate for the lack of housing wealth, which is the preferred 
pension supplement in these societies.
A slightly different version of this chapter was published as 
HOWCOME Working paper 18: Wind, B and Dewilde, C. (2017). Net 
Worth and Financial Wealth among Tenants and Homeowners in 14 
Eurozone Countries with different Institutional Arrangements.
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Introduction
Many studies show that homeowners have higher levels of net worth 
than tenants (e.g. Di et al., 2007; Haurin et al., 2002; Lersch & Dewilde, 
2016; Turner and Luea, 2009). Net worth is the sum of financial wealth 
and housing wealth minus any (residential) debts. With every year 
in homeownership, a household’s net worth increases, mainly due 
to mortgage amortization and house price inflation (Di et al., 2007). 
For low- and middle-income households, who buy generally cheaper 
properties on less attractive locations, similar results are found 
(Turner and Luea, 2009). Homeownership is considered as one of the 
most effective enforced saving schemes (Soaita and Searle, 2016). A 
failure to keep up with monthly interest and amortization payments 
results in eviction from the home, whereas savings for tenants are 
non-committal (Quigley, 2006). The above-mentioned country studies 
point out that tenure wealth gaps exist across various institutional 
contexts. However, they do not show or explain international 
differences in the magnitude of the tenure wealth gap.
The existence of tenure wealth gaps is the result of three 
mechanisms: (1) a selection of households with an appetite for wealth 
accumulation into homeownership (Keister et al., 2016); (2) a gap between 
the ‘long-term’ user-costs of homeownership (based on interest rates, 
house price developments and taxation) and renting (based on the 
rent) (Quigley and Raphael, 2004); and (3) differences in the necessity 
to accumulate savings as a result of differences in the role of housing 
assets in different pension systems. Due to the cross-sectional design 
of our study, we cannot fully explain the existence of a tenure wealth 
gap on the individual level, since we are not able to fully control for the 
selection of households with an appetite for wealth accumulation into 
homeownership (See Lersch and Dewilde [2015] for a panel perspective 
on homeownership and savings). Instead, we accept the assumption 
that the first mechanism is of similar importance across the board: In 
all countries, households with an appetite for wealth accumulation 
select themselves into homeownership. Therefore, we focus on the 
macro-level and study the international variation in the role of the 
other two mechanisms (related to the welfare state and the housing 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   153 18-09-17   10:20
Chapter 5
154
system) that that explain the magnitude of the tenure wealth gap in 
different institutional contexts. 
Explaining cross-country differences regarding the size of the 
tenure wealth gap on the basis of institutional differences starts 
from Kemeny’s (1981) claim that the superiority of homeownership 
over rental housing is constructed in a dialectic between ideology 
and policy. In this line of reasoning, larger tenure wealth gaps are 
rooted in policy systems that favor homeownership ideologically 
and practically, and therefore incentivize households to move into 
homeownership and accumulate wealth. One of the above-mentioned 
mechanisms explaining the existence of  differences regarding the 
tenure wealth gap across countries, namely the user-costs of housing 
of tenants versus homeowners, is studied for a limited number of 
countries, over certain reference periods (Haffner and Heylen, 2011; 
Quigley and Raphael, 2004). International comparisons are however 
limited due to the complicated methodology of this method, which 
takes into account the costs of housing (changing over time while 
amortizing the mortgage) and the depreciation rate (changing during 
the house price cycle). By researching variations regarding the size of 
the tenure wealth gap across a broad range of countries, this paper 
provides further evidence of the (wealth) consequences of housing 
systems that determine the user-costs of housing, and welfare states 
that determine the necessity to save, without adding the complexity 
and uncertainty about future price developments that user-costs of 
housing-approaches normally require.
The main interest of this paper is in identifying and explaining 
tenure wealth gaps in a range of European countries representing 
different housing-welfare regimes (HWR’s). The empirical analyses 
in this paper are based on the Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey (HFCS) of the European Central Bank (ECB), carried out in 
2010/11, which provides multiple imputed data on wealth, incomes 
and consumption. Since data collection took place after the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008, which had a negative impact on (housing) 
wealth holdings, our estimations of tenure wealth gaps are relatively 
conservative. The country selection is restricted to a group of Eurozone 
countries monitored by the ECB (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
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France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Finland). We focus on the middle-income 
brackets, aged between 30 and 67, who are not retired. The middle-
income groups have a ‘real’ tenure choice, as they can afford both 
tenures, which allows us to focus on the effect of tenure on wealth 
holdings, while additionally controlling for the income level in our 
multivariate models. As a sort of sensitivity check, we performed 
analyses on a sample with a wider age section as well, which generated 
similar results. Furthermore, we focus on those who are not retired, 
since pension income does not always represent the labor market 
income that is used to purchase the house.
The tenure rent gap: general principles
For tenants, net worth consists of financial wealth only, whereas it 
consists of a combination of financial wealth and housing wealth for 
homeowners. A gap in favor of homeowners exists when they have 
more savings than tenants, or when their financial- and housing 
wealth holdings together are larger than the savings of tenants. 
Country studies find evidence for both claims. Studies consistently 
find higher levels of net worth among homeowners versus tenants 
(Haurin et al., 2002; Di et al., 2007; Turner and Luea, 2009). Pryce and 
Keoghan (2002) point out that homeowners save more than tenants as 
well, to be able to keep up with mortgage payments in times of income 
loss, whereas Lersch and Dewilde (2016) point out that the inclination 
of owners and tenants to save is dependent on opportunities and 
constraints molding life courses and life-course decisions, and 
differs between countries with different housing systems. However, 
across a wide range of countries, it is confirmed that housing wealth 
holdings of homeowners are larger than savings of tenants. The 
above-mentioned evidence suggests that there are both ‘tenure 
wealth gaps’ and ‘tenure financial wealth gaps’. We acknowledge 
that homeownership is part of an ‘investive life style’, oriented 
towards long-term stability and wealth accumulation (Keister et 
al., 2015). Therefore, the selection of individuals with a preference 
for wealth accumulation into homeownership is one of the main 
individual-level factors explaining the existence of a tenure wealth 
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gap. In the remainder, we however focus on two other factors 
explaining cross-sectional variations in the size of this tenure 
wealth gap: the user-costs of housing and the necessity to save. These 
two factors are determined by the housing system and the welfare 
state, and influence cross-country variations, rather than ‘inherent’, 
‘personal’ inclinations to save and become a homeowner, which we 
assume to be fairly similar across Europe.
First, differences in the user-costs of housing between tenants 
and homeowners determine the possibilities for wealth accumulation 
among both groups. Quigley and Raphael (2004) define the user-costs 
of housing as the costs for housing as a service. For tenants, the user-
costs consist of the rent, whereas for homeowners they are composed 
of mortgage interest payments and maintenance costs, minus 
the depreciation rate of the home. The latter factors are however 
intertwined. Subsidies for homeownership (see Donner, 2000) and 
policy-indulged low interest rates (see Aalbers, 2016) have rendered 
homeownership more affordable in later decades, while simultaneously 
contributing to house price appreciation. In a theoretical fashion, one 
could argue that in this process the costs of housing as a service have 
been reduced, while capital gains are inflated. In a more practical 
fashion, we conclude that this contributes to wealth accumulation 
among homeowners. Even in the 1970s, before housing- and mortgage 
market deregulation, housing scholars already pointed at the 
consequences of homeownership subsidies such as building grants, 
subsidized loans, property tax exemptions and mortgage-interest tax 
deductions (see Donner, 2000) for wealth accumulation and disparities 
between tenants and homeowners. Pahl (1975) prophetically stated 
that “[a] family may gain more from the housing market in a few years 
than would be possible in savings from a life time of earnings” (p.291). 
However, gains and losses from housing market booms and busts 
are unequally distributed through time and space, depending on the 
housing system (Hamnett, 1999; Wind and Hedman, 2016). Even in a 
policy vacuum, the user-costs of housing can be expected to be higher 
for tenants compared to homeowners, although the difference can be 
expected to be smaller than in the contexts outlined above. Controlling 
for income, tenants spend more on housing than homeowners due 
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to a risk premium charged by landlords. Fahey and Norris (2011) cite 
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) when they state that “renting is 
subject to a ‘rental externality’ arising from the incentive tenants have 
to over-utilize their dwelling, for instance, by using it to accommodate 
a greater number of occupants or by taking less care of it than owners 
might” (p. 447). Rent regulations, housing allowances or the availability 
of social housing reduce the user-costs of rental housing and therefore 
contribute to wealth accumulation among tenants. French evidence 
suggests that residing in public housing speeds up the transition into 
homeownership since it allows tenants to accumulate some wealth 
that can be used as a down payment (Goffette-Nagot and Sidibé, 2014). 
To summarize the discussion above, we expect that in countries where 
the user-costs of homeownership are lower and rents are higher, the 
tenure wealth gap will be larger.
Second, the necessity to accumulate wealth is determined by the 
orientation of the welfare state. Social protection against income loss 
due to unemployment, sickness or old-age, determines to what extent 
it is necessary to save private resources to cater for welfare needs. 
De Swaan (1988) argues that contributions to state-funded social 
insurance schemes should be conceptualized as ‘transfer capital’. He 
states that “[w]hatever is accumulated by wage-earners through their 
contributions, is not theirs to dispose of. It is tutelary property, kept 
for them until ‘really’ needed. If contributors ‘own’ anything, it is a 
claim to future transfers upon specified conditions of adversity or 
deficiency” (p. 152). In other words, transfer capital crowds out private 
wealth. In countries with a low generosity or coverage of welfare 
arrangements, individuals need to accumulate private wealth to 
cater for welfare needs, and are able to do so due to the lower social 
contributions in these countries.   It might be attractive to accumulate 
wealth through homeownership, especially for self-employed who 
are over-represented in private landlordism. Since tenants need to 
accumulate private wealth through other means, the gap between 
homeowners and tenants regarding net worth is not necessarily larger 
in such contexts. In contexts with a more generous, universalistic 
welfare state, homeowners accumulate housing wealth on top of 
‘their’ transfer capital instead of as a replacement of transfer capital. 
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Tenants, who spend – controlling for the income – a comparable or 
larger share of their income to satisfy their housing needs, are not 
in need of extra savings. Therefore, the tenure wealth gap can be 
expected to vary between different welfare state contexts. 
The tenure wealth gap in Europe
The size of the tenure wealth gap is expected to vary across Europe, 
since two drivers of the tenure wealth gap, namely the user-costs of 
housing and the necessity to save, are associated with differences 
between different housing systems and welfare states. We propose 
five ‘housing-welfare regimes’ (HWR’s) in which the housing system 
and welfare state are configured in a different fashion. Therefore, we 
first present the classic theory that connects housing and welfare, 
which we amend subsequently by introducing theories of housing 
system- and welfare state change as a consequence of intensification 
of economic globalization and economic restructuring.
The classic trade-off
The earliest attempts to integrate theories on housing systems and 
welfare states connect the two drivers of the tenure wealth gap: the user-
costs of housing and the necessity to save. Kemeny (1981) argues that 
countries with high homeownership rates do not develop generous 
welfare states. Key in his argument is the distribution of housing 
expenses across the life course for both tenure groups. Whereas 
tenants pay (a fairly even amount) of rent across the life course, 
homeowners are characterized by ‘frontloading’. Their housing-
related expenditures peek early in their career, when they build their 
own house or when they amortize their mortgage. Therefore, they 
are reluctant to support the introduction of higher taxes, needed to 
finance the establishment of a generous welfare state. Castles (1998) 
refines this argument by narrowing down the trade-off between 
homeownership and welfare to a trade-off between homeownership 
and pensions. Due to financial frontloading, the housing expenses 
of homeowners are very low after the amortization of the mortgage. 
Homeowners are therefore not in need of very generous public (PAYG) 
pensions. The above-mentioned trade-off is based on social protection 
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and expenditures, but could also be interpreted in line with de 
Swaan’s (1988) vision, in which transfer capital (social security wealth) 
crowds-out private savings (including housing wealth accumulation), 
vica versa. Following the classic trade-off between homeownership 
and welfare, there are countries with low homeownership rates and 
generous pensions, and countries with high homeownership rates 
and low pensions.
Changing housing systems and the user-costs of housing
Three housing-welfare regimes (HWR’s) can be positioned in the 
above-mentioned classic trade-off between homeownership and 
pensions. First, there is the Regulated HWR, consisting of a group 
of German-speaking countries with relatively low homeownership 
rates, large regulated rental sectors, and generous public pensions 
(Germany and Austria). In this regime, the taxation of homeownership 
is moderately low and subsidies for homeownership uncommon. Tax 
benefits for rental landlords are considerable, which increases the 
attractiveness of owning rental housing in these countries (Bourassa 
and Hoesli, 2010). As a result of a political compromise between 
social-democrats and conservatives, homeownership is widespread 
in rural surroundings, whereas rental housing dominates the cities 
(Matznetter, 2002). In this regime, the user-costs of homeownership are 
relatively high, as a consequence of limited house price inflation due 
to the conservative housing finance system that requires considerable 
down-payments. The user-costs of housing are lower for tenants due 
to extensive rental regulations. 
Second, there is the State-supported HWR (Belgium, France, 
Finland), in which homeownership rates are moderately high, Pay-
As-You-Go6 (PAYG) pensions relatively generous, but funded pensions 
are small. The countries in this regime favor homeownership over 
rental housing by means of fiscal benefits and (indirect) subsidies 
(Donner, 2000). Homeownership is promoted as pension arrangement, 
rather than investments in funds. Among self-employed, who are 
6  Pay-As-You-Go pension systems use the pension contributions of the current cohort of 
workers to finance the pensions of the retired population. In funded pension systems, 
a cohort of workers saves for their own pensions after retirement.
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poorly covered by the welfare state, secondary property ownership is 
common to supplement pensions (De Decker and Dewilde, 2010). Rents 
in the, predominantly private, rental sector are high due to the fairly 
unregulated nature of this market (Haffner et al., 2008). For the lowest 
income groups (not included in this study) social housing is available. 
For the middle incomes, one could argue that homeownership is a 
public-private pillar of the welfare state in the State-supported HWR. 
Whereas the user-costs of homeownership are subsidized, the user-
costs of rental housing far less subsidized. 
Third, a group of Mediterranean and post-communist countries 
makes up the Familialistic HWR (Italy, Malta, Greece and Slovakia). 
In the Mediterranean countries, homeownership has become the 
dominant tenure due to a high tolerance towards informal self-
construction (Allen, 2006). Currently, homeownership is taxed 
moderately. In the countries with a post-communist legacy, the 
taxation of homeownership is often very limited as a result of the 
mass-privatization of (low-quality) rental housing after the fall of 
communism, which transferred assets that were a financial burden 
for the state to households (Stephens et al., 2015). What unites this 
subset of Mediterranean and post-communist countries is the large 
role of the family in the provisioning of housing. This is, for instance, 
visible through the low rent levels in these countries due to rent-free 
living and family-landlordism (Allen, 2006). The user-costs of housing 
are moderate for both tenures in the Familialistic housing-welfare 
regime. However, wealth accumulation has a different meaning in 
this regime since wealth should be considered a family rather than a 
household resource in these countries. 
Two housing-welfare regimes can no longer be positioned in 
the ‘classic’ trade-off between housing and welfare due to changes 
in their political economy of housing and welfare. In countries 
that introduced liberal mortgage finance, homeownership rates 
have increased, without causing a reduction of pension generosity 
or pension wealth. Schwartz (2014) argues that a complementarity 
between mortgage debts and pension wealth has arisen, since large 
mandatory pension savings (in funds) cover the residential loans 
of the mortgaged homeowners. Delfani et al. (2014) add that this 
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complementarity only occurs when housing is provisioned through 
the market and pensions are organized as collective, mandatory 
funds. The complementarity between pensions and mortgage debt 
can be conceptualized as a form of macro-level asset-based welfare. 
Contra to classic welfare provisioning, in which social contributions 
are used to fund collective arrangements, asset-based welfare is built 
on private wealth (assets) that can be used to absorb income shocks. 
The regime in which the liberalization of housing finance 
has taken place first, is the Financialized HWR, consisting of the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg. These countries have geared towards a 
fully financialized model of homeownership provisioning already in 
the early 1990s. The deregulation of mortgage markets allows financial 
institutions to take larger risks, by externalizing risks to third parties 
(residential mortgage-backed securities). Higher loan-to-income 
and loan-to-value ratios, and reduced interest rates, enabled a larger 
share of the lower-middle class to enter homeownership (Schwartz 
and Seabrooke, 2008). In the Netherlands, loan-to-value rates of more 
than 100% are common practice. The financialized provisioning of 
homeownership has impacted upon housing market dynamics. It has 
increased the turnover rate on the housing market (van der Heijden 
et al., 2011) and boosted house prices (OECD, 2014). The increased 
borrowing capacity boosted the purchasing power of households, 
while bidding on the same properties as before. Whereas house prices 
followed inflation in Germany (representative of a conservative 
housing finance system), prices tripled in real terms since the mid-
1980s in the Netherlands (representative of a liberal housing finance 
system). The introduction of liberal housing finance can be considered 
as a continuation of the promotion of homeownership through 
subsidies.  In the Netherlands, mortgage tax relief is still larger than 
all taxes on homeownership together (Hilbers et al., 2008). The house 
price inflationary policies entail a gain for homeowners, but a loss 
for tenants. Rent levels in the Financialized housing-welfare regime 
are among the highest in Europe since the commodification and 
financialization of housing have resulted increased the premiums 
charged by private landlords. Especially for low-income tenants, 
affordability has decreased (Dewilde and De Decker, 2016). Hence, 
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homeowners have more room to save, due to their lower housing 
expenses. In the Financialized housing-welfare regime, the user-costs 
of homeowners are heavily subsidized, whereas they are only reduced 
for a subsample of social tenants (all countries in this regime have 
relatively large social rental sectors [Housing Europe, 2015]). 
Finally, there is the Financialized-familialistic HWR, consisting 
of countries that are historically characterized by a large role 
of the family in the provisioning of housing, and consequently 
high homeownership rates, and shifted towards a financialized 
provisioning of homeownership since the (late) 1990s (Spain, Portugal 
and Cyprus). In this regime, the share of outright homeownership is 
however still far larger. Furthermore, pensions are less generous and 
pension funds smaller.
Changing welfare states and the necessity to save
The necessity to save differs between countries along the lines of the 
above-mentioned housing-welfare regimes. First, the generosity of 
welfare state benefits (especially pensions) determines the necessity 
to save. Second, the role of private assets in welfare provision impacts 
upon the necessity to save.
The generosity of the welfare state has an impact on wealth 
accumulation of different socio-economic groups. Cowell et al. (2012) 
conclude that “[i]n countries with more generous and inclusive 
welfare state provision there will not only be less incentive to 
accumulate private wealth holdings but as these services are funded 
through taxation this will reduce personal income, as taxation 
represents a form of compulsory saving, and therefore the ability to 
accumulate personal financial assets” (p. 10). However, this trade-off 
seems to apply to the lower socio-economic strata only. They engage 
in consumption when labor-market and life-course risks are covered 
by collective insurance schemes. The upper socio-economic strata 
are able to invest a considerable share of their high and stable labor 
market income. In an overview of wealth inequality in Europe, Skopek 
et al. (2014) find that European countries with more extensive welfare 
states are therefore characterized by generally more unequal wealth 
distributions. When this line of reasoning is extended to the necessity 
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to save for tenants and homeowners, one could argue that tenants need 
private savings in the housing-welfare regimes with low pensions or 
fragmented pension coverage in order to compensate for the lack of 
housing wealth holdings, such as in the State-supported HWR and the 
Familialistic HWR, whereas the necessity to save for tenants is much 
lower in the Regulated HWR, as tenants are covered by generous 
welfare state arrangements. 
The generosity of the welfare state has changed as a result of 
welfare state restructuring. Some scholars describe this restructuring 
as retrenchment under influence of fiscal austerity (Garett and 
Mitchell, 2001), whereas others see resilience or gradual change 
under influence of the creation of a welfare state constituency that 
votes against retrenchment (Pierson, 2001). Lennartz (2017) classifies 
countries based on changes in two types of welfare state spending 
between 1995 and 2007: protective spending and productive spending. 
Protective spending represents the classical social security expenses, 
whereas productive spending entails expenses for active labor market 
policies and social investment strategies. First, there is a group 
of countries where productive spending has decreased whereas 
protective spending has remained stable or slightly decreased as well. It 
concerns countries from the State-supported HWR and the Regulated 
HWR. Second, there are “Southern, Central and Eastern European 
countries [that] have retained a welfare model that primarily aims 
to protect and stratify income” (p. 126), by increasing both protective 
and productive spending. It concerns especially countries from the 
Familialistic HWR and the Financialized-familialistic HWR.
Due to the introduction of social investment strategies and asset-
based welfare in the Financialized HWR, the relationship between 
welfare state generosity and the necessity to accumulate private 
wealth is no longer linear. Especially in Northwestern Europe, the 
welfare state has been reorganized to include those who suffer 
from new social risks (such as recurrent unemployment, divorce, 
single parenthood) with, consequentially, a new balance between 
rights and duties (Bonoli, 2005). Lennartz argues that this subgroup 
of countries has reoriented its welfare state towards the productive, 
social investment model. In these countries, welfare taxes are lower 
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than in other countries, but benefits remain generous. It is especially 
the latter group where ‘privatized Keynesianism’ has gained ground 
in recent years. By taking out larger debts (with housing assets as 
collateral), middle-class households with stagnant incomes are able 
to sustain their consumption (Crouch, 2009; Mau, 2015). Lennartz 
(2017) points out that there is synergy between asset-based welfare 
and social-investment strategies, since both aim to buffer risks from 
an individual life-course perspective in order to maximize human 
capital. As a result, dual-income households are common, which 
facilitates entering into large mortgage debts. 
Labor market regulations have furthermore changed, since 
European welfare states are confronted with a fiercer trade-off 
between social equality and economic growth, as its low-skilled 
but well-protected workers have difficulties to remain employed in 
an increasingly competitive world market. Barbieri (2009) argues 
that European welfare states have responded to this challenge in 
broadly three ways. First, there are the liberal-oriented Anglo-Saxon 
welfare states that allowed for an increase of income inequality (no 
country representative of this development is included in our study). 
Second, in the Northwestern European welfare states with a smaller 
tolerance towards income inequality, the insecurity of employment 
has increased for a specific subpopulation due to the emergence of a 
shell of flexible and temporary labor contracts. It concerns especially 
the Regulated HWR, the Financialized HWR and the State-supported 
HWR. Finally there is a group of, especially Mediterranean, countries 
where labor of mainly male breadwinners remained relatively 
protected and unemployment has increased (the Familialistic HWR 
and the Financialized-familialistic HWR). 
Housing and welfare: a typology
We can now distinguish between five housing-welfare regimes (HWR’s) 
that differ from each other regarding the user-costs of housing and / 
or the necessity to save. There are three regimes in which the classical 
trade-off between homeownership and welfare takes a different shape. 
First, there is the Regulated HWR (Germany and Austria), in which 
homeownership rates are low and collective pension arrangements 
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generous (but fairly stratified). Fiscal benefits for homeownership are 
limited and house prices fairly stable. Furthermore, rents are affordable. 
In theory, this policy configuration results in a small tenure wealth 
gap. Second, there is the Familialistic HWR (Greece, Italy, Malta and 
Slovakia) in which welfare state spending is moderate and especially 
used for pensions. Furthermore, rental housing is relatively affordable 
due to rent-free living and family-renting. In this regime, the tenure 
wealth gap is expected to be relatively small since tenants need to 
accumulate savings to cater for their welfare needs. Third, in the State-
supported HWR (Belgium, France and Finland), homeownership 
rates are high, and collective pension arrangements relatively small 
and stratified. Through fiscal welfare, homeownership functions as 
a pension supplement. Whereas tenants with a low socio-economic 
status fall below the poverty line due to high rent levels, tenants with a 
higher socio-economic status can be expected to accumulate financial 
wealth as pension arrangement. The tenure wealth gap in the State-
supported HWR is expected to be larger than in the Familialistic HWR 
due to a state-indulged reduction of the user-costs of homeownership.
There are two regimes in which the traditional trade-off between 
homeownership and welfare does not occur due to the introduction 
of liberal housing finance and social investment strategies in welfare. 
In the Financialized HWR (the Netherlands and Luxemburg), 
homeownership rates are high and mortgage debts extensive. These 
debts are balanced by a very large stock of collective pension wealth. 
Social investment strategies play an important role in the provision of 
welfare. Due to the extensive (indirect) homeownership subsidies and 
house price inflation, homeowners have a large potential for wealth 
accumulation, whereas tenants have a low incentive to save due to 
their inclusion in generous welfare state arrangements. We therefore 
expect the largest tenure wealth gap in the Financialized HWR. Finally, 
in the Financialized-familialistic HWR (Spain, Portugal and Cyprus), a 
similar tendency can be observed. However, the public pension system 
is less generous, which encourages tenants to accumulate savings, 
which eventually result in a smaller tenure wealth gap. A summary 
of the housing-welfare regimes is given in Table 5.1, including 
expectations regarding the size of the tenure wealth gap.
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Data and methods
The empirical work is based on the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey (HFCS), conducted by the European Central 
Bank (ECB), between 2008 and 2011 in 15 European countries. We 
exclude Slovenia due to a small sample size. The HFCS provides 
multiple imputations (five in total) to overcome the problem of item 
non-response on questions about income and wealth. The sample is 
representative for the general population (ECB, 2013). In total, 62.000 
households are included in the dataset. Malta has the smallest sample 
(843), France the largest (15.006).
The analysis sample is restricted to non-retired households aged 
between 30 and 67. Moves into homeownership (and thus: tenure 
choice) generally take place around or after the age of 30 (Angelini et 
al. 2013). Furthermore, the post-retirement income does not represent 
the labor market income used for home-buying. Our sample only 
includes the middle class (the middle four deciles of the income 
distribution). The lowest thirty percent of the income distribution has 
in many countries no other choice but renting, whereas the top thirty 
percent nearly always resides in homeownership. It is the broader 
middle class that is effectively able to choose between renting and 
owning, and therefore mostly responds to institutional arrangements.
Micro-level variables
Net worth and financial wealth are used to operationalize the tenure 
wealth gap. Both are measured at the household level, since household 
members are assumed to pool resources. Net worth is measured as 
the sum of savings, investments in bonds and stocks, the value of 
the owned home and other real estate, minus outstanding mortgage 
debts. We do not include pension wealth as a micro-level variable, 
since its meaning and measurement is dependent on the welfare 
regime (public/private, savings/PAYG). Financial wealth is the sum of 
savings and investments in bonds and stocks (for tenants equal to net 
worth). For both variables, multiple imputations provide estimates 
for each household to deal with missing values. The wealth variables 
are expressed in Euro’s, and as a percentage of the national mean. 
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We differentiate between the following tenure statuses: tenants 
(residing in rental housing / rent-free accommodation / tenant-
owners), and homeowners (outright and mortgaged). Four percent 
of our sample consists of tenants who own real estate that is not 
their primary residence (see Hulse and McPherson [2014] for a 
conceptualization of dual tenure). Unfortunately, we are unable 
to distinguish between social and private tenants. However, the 
organization of the rental sector and the meaning of social housing 
differ across institutional contexts and is part of the regime typology 
on the basis of which we explain cross-country differences. Second, 
we differentiate between mortgaged homeowners and outright 
homeowners since both categories represent different stages of 
housing wealth accumulation. Descriptive indices of tenure wealth 
gaps are based on a simplified tenure variable, in which we only 
differentiate between tenants and homeowners (tenants and tenant-
owners versus mortgaged- and outright homeowners).
To estimate the ‘net’ effect of tenure on net worth / financial 
wealth, we control for the following covariates that are associated 
with both the process of wealth accumulation and tenure choice: gross 
income (net income is unavailable in the HFCS), educational status 
of the reference person (primary, lower secondary, higher secondary 
and tertiary education), immigrant status, age, household size and 
secondary property ownership.
Methods
First, we provide descriptive information on the size of the tenure 
wealth gap in each of the 14 countries under observation. The size of 
the gap is measured as a ratio between the wealth holdings of tenants 
and homeowners, and as the effect of tenure on net worth / financial 
wealth, controlling for all above-mentioned control variables (to 
single out the share of the tenure wealth gap that is the result of 
housing tenure). Both measures are displayed graphically. 
Second, we present country-fixed effects regression analyses, 
estimating the effect of housing tenure on net worth and financial 
wealth. In these analyses, we control for all unobserved heterogeneity 
at the country-level (Möhring, 2012). We estimate the effect of different 
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institutional arrangements by including an interaction between the 
housing-welfare regime (Regulated, State-supported, Familialistic, 
Financialized, Fiancialized-familialistic) and tenure (tenants versus 
homeowners). Analyses are carried out on five implicates containing 
imputations and are combined using Stata’s multiple imputation 
package. Due to the structured nature of the HFCS, all results are 
presented with robust standard errors to allow residuals to vary in a 
non-random way. 
Results
Describing the tenure wealth gap
Table 5.2 shows the size of the tenure wealth gap in 14 Eurozone 
countries. First, it describes the ratio between tenants and homeowners 
regarding net worth and financial wealth. Second, it displays the 
effect size of the tenure effect on net worth and financial wealth per 
country, which can be considered as the ratio between the wealth 
holdings of tenants and homeowners, controlling for household-level 
covariates. In 5.1 and 5.2, both representations of the tenure wealth gap 
are ordered from high to low.
In all 14 Eurozone countries under observation, homeowners 
have significantly (p<0.05) higher levels of net worth than tenants 
(see Table 5.2). These results are robust when a wider age range is 
taken into consideration. Figure 5.1 shows the ratio between tenants 
and homeowners in terms of net worth and financial wealth. The 
largest tenure wealth gaps (based on net worth) can be found in 
Austria, Italy, Malta and Slovakia (in these countries, homeowners 
own between 6x and 12x the net worth of tenants). Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Cyprus and Spain have the smallest relative difference 
between tenants and homeowners (between 2x and 4x the net 
worth of tenants). Interestingly, countries with larger gaps between 
tenants and homeowners in terms of net worth, are characterized 
by larger gaps between these groups in terms of financial wealth 
as well. In countries with small tenure wealth gaps (such as Greece, 
Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Luxemburg), the difference 
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between tenants and homeowners regarding financial wealth is not 
significant. This finding provides new, cross-country evidence for the 
claim that that housing wealth and financial wealth do not operate 
as ‘communicating vessels’. On the contrary, homeowners have more 
financial wealth than tenants, and accumulate housing wealth on 
top.
Figure 5.2 shows the size of the tenure wealth gap, after 
controlling for household-level covariates that are associated with 
the accumulation of wealth and the entry into homeownership. 
After controlling for income, age, educational level, immigration 
background, having received a financial gift, and the ownership of 
secondary property, the ratio between tenants and homeowners 
regarding net worth and financial wealth holdings is strongly reduced 
in all countries under observation. What is left, is the ‘net’ effect of 
housing tenure, representing the financial outcome of a tenure choice, 
ceteris paribus. This pattern differs from the pattern presented in 
Figure 5.1, based on the ratio between tenants and homeowners, due to 
differences in the socio-economic profile of homeowners (regarding 
income, education, age and secondary property ownership) between 
countries. Controlling for household characteristics does not reduce 
the tenure wealth gap as much as in other countries in Germany, 
Portugal, Greece and Cyprus. This means that homeownership is 
less selective of households consisting of older natives with higher 
incomes and higher educational levels (characteristics that are 
generally associated with wealth accumulation). In Italy and Finland 
and Slovakia, the tenure wealth gap is reduced more than in other 
countries after controlling for household characteristics. This means 
that homeownership is more selective of household with the ‘right’ 
characteristics in relation to wealth accumulation. 
The pattern of tenure wealth gaps, based on the effect sizes of 
the association between housing tenure and net worth / financial 
wealth (controlling for household characteristics linked with wealth 
accumulation), shows a clear overlap with the typology of housing-
welfare regimes, albeit in a different direction than expected. The 
largest tenure wealth gaps are found in the Regulated HWR (Austria 
and Germany), followed by the Familialistic HWR (Greece, Malta, Italy 
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– Slovakia is an exception with a relatively small tenure wealth gap). 
The smallest tenure wealth gaps can be found in the Financialized 
HWR (Luxemburg, the Netherlands), followed by the State-supported 
HWR (Finland, Belgium – France is an exception with a relatively 
large tenure wealth gap). The Financialized-familialistic HWR takes 
a middle position. The tenure financial wealth gap is generally larger 
in housing-welfare regimes with larger tenure wealth gaps. An 
exception is the Financialized-familialistic HWR with a moderate 
tenure wealth gap, but the largest financial wealth gap. The smallest 
tenure financial wealth gap is observed in the Financialized HWR 
(which is characterized by the smallest tenure wealth gap as well).
Table 5.2. Net worth and financial wealth differences between tenants and homeowners 
in 14 European countries
Net 
worth




































Austria 11.25 * 4.54 * 3.71 * 2.59 * 195 162
Belgium 3.83 * 0.94 * 1.71 0.13 126 379
Cyprus 3.46 * 1.23 * 1.47 1.85 * 73 308
Germany 4.95 * 2.17 * 1.85 * 0.94 * 325 367
Spain 3.61 * 1.04 * 1.47 1.54 * 226 1202
Finland 6.53 * 0.77 * 2.8 * 0.63 * 409 2217
France 6.14 * 1.21 * 1.96 * 1.07 * 1206 2228
Greece 4.82 * 1.48 * 1.68 0.87 279 416
Italy 7.84 * 1.32 * 1.64 * 0.42 * 592 1028
Luxemburg 2.97 * 0.81 * 1.1 0.03 54 162
Malta 7.19 * 1.34 * 2.13 * 1.32 34 152
Netherlands 3.29 * 0.81 * 1.09 0.11 55 183
Portugal 5.59 * 1.57 * 2.92 * 1.92 * 308 640
Slovakia 6.76 * 1.02 * 1.55 0.23 88 415
Note: Significance levels are based on p<0.05. Source: HFCS (2016).
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Tenure	wealth	gap	(ratio)
Net	worth Financial	wealth
Note: Non-signifi cant results (p<0.05) are displayed in a lighter color.













AT DE PT GR MT IT CY FR ES SK BE LU NL FI
Tenure	wealth	gap	(effect	size)
Net	worth Financial	wealth
Note: Non-signifi cant results (p<0.05) are displayed in a lighter color.
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Explaining the gap: the household-level
We present two groups of country-fixed effects models to explain 
household differences in net worth and financial wealth, controlling 
for all unobserved heterogeneity at the macro-level (see Table 5.3). 
Model 1.1 and 2.1 presents the association between different housing 
tenures (tenant, tenant-owners, mortgaged homeowners, outright 
homeowners) and net worth / financial wealth. In Model 1.2 and 
2.2, household characteristics are added (income, age, educational 
status, migration background, household size, secondary property 
ownership). 
Model 1.1 shows that tenant-owners, mortgaged homeowners and 
outright homeowners have higher levels of net worth than tenants. 
Furthermore, it shows that outright owners have higher levels of net 
worth than mortgaged owners, whereas mortgaged homeowners have 
higher levels of net worth than tenant-owners. We suggest that tenant-
owners (a large majority of them is outright owner) own generally 
smaller properties (holiday homes, buy-to-let properties etc.). Tenant-
owners might however have higher levels of financial wealth than 
tenants, since they might have rental income from these properties. 
Furthermore, mortgaged homeowners have less housing wealth than 
outright owners since part of their home value is covered by a mortgage. 
Model 2.1 shows that tenant-owners and mortgaged homeowners have 
more financial wealth than tenants, whereas outright homeowners 
have significantly higher financial wealth holdings than tenant-
owners and mortgaged homeowners. Altogether, Model 1.1 explains 
19% of the total variance in net worth, whereas model 2.1 explains only 
2% of the total variance in financial wealth.
The addition of household characteristics, associated with wealth 
accumulation in general, reduces the coefficients of different tenures 
in Model 1.2 and 2.2, and improves the model fit considerably (from 
19% to 30% and from 2% to 8%). Model 1.2 and 2.2 show that net worth 
and financial wealth are associated with higher incomes, older ages 
and higher education. Migrant background is associated with lower 
levels of net worth, but not with lower levels of financial wealth. This 
finding matches the conclusions of research from the United States 
(US), reporting lower levels of net worth among lower socio-economic 
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groups and ethnic minorities (Krivo and Kaufman, 2004). Receiving 
a fi nancial gift (of at least 5000 Euro) is associated with higher 
net worth and fi nancial wealth holdings. Furthermore, owning 
secondary property is associated with higher levels of net worth and 
fi nancial wealth. The introduction of these variables changes the 
eff ect of housing tenure on net worth and fi nancial wealth. Tenant-
owners no longer diff er signifi cantly from tenants in terms of net 
worth and fi nancial wealth after the introduction of a variable 
describing secondary property ownership. Model 1.2 and 2.2 show that 
mortgaged homeowners have, even after controlling for the above-
mentioned household characteristics, higher levels of net worth 
and fi nancial wealth compared to tenants. However, the diff erence 
between tenants and mortgaged homeowners regarding fi nancial 
wealth is relatively small. We argue that housing wealth crowds out 
fi nancial wealth during the period of mortgage amortization because 
mortgage payments partly obstruct the accumulation of savings. The 
largest accumulation of net worth and fi nancial wealth takes place 
in the hands of the outright homeowners. They have amortized their 
mortgage and have – due to their low housing expenses – room to 
accumulate considerable savings.
Figure 5.3. Tenure wealth gaps (eff ect sizes) in diff erent housing-welfare regimes.
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Table 5.3. Country-fixed effects regression analysis of the effect of housing tenure on net 
worth and financial wealth.
 
 
Net worth    
 
Financial wealth
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2
Tenure
Tenant - - - -
Tenant-owner 1.18*** -0.23 1.32** -0.95
Mortgaged owner 1.55*** 1.04*** 1.27* 0.40*  




High 0.21*** 0.59** 
Age
30-39 (ref.) - -





Lower secondary 0.22*** 0.84***
Higher secondary 0.39*** 1.15***
Tertiary 0.52*** 1.41***
immigrant
No (ref.) - -
Yes -0.12*  -0.06
Household size 0.05+  0.00
Gift received
No (ref.) - -
Yes 0.42*** 1.31***
Owning secondary property
No (ref.) - -
Yes 1.32*** 1.945*  
Constant 0.04 -0.71**   1.02** -0.57
R-squared 0.19 0.3 0.02 0.08
N 13829 13787   13829 13787
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.005, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Source: HFCS (2015).
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Explaining the gap: Housing-welfare regimes
We next explain cross-regime variation regarding the size of the (1) 
tenure wealth gap and (2) tenure financial wealth gap by including an 
interaction between the housing-welfare regime and housing tenure 
in the country-fixed effects models that control for a wide range of 
household characteristics, presented in Model 1.2 and 2.2 (Table 5.3). 
A graphical representation of the tenure wealth gap and the tenure 
financial wealth gap in different HWR’s, controlling for household 
covariates and all unobserved heterogeneity on the country level, is 
presented in Figure 5.3. In the remainder, HWR’s are discussed one 
by one, by presenting a comparison with the tenure wealth gaps 
occurring in other regimes. 
Table 5.4. Tenure wealth gaps compared across regimes (Regulated HWR as reference). 
Housing-welfare regime (HWR) Net worth Sig. Financial wealth
Regulated HWR 3.28 * 1.44
State-supported HWR -2.20 * -0.50
Familialistic HWR -2.04 * -0.90
Financialized HWR -2.41 * -1.41
Financialized-familialistic HWR -1.97 * 0.41
Control variables not displayed
Constant -0.66 * -0.73
R-squared 0.31 0.07
N 13787 13787
Note: The main effect of tenure is the effect of owning versus renting on net worth and financial 
wealth for the housing-welfare regime that is the reference category in this analysis (and refers 
to the effect reported alongside the Regulated HWR). Results are considered significant if 
p<0.05.
The largest tenure wealth gap can be found in the Regulated HWR. 
Table 5.4 shows that the difference between tenants and homeowners 
in terms of net worth and financial wealth is significantly larger 
than in all other regimes (p<0.05). This is unexpected since 
homeownership is not taxed preferentially, and house price inflation 
has been very limited. Furthermore, rents are moderate due to strict 
regulations. We argue that the large tenure wealth gap is the result 
of the nature of homeownership in Germany and Austria. In both 
countries, homeownership is socially selective due to the conservative 
housing finance system and low (indirect) government subsidies 
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on homeownership. Although the selectivity of homeownership 
is partly controlled for in the model, our income band is still quite 
broad (deciles 3 to 7) and apparently we do not capture all selectivity. 
Furthermore, due to stable house prices, housing wealth holdings 
of homeowners dampened less in this regime compared to others. 
What sets the countries in the Regulated HWR apart from the other 
countries is the over-representation of rental housing in urban areas, 
and a large proportion of small-scale private landlords being active 
on the rental market. In larger cities such as Vienna, homeownership 
rates are well-below 20% (Kadi, 2015), whereas homeownership is a 
majority-tenure in most of the Southern-European cities. In Germany, 
60% of rental housing is let out by private individual landlords (Kemp 
and Koffner, 2014). Private landlords might make smaller gains than 
in other countries due to strict rent regulations, but their investments 
are very stable. The rental incomes of private landlords are one of the 
main explanations of the large financial wealth gaps between tenants 
and homeowners in the Regulated HWR. Only the Financialized-
familialistic HWR is characterized by a larger financial wealth gap 
(p<0.05). 
Table 5.5. Tenure wealth gaps compared across regimes (Financialized HWR as reference).
Housing-welfare regime (HWR) Net worth Sig. Financial wealth Sig.
Financialized HWR 0.87 * 0.03
Regulated HWR 2.41 * 1.41
State-supported HWR 0.21 0.91 *
Familialistic HWR 0.37 * 0.51 *
Financialized-familialistic HWR 0.44 * 1.82 *
Control variables not displayed 2.41 *
Constant -0.66 * -0.73
R-squared 0.31 0.07
N 13787 13787
Note: The main effect of tenure is the effect of owning versus renting on net worth and financial 
wealth for the housing-welfare regime that is the reference category in this analysis (and refers 
to the effect reported alongside the Financialized HWR). Results are considered significant if 
p<0.05.
The smallest tenure wealth gap is found in the Financialized HWR 
(the Netherlands and Luxemburg). The difference between tenants 
and homeowners in terms of net worth is smaller in this regime 
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than in all others (p<0.05), except for the State-supported HWR (see 
Table 5.5). The countries in the Financialized HWR have promoted 
homeownership through extensive subsidies or tax benefits and 
enabled lower socioeconomic groups to enter homeownership 
through liberal housing finance. In combination with high house 
price inflation, this should – in theory – boost the housing wealth 
holdings of homeowners. However, the countries in this regime have 
the smallest tenure wealth gap observed in Europe. We suggest that 
the widespread availability of mortgage debt maintains housing 
affordability in times of inflated house prices, but without contributing 
to housing wealth accumulation. Since we focus on a rather young 
population (30-67), homeowners in this regime might – in the long 
run – outperform their counterparts in other regimes. Interestingly, 
the financial wealth gap is significantly smaller than in all other 
countries under observation as well. In other words, homeowners do 
not accumulate significantly more savings than tenants. We suggest 
that the high rents impede the ability to save, whereas the generous 
welfare state reduces the necessity for savings. 
Table 5.6. Tenure wealth gaps compared across regimes (State-supported HWR as 
reference).
Housing-welfare regime (HWR) Net worth Sig. Financial wealth Sig.
State-supported HWR 1.08 * 0.94 *
Regulated HWR 2.20 * 0.50
Familialistic HWR 0.16 -0.40
Financialized HWR -0.21 -0.91 *
Financialized-familialistic HWR 0.23 0.91 *
Control variables not displayed
Constant -0.66 * -0.73
R-squared 0.31 0.07
N 13787 13787
Note: The main effect of tenure is the effect of owning versus renting on net worth and financial 
wealth for the housing-welfare regime that is the reference category in this analysis (and refers 
to the effect reported alongside the State-supported HWR). Results are considered significant 
if p<0.05.
The State-supported HWR is characterized by a smaller tenure 
wealth gap than the Regulated HWR. However, differences with other 
regimes are not significant (see Table 5.6). In the countries that are part 
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of the State-supported HWR, homeownership is promoted through 
(indirect) subsidies and tax benefits. Homeownership is expected to 
compensate for low pensions. Although the state-supported expansion 
of homeownership enables homeowners to accumulate considerable 
amounts of wealth, the relatively poor coverage of the welfare state 
encourages tenants to accumulate some wealth as well to cater for 
their welfare needs. The State-supported HWR therefore takes a 
middle position in the ranking of tenure wealth gaps across Europe. 
The financial wealth gap between tenants and homeowners in the 
State-supported HWR is significantly larger than in the Financialized 
HWR, but significantly smaller than in the Financialized-familialistic 
HWR. We suggest that the preferential treatment of homeownership 
allows homeowners to accumulate more savings in the long run, after 
the amortization of the mortgage. Moreover, like in the Regulated 
HWR, small-scale landlordism is relatively common to supplement 
low and stratified pensions. For example, the HFCS shows that 30% 
of the homeowners in Belgium owns secondary properties, of which 
slightly more than 50% is a private landlord.
 
Table 5.7. Tenure wealth gaps compared across regimes (Familialistic HWR as reference)
Housing-welfare regime (HWR) Net worth Sig. Financial wealth Sig.
Familialistic HWR 1.24 * 0.54 *
Regulated HWR 2.04 * 0.90
State-supported HWR -0.16 0.40
Financialized HWR -0.37 * -0.51 *
Financialized-familialistic HWR 0.07 1.31 *
Control variables not displayed
Constant -0.66 * -0.73
R-squared 0.31 0.07
N 13787 13787
Note: The main effect of tenure is the effect of owning versus renting on net worth and financial 
wealth for the housing-welfare regime that is the reference category in this analysis (and refers 
to the effect reported alongside the Familialistic HWR). Results are considered significant if 
p<0.05.
The Familistic HWR is characterized by relatively large tenure wealth 
gaps. This regime has a significantly (p<0.05) smaller tenure wealth 
gap than the Regulated HWR, but significantly larger tenure wealth 
gap than the Financialized HWR (see Table 5.7). The differences with 
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the State-supported HWR and the Financialized-familialistic HWR 
are not significant. Although the tenure wealth gap might be relatively 
large in the Familialistic HWR, its meaning is different compared 
to other regimes, since (housing) wealth should be considered a 
family rather than a household asset. The Familialistic HWR takes a 
middle position regarding the financial wealth gap between tenants 
and homeowners, and does not differ significantly from the State-
supported HWR and the Regulated HWR, which indicates that tenants 
need to accumulate financial wealth to compensate for low pensions. 
Table 5.8. Tenure wealth gaps compared across regimes (Financialized-familialistic HWR 
as reference).
Housing-welfare regime (HWR) Net worth Sig. Financial wealth Sig.
Financialized-familialistic HWR 1.30 * 1.85 *
Regulated HWR 1.97 * -0.41
State-supported HWR -0.23 -0.91 *
Familialistic HWR -0.07 -1.31 *
Financialized HWR -0.44 * -1.82 *
Control variables not displayed
Constant -0.66 * -0.73
R-squared 0.31 0.07
N 13787 13787
Note: The main effect of tenure is the effect of owning versus renting on net worth and financial 
wealth for the housing-welfare regime that is the reference category in this analysis (and refers 
to the effect reported alongside the Financialized-familialistic HWR). Results are considered 
significant if p<0.05.
Finally, the Financialized-familialistic regime resembles both the 
Financialized HWR, and the Familialistic HWR. It has significantly 
smaller tenure wealth gaps than the Regulated HWR, and a 
significantly larger tenure wealth gap than the Financialized 
HWR (see Table 5.8). The countries in this regime share with the 
Familialistic HWR that the family has historically played a large role 
in the provisioning of housing, and with the Financialized HWR the 
more generous access to mortgage finance, at least before the Global 
Financial Crisis. The subset of households that has bought the home 
prior to the introduction of liberal mortgage finance (later than in the 
Financialized homeownership regime) has profited from considerable 
house price gains, whereas those who bought after the introduction 
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of these policy schemes have accumulated considerable debts. 
Interestingly, the Financialized-familialistic HWR is characterized by 
the largest difference between tenants and homeowners regarding 
financial wealth, compared to all other regimes (p<0.05). The difference 
with the financialized homeownership regime, characterized by the 
smallest financial wealth gap between tenants and homeowners, 
is very large. We suggest that this is the result of the relatively large 
share of outright homeownership (of households that bought prior to 
the introduction of liberal housing finance), which enables them to 
accumulate considerable financial wealth holdings, and differences 
in the generosity of the pension system between the two regimes.
Figure 5.4. Map of tenure wealth gaps in Europe
Note: labels display the gap regarding net worth. Source: HFCS (2016).




Homeownership is associated with higher levels of net worth 
(housing and non-housing wealth combined) and financial wealth 
(Belsky et al., 2007; Di et al., 2007; Haurin et al., 2002). Theoretically, the 
gap between tenants and homeowners regarding net worth originates 
from differences in (1) wealth accumulation preferences, (2) the user-
costs of housing and (3) the necessity of savings among tenants and 
homeowners. We accept the assumption that homeownership is 
first and foremost part of a life style that is oriented on long-term 
stability and wealth accumulation in all countries (Keister et al., 
2016), whereas the other two factors differ along the lines of welfare 
states and housing systems. We cannot estimate the impact of the 
first mechanism on the size of the tenure wealth gap in individual 
countries. Instead we explain cross-country variations in the size 
of the tenure wealth gap across Europe on the basis of institutional 
differences, controlling for micro-level characteristics associated 
with selection into homeownership. This approach is much simpler 
than studies that use complex methods to calculate the user-costs of 
housing in few countries (Haffner and Heylen, 2011), and is able to 
extend its scope to a wider range of contexts. Furthermore, we focus on 
the outcomes of differences in the user-costs of housing in different 
contexts, alongside differences in the necessity to save.
Our findings indicate that, studying a sample of non-retired 
households headed by persons between 30 and 67 years old, using 
country-fixed effect regression analyses, homeownership is indeed 
associated with higher levels of net worth and financial wealth, even a 
few years after the Global Financial Crisis that reduced homeowners’ 
housing wealth holdings. Net worth differences between tenants 
and outright owners are larger than between tenants and mortgaged 
homeowners, indicating that homeowners ‘grow apart’ from 
tenants over time, when they amortize their mortgage. Mortgaged 
homeowners barely differ from tenants in terms of financial wealth, 
which indicates that housing wealth and financial wealth function 
as communicating vessels in the period directly after home-buying. 
Outright homeownership is associated with higher levels of financial 
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compared to tenants and mortgaged homeowners, since low housing 
costs after the amortization of the mortgage give room for savings. 
The tenure wealth gap shows considerable cross-country variation. 
However, the pattern is opposite to expectations on the basis of the 
orientation of the housing system and welfare state. The highest ratio 
between tenants and homeowners regarding net worth can be found 
in Austria, Italy and Malta (homeowners have between 6x and 12x the 
net worth of tenants), the smallest in Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Cyprus and Spain (between 2x and 4x). Our findings show that the 
gap between tenants and homeowners in terms of financial wealth 
is generally larger in countries with a larger tenure gap in terms of 
net worth.  This provides new, internationally-comparative evidence 
for the claim that housing wealth does not crowd-out financial 
wealth. On the contrary, especially in the case of private landlordism, 
homeownership contributes to the accumulation of financial wealth.
Cross-national variations in the size of the tenure wealth gap can 
for a large part be explained on the basis of the configuration of the 
housing-welfare regime (HWR), albeit in a different fashion than 
expected. In three HWR’s a different form of the ‘classical’ trade-off 
between housing and welfare occurs. The latter entails that countries 
with widespread homeownership do not develop generous welfare 
states (especially pension systems). In the Regulated HWR, with low 
homeownership and relatively generous pensions (Germany and 
Austria), the tenure wealth gap is unexpectedly large. We suggest 
that private landlordism, which is one of the engines under the 
large rental sector in these countries, contributes to housing wealth 
accumulation and also financial wealth accumulation among 
homeowners. Although the profits are smaller than in other regimes 
due to rent regulation, gains are considerable due to the stability of 
rental investments. Studies of wealth and income should have more 
attention for the consequences of the promotion and nature of private 
landlordism. The tenure wealth gap is much smaller in countries with 
high homeownership rates and low pensions. In the State-supported 
HWR (Belgium, France, Finland), homeownership is supported as 
pension arrangement through tax benefits (fiscal welfare). Tenants 
need to accumulate savings to cater for their welfare needs, which 
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results in a smaller tenure wealth gap compared to the Regulated 
HWR. In the Familialistic HWR, neither of both tenures is strongly 
supported by the state, but due to the low state pensions, tenants 
need to accumulate some savings. However, the meaning of housing 
wealth is different compared to other housing-welfare regimes, since 
it concerns a family, rather than a household asset. In two housing-
welfare regimes, the classic trade-off between housing and welfare 
is altered since they have responded to globalization and economic 
restructuring in a different fashion. These regimes combine high 
homeownership rates with generous pensions, as their pension 
funds are able to cover extensive mortgage debts. In the Financialized 
HWR, liberal housing finance reduces the user-costs of housing 
(through a prolongation of mortgage loans and house price inflation), 
which has increased the opportunity for wealth accumulation among 
homeowners. However, the Financialized HWR is characterized by 
the smallest tenure wealth gap in Europe. We suggest that this is the 
result of low amortization among homeowners and high low savings 
among tenants as a result of high rents and a low necessity to save due 
to generous welfare arrangements. The balance between outright and 
mortgaged homeowners is different in the Financialized-familialistic 
regime, with a tradition of wide-spread outright homeownership and 
a later introduction of liberal housing finance. Therefore, especially 
the tenure financial wealth gap is very large in this regime. 
Small tenure wealth gaps seem to be matched with problems 
regarding the affordability of both homeownership and rental 
housing, whereas large tenure wealth gaps are matched with 
problems regarding the accessibility of homeownership. Moreover, 
tenure wealth gaps are smaller in contexts where some form of asset-
based welfare (micro- or macro) is incorporated in the welfare state. 
The surprisingly different pattern of tenure wealth gaps in Europe 
as could be expected on the orientation of the housing system and 
welfare state, urges for research into the consequences of second 
property ownership and small-scale landlordism for income and 
wealth.
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Throughout the past fifty years, a vast increase of owner-occupied 
housing has taken place across the European continent (Angelini et al., 
2013). In the period directly following World War II, homeownership 
rates were already relatively high in the Mediterranean 
countries (Allen, 2006), while Northern European households still 
predominantly resided in rental housing (Kemeny, 1981). Based on 
the belief that homeownership contributes to a more stable society 
(homeownership ties people to their local community and labor 
market, which allegedly reduces the risk for revolutions and crime, 
see Engels, [1887] 1970), many European governments have increased 
the attractiveness and affordability of this type of housing tenure 
(Ronald, 2008). In Northern Europe, subsidies and tax benefits are 
used, whereas a tolerance towards informal construction is the main 
engine behind the growth of homeownership in the Mediterranean 
countries (Donner, 2000). Moreover, the long-term economic growth 
and the stable income development as a results of the establishment 
of more generous welfare arrangements during les trente glorieuses 
(1945-1975) enabled ever larger shares of the population to buy their 
own home (Ferrera, 2008). 
From the 1980s onwards, a paradigmatic shift took place across 
Europe. The ‘market’ was supposed to play a more central role in 
the provisioning of housing (Aalbers, 2015; Mau, 2015). The ideology 
behind the desirability of homeownership did not necessarily 
change, but due to a renewed state-market configuration, a larger 
share of the population has been able to enter homeownership. 
Generous mortgage lending has allowed households with a lower 
socio-economic status to become a homeowner at a younger age 
(Aalbers, 2008; Rolnik, 2013). The expansion of homeownership has 
consequences for the economy at large and the housing market in 
particular. From the 1980s until the Global Financial Crisis, starting 
on the US market for real estate in 2007, housing has functioned 
as a sponge for international capital, which has driven up house 
prices tremendously (Fernandez et al. 2016). In countries such as the 
Netherlands, where housing finance became fairly deregulated since 




the 1980s (Damen et al., 2016), real house prices tripled, whereas real 
house prices remained more or less constant in Germany, where 
housing finance is organized in a more conservative fashion (OECD, 
2014). 
In the first decade of the 21st century, homeownership rates in 
continental Europe are higher than at any moment in in the 20th 
century, which means that more people than ever before are able to 
accumulate housing wealth. Wealth accumulation is celebrated as one 
of the central elements of the beneficial nature of homeownership 
(DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1994). Housing wealth has the potential to 
be used as collateral for asset-based welfare, in which individuals take 
over (a part of) the responsibility of the state in welfare provisioning 
(Doling and Ronald, 2010). This, in return, makes homeowners cheaper 
citizens for the welfare state. Should we therefore conclude that 
the state-sponsored expansion of homeownership is successful in 
spreading wealth into lower socio-economic strata? Not necessarily. 
Its success is dependent on the ability of homeowners with different 
life courses and different social backgrounds to turn their housing 
tenure into an engine of wealth accumulation. 
Wealth inequality is increasingly recognized as a separate 
dimension of socio-economic stratification, driven by other factors 
compared to income. The upswing in terms of wealth inequality, 
as documented by Piketty (2014), is considered a social problem 
across Europe. Whereas the total amount of private wealth in most 
Western countries right after WWII was around 300% of the national 
income, this ratio increased rapidly after the financial deregulations 
that started in the 1980s. Nowadays, ratios of 600% to 700% are not 
uncommon (Piketty, 2014). The upswing can almost entirely be 
explained with the absorption of capital by the built environment, 
which has translated into inflated house prices. This places the 
government-sponsored expansion of homeownership in a new 
perspective and thus legitimizes the overarching research question of 
this dissertation: “what does the housing wealth distribution look like in 
European countries with different housing regimes, and how can cross-
country variations be explained from (an interaction between) life course 
factors and institutional factors?”
47018 Barend Wind.indd   189 18-09-17   10:20
Chapter 6
190
In this conclusion, I will first outline the main findings of the four 
empirical chapters. Subsequently, I discuss the relevance of these 
findings for the scholarly debates on stratification- and housing 
studies. Third, I will summarize the implications of the four studies 
on housing wealth inequality bearing in mind the contemporary 
policy debate on housing in Europe. Finally, I will sketch out 
recommendations for future research, based on the shortcomings as 
well as the strengths and findings of the studies that are part of this 
dissertation. 
Main findings
First of all, this dissertation contributes to a better conceptualization 
of housing wealth. Previous studies focused on the outcomes of 
the process of housing wealth accumulation only, by considering 
housing wealth as the market value of the home minus outstanding 
residential debts (see Di et al., 2007; Appleyard and Rowlingson, 2010). 
In this dissertation, housing wealth is understood as consisting of six 
dimensions that reflect the accumulation process itself. This opens 
up new grounds to study the origins of housing wealth inequality. 
We differentiate between three static and three dynamic dimensions 
of housing wealth. The static dimensions (housing tenure, purchase 
price, initial mortgage debt) determine the level of housing wealth 
at the moment of purchase, whereas the three dynamic dimensions 
(mortgage amortization, capital gains / losses, historical transaction 
costs) determine the development of housing wealth over time. 
Different socio-economic-, housing-, and spatial policies impact upon 
these dimensions separately and shape the distribution of housing 
wealth across social classes and age groups.
The empirical part of this dissertation starts off with an overview 
of tenure-, housing wealth- and mortgage debt inequality in 16 
European countries. In Chapter 2, two birth cohorts (born between 
1930-1949 and 1950-1962) are compared regarding housing wealth 
inequality between different occupational classes (low, middle, 
high and self-employed). In all the researched countries, the higher 




occupational classes possess significantly higher housing wealth 
than the lower occupational classes. However, cross-country variation 
is large. The rationale behind the cohort comparison can be found in 
the different housing market and housing policy circumstances at the 
moment these cohorts entered the market for owned homes (typically 
between 25 and 40 years old). The cohort comparison sheds light on 
the distributional consequences of policy changes that occurred since 
the 1980s (when the younger cohort entered the housing market). In 
Chapter 2, 16 European countries are clustered in seven ‘housing wealth 
accumulation regimes’, based on the expansion of homeownership 
until 1980, and the political-economy of housing in the period between 
1980 and 2010. Until 1980, Europe could be classified in homeownership 
societies in the Mediterranean (both capitalist and communist), 
rental societies in Europe’s heartland (both capitalist and communist), 
and government-sponsored expansion of homeownership in the 
Northwestern part of the continent. The privatization of social 
housing after the fall of communism changed the political economy 
of a sub-set of former communist homeownership and rental 
societies (Hungary, Slovenia / the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia). 
The deregulation of housing finance altered the path followed by a 
subset of countries in the homeownership-expansion group (the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), and Spain (a homeownership 
society). A sub-set of rental societies and homeownership expansion 
societies, however, remained fairly regulated after the 1980s (Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria / France, Belgium), whereas the family remained 
dominant in a sub-set of Mediterranean countries (Italy, Portugal). 
The expansion of homeownership might result both in a more 
unequal and a more equal distribution of housing wealth, depending 
on the political-economy of homeownership in the country. Object 
subsidies for affordable homeownership, which are used in the 
Nordic countries, are associated with lower levels of housing wealth 
inequality between occupational classes in the older cohort that 
entered the housing market before the 1980s. A similar argument can 
be made for the older generation in the post-communist countries 
that profited from the subsidized construction of affordable (social/ 
cooperative/ public) rental housing when they entered the housing 
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market, and the (give-away) privatization of this housing stock after 
the fall of communism. The liberalization of housing finance, on the 
other hand, is associated with a more unequal distribution of housing 
wealth. It allowed households with a lower socio-economic status 
until the global financial crisis of 2007 to enter homeownership by 
taking out large mortgage loans. Especially lower-class households 
prolong their debts into old-age. Ironically, especially in the liberal 
housing wealth accumulation regime, homeownership does not 
always function as a vehicle for wealth accumulation.
In Chapter 3, we shift the focus from class-based housing wealth 
inequality towards life course-based housing wealth inequality. The 
Chapter is centered on the housing wealth consequences of one of 
the most common and most critical disruptive life course events in 
contemporary Europe: divorce. After a divorce, at least one of the 
partners needs to seek a new home. Previous studies have shown that 
this is most often a home in the rental sector. However, a majority 
of ever-divorced people, residing in homeownership during their 
(first) marriage, is able to enter this housing tenure again before they 
retire from the labor market. Those who remain in homeownership 
or re-enter this housing tenure after a divorce, have around 30% 
lower housing wealth holdings than their married counterparts 
due to moves into smaller properties and prolonged indebtedness. If 
divorcees re-partner, the difference with first-time married couples 
is much smaller. After a divorce, women accumulate less housing 
wealth than their male counterparts. However, the negative effect 
strengthens over time for men since dual earnings have become 
essential to purchase a home and amortize the mortgage, whereas it 
weakens over time for women since their labor market participation 
has increased rapidly since the 1970s. 
The negative effect of divorce also shows large cross-country 
variation, as has been proven by comparing ten European countries. 
The effect is more negative in housing regimes that facilitate a 
re-entry into homeownership after a divorce. It concerns in the 
first place countries with moderate homeownership rates, where 
mortgage finance is readily available, such as Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. This allows divorcees with a weaker economic 




position to re-enter homeownership by postponing the amortization 
of the mortgage loan. Furthermore, in these countries, couples with 
an intact first-time marriage ‘grow apart’ from divorcees over time 
since liberal housing finance encourages them to trade up the housing 
ladder. A small gap between people with divorce experience and those 
without can be found in conservative welfare states with generous 
spousal child maintenance payments (for the female partner). In 
these countries, re-entering homeownership is uncommon for 
women, whereas those who remain in the former marital home (with 
the help of alimony payments) are able to continue accumulating 
housing wealth.
The fourth chapter emphasizes the process of housing wealth 
accumulation. Whereas the first two empirical contributions to this 
dissertations focus on the accumulated housing wealth in old-age, 
this chapter tracks the residential mobility of Swedish people born 
between 1970 and 1975, in order to investigate the impact of their 
spatial- and housing decisions on the size of capital gains and losses 
(one of the dynamic dimensions of housing wealth). Whereas Sweden 
is widely acknowledged as corporatist and universal social-democratic 
welfare state, it has one of the most liberal-governed housing markets 
of Europe since the 1990s. As a result of the liberalization of housing 
finance and the privatization of former public rental housing, 
Swedish cities have experienced a wave of gentrification and low-
income filtering, which has resulted in larger socio-spatial inequality. 
The residential choices of people with a different social status are the 
engine of this process of spatial sorting. Households with a high socio-
economic status moved into the same neighborhoods. Households 
with a lower socio-economic status moved into other neighborhoods, 
since the influx of households with a high socio-economic status in 
other neighborhoods rendered these locations unaffordable for them. 
When being a resident in a neighborhood, the residential choices of 
those who migrate into your neighborhood determine the status of 
your neighborhood. The influx of new residents with a high socio-
economic status is paired with rising house prices. We find that 
people in the lower income brackets have accumulated significantly 
less capital gains than people in the higher income brackets in the 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   193 18-09-17   10:21
Chapter 6
194
period between 1995 and 2010. Moreover, migrants experience lower 
capital gains than native Swedes. The results of Chapter 4 indicate 
that lower income groups and people with a migrant background 
accumulate less capital gains due to their sorting into neighborhoods 
with relatively low shares of highly-educated residents or relatively 
high shares of residents with a migrant background. Furthermore, 
they are more likely to move into neighborhoods with a decreasing 
social status in the period of residence. In other words: the re-sorting 
of households through urban space, as a result of multiple decennia 
of market-oriented reforms on the Swedish housing market, has 
polarized capital gains when natives and migrants, and lower and 
higher income groups are respectively compared. 
The final empirical chapter of this dissertation elaborates on 
the connection between housing wealth and financial wealth. Only 
by comparing the accumulation of housing wealth among different 
social groups with the accumulation of financial wealth, it is possible 
to draw conclusions on the impact of housing wealth on the socio-
economic stratification at large. If housing wealth and financial 
wealth function as communicating vessels, homeowners and tenants 
can be expected to have similar levels of net worth. In that case, it is 
only stored in different manners. Since homeownership is part of an 
investive life style, and often subsidized by the state, homeowners have 
higher levels of net worth everywhere in Europe. Put simply: housing 
wealth and financial wealth do not operate like communicating 
vessels. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that housing wealth 
inequality between occupational classes (Chapter 2), and between 
people who experienced a disruptive life course event and those who 
did not (Chapter 3), is not counterbalanced by a different distribution 
of financial wealth. 
The size of the tenure wealth gap differs between countries on 
the basis of the orientation of the housing system and the welfare 
state, which impact upon the user-costs of housing and the necessity 
to save. Chapter 5 shows that larger tenure wealth gaps occur in 
countries with low homeownership rates, conservative housing 
finance and generous (but stratified) welfare arrangements. In 
these countries, the revenues from private landlordism, result in 




larger differences between homeowners and tenants regarding net 
worth. The smallest tenure wealth gap can be found in countries 
with moderate homeownership rates, liberal housing finance, 
homeownership subsidies, and generous welfare states that embraced 
social investment strategies. Although house price inflation has been 
considerable in these contexts, the extensive take-up of mortgages 
has hampered wealth accumulation among homeowners, whereas 
the high rent levels reduce the opportunity to save for tenants, and 
the generous welfare state reduces the necessity to save. In countries 
where high homeownership rates coincide with less generous pension 
schemes (the classical trade-off between housing and welfare), tenure 
wealth gaps are moderate since tenants need to accumulate financial 
wealth to cater for their retirement income. The size of the tenure 
wealth gap in these countries is dependent on policies that reduce 
the user-costs of housing and promote homeownership as pension 
supplement.
Housing wealth and stratification
Together, the four empirical chapters of this dissertation emphasize 
the importance of housing wealth inequality for understanding 
the socio-economic inequalities that characterize contemporary 
European societies. Previous studies on wealth holdings (both 
financial wealth and housing wealth) show that wealth is distributed 
much more unequally than income (Appleyard and Rowlingson, 2010; 
Cowell et al. 2012). In the Netherlands, generally perceived as one of 
the more egalitarian countries in Europe, the highest five percent of 
the wealth distribution owns a quarter of all wealth in the country 
(Vermeulen, 2014). The income distribution is much more equal: the 
ten percent highest earners, earn around four times more than the 
ten percent lowest earners. Traditionally, individuals occupying high 
positions in the wealth distribution are not represented in the upper 
strata of the income distribution: they have their capital ‘working 
for them’, as their investments yield returns. They are able to live 
as rentiers (of fund managers), since their wealth growth generates 
a constant stream of revenues. Piketty (2014) has shown that the 
increasing returns on capital, after the deregulation of finance since 
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the 1980s, are a major engine behind the upswing of wealth inequality 
in recent decades. 
The income distribution is shaped by different mechanisms than 
the distribution of wealth (Spilerman, 2000). The labor market is the 
main engine that underlies income inequality. It is therefore that 
stratification researchers have focused on occupational prestige, and 
the role of skills, education and institutions in explaining differences 
in occupational prestige (Erikson et al., 1979; Breen et al., 2010). Although 
some wealth is accumulated over the life course when households 
save what is left of their income after consumption (or amortize the 
mortgage on their home), inheritances are a main engine under wealth 
inequality, alongside profits on financial / business investments 
(Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 2013). The empirical chapters of this 
dissertation show that housing wealth, contrary to some other forms 
of wealth, is distributed across the lines of the income distribution. 
Whereas the financial wealth holdings of the upper strata of the 
wealth distribution that are mainly inherited, housing wealth is 
generally accumulated over the life course when people amortize 
their mortgage. Chapter 2 confirms that housing wealth holdings of 
those from the highest occupational groups are significantly higher 
than those of the lower occupational groups. As is stated in previous 
research, housing wealth is the predominant wealth form for ‘the 
masses’. However, households with higher incomes have a higher 
purchasing power on the market for owned homes, which translates 
into a larger capacity for housing wealth accumulation. 
More importantly, Chapter 4 provides evidence that the housing 
market might become a very important engine under increasing 
socio-economic inequality, alongside the labor market (for income) 
and the financial market (for financial wealth). Swedish households 
that bought their home at the right moment and the right location 
are able to make large capital gains, regardless their social 
background. The generation that had been able to buy the home 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, when house prices began to rise across 
Europe (Scandinavia being an exception) finds itself in a profitable 
position. However, the upswing of socio-spatial inequality caused by 
neo-liberal urban policies, including a deregulation of housing finance 




and a privatization of social rental housing, have made the housing 
market a more favorable engine under wealth accumulation for 
higher income groups than for lower income groups. Neighborhoods 
in Sweden with a highly educated population and a low share of 
migrants improved their position in the urban hierarchy, whereas 
neighborhoods with a high share of lower-educated residents and a 
high proportion of migrants experienced decline in terms of house 
prices. In the case of Sweden, an example of the previous can be 
found in Stockholm’s elitist villa neighborhood of Danderyd, located 
at a green edge of the city, whereas an example of the latter can be 
found in immigrant dense modernist suburbs like Husby. A parallel 
process of upgrading (e.g. in Danderyd) and downgrading (e.g. in 
Husby) contributes to increasing levels of socio-spatial inequality. 
Moreover, in gentrifying areas, like Stockholm’s former working 
class neighborhood, and contemporary hipster paradise Södermalm, 
residents with a higher socio-economic status profit from increasing 
house values, whereas further upgrading does not capitalize in the 
hands of working class residents who generally do not own the home 
they live in. Sweden is no exception regarding the upswing in terms 
of socio-spatial inequality. In most European larger cities, processes of 
simultaneous up- and downgrading have taken place since the 1980s 
(Tammaru et al. 2014). It is therefore very likely that in other countries, 
the housing market is a similarly-important engine under housing 
wealth inequality.
Internationally comparative perspectives on income inequality 
and wealth inequality point at the institutional dynamic within 
the national political economy to explain cross-country differences. 
The distribution of post-tax, post-transfer income is heavily shaped 
by the orientation of the welfare state. In countries with more 
decommodifying welfare arrangements, that allow people to survive 
in times of non-participation on the labor market, the income 
distribution is more equal. Previous research shows that there is no 
relationship between the level of income inequality in a country 
and the level of wealth inequality. Whereas the Scandinavian 
countries can be considered as egalitarian in terms of income due 
to a corporatist wage-setting system and state redistribution, their 
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wealth distributions belong to the most unequal in Europe (Skopek 
et al., 2014). Both its corporatist nature (large family-owned businesses 
with limited competition) and the full-fledged deregulation of the 
financial sector since the 1980s have contributed to this outcome. The 
empirical results of this dissertation suggest that housing wealth is 
shaped by different mechanisms than income and financial wealth, 
and is therefore affected by different institutional arrangements, 
especially housing- and spatial policies. Chapter 3 illustrates that the 
housing wealth consequences of a divorce are mitigated by different 
institutional arrangements than those that mitigate the risk of 
moving out of homeownership. Whereas welfare state arrangements 
are associated with the possibilities for re-entering homeownership 
or remaining in homeownership, the housing regime determines 
how much housing wealth, individuals with divorce experience can 
accumulate. In countries with liberal housing finance and a ‘dynamic’ 
housing market, the housing wealth consequences of a divorce 
are stronger, since the prolongation of mortgage debt allows more 
divorcees to re-enter homeownership, whereas it enables those with 
an intact first-time marriage to trade up the housing market (which 
increases the gap). 
Housing wealth and housing studies
The rise of homeownership
The academic field of housing studies is traditionally pre-occupied 
with housing tenure. Chapters 2 and 3 emphasize that housing wealth 
inequality and tenure inequality are related, but shaped by different 
factors. Within housing studies, the growth of homeownership since 
WWII is widely documented (Angelini et al., 2013; Barlow and Duncan, 
1994). In the Mediterranean countries, homeownership became almost 
universal due to a lenient stance towards informal self-construction 
(Allen, 2006), whereas government subsidies are the main engine 
behind the increase of homeownership in the Scandinavian countries 
(Bengtsson et al., 2013). In the former communist states in Central 
and Southeastern Europe, homeownership rates increased rapidly 
after the revolutions of 1990, when formerly public rental housing 




was privatized (Stephens et al., 2015). In much of Western Europe, 
liberalized housing finance became the main engine of increasing 
homeownership rates since the 1980s (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014). 
The attractiveness of homeownership can only be considered vis-a-
vis the position of rental housing. The costs and benefits of rental 
housing versus homeownership display large cross-country variation 
(Rohe et al., 2013) and have changed in favor of homeowners in most 
countries since the 1980s. It is not a coincidence that the existence 
of a unitary rental market, in which regulated rental housing 
(cost-rental) is available to the entire population, is often matched 
with lower homeownership rates (Hoekstra, 2009; Kemeny, 1981). 
However, residing outside homeownership became increasingly 
considered as problematic in recent years. For example, the lower 
homeownership rates among migrants are considered as part of their 
disadvantaged position (Gyourko and Linneman, 1997; Santiago et al., 
2010). Furthermore, moves out of homeownership after a disruptive 
life event are problematized as obstruction to wealth accumulation. 
Since the end of the 1990s, homeownership is increasingly studied as 
collateral for asset-based welfare (Doling and Ronald, 2010; Watson, 
2009). 
Homeownership and wealth accumulation
The implicit assumption made by antagonists of homeownership 
expansion, is that more households are able to accumulate wealth 
in a country with high homeownership rates. Chapter 2 nuances 
this assumption. It shows that different models of homeownership 
expansion generate different patterns of housing wealth inequality 
between occupational classes. 
Generally, housing wealth inequality is larger in countries with 
high homeownership rates, since a larger part of the lower middle- 
and working class is residing in homeownership, who generally 
reside in smaller and cheaper dwellings than their upper class 
counter parts. . However, housing wealth inequality is found to be 
limited in countries where housing consumption is de-coupled from 
the labor market income. Chapter 2 mentions three instances. First, 
housing wealth inequality is mitigated when state subsidies are 
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the driving force behind the expansion of homeownership. Second, 
housing wealth inequality is smaller in countries where public 
rental housing, distributed on the basis of need, is privatized and 
the material benefits materialize in the hands of the former tenants, 
which is the case in many Northeastern European countries such 
as Poland and the Baltic States. Third, housing wealth inequality is 
mitigated by familialism, since family members pool resources in 
order to generate economies of scale. These economies of scale couple 
the collective family income rather than the individual labor market 
income to housing consumption. Although this results in a somewhat 
more equal distribution of housing wealth, it is known to be related to 
other housing-related issues like a delayed entry into homeownership 
and overcrowding (Allen, 2006) (with Italy as prime example). 
Chapter 2 shows that an expansion of homeownership by means 
of liberal housing finance exacerbates housing wealth inequality. 
It allows households with a lower socio-economic status to enter 
homeownership by taking out large loans. Since the amortization 
of the loan is in these contexts not required, many homeowners do 
barely accumulate housing wealth. Tenure inequality and housing 
wealth inequality are mitigated by different institutions, as is 
shown in Chapter 3. Previous research points out that moves out 
of homeownership are common after a divorce due to the reduced 
economies of scale, especially for women (Dewilde, 2008; Dewilde 
and Stier, 2014). Especially the role of welfare state arrangements is 
mentioned as an institutional factor that impacts upon the odds of 
moving out of homeownership after a divorce. Chapter 3 points out 
that divorcees that remain in homeownership or re-enter this tenure, 
accumulate less housing wealth than first-time married couples. It is 
however not the welfare state, but the housing regimes that determines 
the size of the gap between divorcees and first-time married couples 
in terms of housing wealth. In more liberally governed housing 
markets, more divorcees are able to remain in homeownership due to 
the accessibility of mortgage finance. However, they are less able than 
first-time married couples to amortize their loan, whereas the latter 
group uses mortgage finance to further climb the housing ladder 
within homeownership.




The relationship between housing systems and the affordability of 
housing in different tenures has extensively been discussed within 
the academic literature (Dewilde and De Decker, 2016; Kemeny, 1981; 
Lind, 2001). The concept of tenure neutrality describes a situation in 
which the choice between rental housing and homeownership has 
no consequences for the housing costs. In some countries (especially 
Sweden), the concept is used as guiding principle for the formulation 
of housing policies, while for other countries it is used as an analytical 
tool to estimate the advantageous position of homeownership (Haffner, 
2003; Lundqvist, 1987). Chapter 5 advances notion of tenure neutrality 
by comparing the net worth of tenants and homeowners. It builds 
on the user-costs of housing approach that decomposes the housing 
costs for homeowners in three components: mortgage amortization, 
interest payments and capital gains / losses (Haffner and Heylen, 2011; 
Quigley and Raphael, 2004). User-costs for tenants consist of the rent 
only. Tenants accumulate wealth by saving, whereas homeowners 
accumulate wealth by saving, the amortizing their mortgage and 
accumulating capital gains. Homeowners generally accumulate more 
wealth than tenants, even controlling for their income level. This 
difference is partly due to life style differences: homeownership is 
part of a more stable, investment-oriented life style. However, cross-
country differences in the gap between tenants and homeowners 
regarding net worth are the outcome of differences in the housing 
system and welfare state. In some countries, homeownership is 
treated more preferentially than in others, and in some countries 
housing assets play a more important role in the welfare state than in 
others. The countries that have pursued ‘tenure neutral policies’ have 
mainly tried to give lower middleclass households a choice between 
renting and owning through a liberalization of housing finance 
(Grundström and Molina, 2016). It concerns a group of countries that 
has simultaneously marketized its large social rental sectors and 
introduced social investment strategies in its welfare state (Lennartz, 
2017). Surprisingly, in these countries, the gap between tenants and 
homeowners regarding net worth is very small. Housing wealth 
accumulation is very limited among (younger) homeowners due 
to prolonged amortization periods. Financial wealth accumulation 
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among tenants is limited due to high rents and a low necessity to save 
as a result of generous welfare state benefits. In these ‘tenure neutral’ 
countries, the tenure wealth gap can be expected to increase with 
age, as homeowners are expected to amortize their loan. Whereas 
the increasing housing costs of tenants materialize as wealth in the 
pockets of their landlords, part of the housing costs of homeowners 
materializes in their own pockets as housing wealth. Although tenure 
neutral policies might result in an equal choice between renting and 
owning, they are not likely to contribute to more equal outcomes 
between tenants and owners in terms of wealth accumulation.
Together, the empirical chapters of this dissertation revitalize the 
idea of the existence of housing classes. The notion of housing classes 
is introduced by British housing scholars from the 1970s and 1980s, 
arguing that the traditional social class cleavages would eventually 
be replaced by housing market cleavages (Edel, 1982; Saunders, 
1984; Thorns, 1981). Especially in times of increasing house prices, it 
becomes very difficult for tenants to enter homeownership, whereas 
those who already reside in homeownership (especially higher class 
households) can more easily acquire buy-to-let properties. Chapter 
2 shows that instead of a tenure cleavage (as suggested by Edel, 
Saunders and Thorns), a housing wealth cleavage has become more 
central. The expansion of homeownership has decreased tenure 
inequality, since it allowed more working- and lower-middle class 
households to enter homeownership. Certain institutional models of 
homeownership expansion have however caused increasing levels of 
housing wealth inequality.  Therefore, housing wealth might mark 
one of the major cleavage lines in contemporary European societies. 
Chapter 4 shows that there is evidence that housing classes are not a 
simple derivative from socio-economic inequality. However, income 
inequality and housing wealth inequality are interrelated. One share 
of housing wealth inequality can be explained by differences in 
income at the moment of purchase. Those with higher incomes can 
buy larger and more expensive properties and accumulate in the long 
run higher levels of housing wealth. Another share of housing wealth 
inequality can be explained by capital gains and losses occurring after 
the moment of purchase. Evidence from Swedish cities between 1995 




and 2010 indicates that changes in the neighborhood composition 
regarding the share of migrants and highly-educated residents are 
the main mechanism behind capital gains, in a period in which the 
country experienced a severe increase of socio-spatial inequality. In 
case they bought a home at the ‘right moment’ at the ‘right location’, 
people from different social backgrounds were able to profit from 
considerable capital gains. However, higher-income groups are more 
likely to profit, since the influx of this social group triggers a positive 
house price spiral. In other words, the housing market is one of the 
major engines under new societal cleavages, albeit in a different 
fashion than previously assumed. 
Policy implications
Piketty’s (2014) influential study on wealth inequality has fueled 
political debates on this topic across Europe. It is recognized that wealth 
holdings increasingly impact life chances, and that wealth inequality 
might adversely affect those that belong to the lower socio-economic 
strata. Whereas the European political left traditionally focused 
on the redistribution of disposable income to accomplish a socially 
just society, countering wealth inequality starts to play a much more 
prominent role in contemporary left-wing ideological narratives 
(De Kam, 2014). For decades already, the spread of wealth to the lower 
socio-economic strata has been at the forefront for liberal parties, and 
forms the ideological legitimation of the financial deregulations of 
the 1980s that have resulted in the current distribution of wealth as 
described by Piketty (Hay, 2009).
Tackling the issue of the extremely skewed distribution of wealth 
is complicated, since it concerns a footloose resource. The lifting of 
restrictions on the movement of capital as part of the liberalization 
of financial markets limits the effectiveness of national solutions like 
a Tobin tax (tax on financial transactions, named after Nobel Prize 
winner James Tobin). In the policy debate, it is broadly overlooked that 
the growth of capital relative to the national income is mainly driven 
by an upswing in housing wealth. It might be more feasible to tackle 
inequality regarding housing wealth (the largest source of wealth for 
a majority of the households in Europe) than inequality regarding 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   203 18-09-17   10:21
Chapter 6
204
financial wealth (with an undeniably more skewed distribution). 
Housing wealth is directly linked to a non-movable object of real-
estate, although the financial products to finance the property might 
be sold on a footloose market. 
The empirical chapters of this dissertation point at four 
mechanisms that explain why housing wealth inequality is larger in 
some European countries, as compared to others. First of all, rising 
house prices increase the potential for an upswing in housing wealth 
inequality. Rising prices namely allow housing market insiders to use 
their capital gains to climb up the housing ladder, while it encourages 
prospective homeowners to enter the market. The upswing of house 
prices across Europe is linked to the expansion of housing finance, 
which as a follow-up on government subsidies on homeownership, 
reduces the user-costs of housing and therefore does not substantially 
alters the long-term affordability of homeownership. Put simply, it 
causes a similar number of people bidding on a similar number of 
properties with a larger budget due to the increased loan-to-income 
ratio. 
Second, the increase of mortgage debt is associated with an upswing 
of housing wealth inequality. Liberal housing finance has enabled 
lower-middle class households to enter homeownership by keeping 
their housing costs affordable through prolonged indebtedness. On 
the contrary, the upper-middle class is able to amortize the mortgage 
more quickly and under more favorable conditions. The combination 
of structurally higher house prices and higher mortgage debts tie 
households more strongly to the financial market, on which they rely 
in order to finance their housing consumption. The larger inequality 
between homeowners in countries with liberal housing finance 
might translate to higher levels of wealth inequality in general, when 
the large mortgage debts of the lower-middle class appear as assets on 
the balance sheet of the upper few percent of the wealth distribution. 
Third, the increasing levels of socio-spatial inequality that many 
large European cities have witnessed since the 1980s are a driving 
force behind housing wealth inequality. The residential moves that 
are associated with the realization of a mortgage market-based 
sorting of individuals over urban space, generate strongly positive 




house price developments in gentrification neighborhoods and 
neighborhoods with a high socio-economic status, whereas they 
generate a negative price spiral in neighborhoods with a lower socio-
economic starting position or a high share of migrants. Locally-
based and government-sponsored urban growth coalitions to attract 
international investments and highly-skilled labor has facilitated the 
increase of socio-spatial inequality, and consequently housing wealth 
inequality. Fourth, the upswing of income inequality, and the surge 
of instable employment are acknowledged throughout the empirical 
part of this dissertation as a mechanism behind increasing levels of 
housing wealth inequality. When the income distribution is polarized, 
the purchasing power on the housing market is polarized as well. The 
income level and stability namely determines the size of residential 
loans that banks are willing to provide, dependent on the national 
institutional framework. Therefore, the income maximizes the initial 
purchase price of the dwelling. In countries with a more equal income 
distribution, those with moderate incomes can buy more expensive 
properties, and consequently accumulate more housing wealth, 
which eventually mitigates housing wealth inequality.
If rising house prices, an upswing in mortgage debts, a surge of 
income inequality and an increase of socio-spatial inequality are 
the mechanisms that have contributed to current levels of housing 
wealth inequality, which policy measures are then suited to counter 
housing wealth inequality? A re-regulation of housing finance will 
most likely temper house price developments, mitigate house price 
volatility and reduce indebtedness. As a result, homeownership will 
become more socially selective (outside the reach of most lower-
middle class households). The consequences of such a strategy can be 
assessed by taking a look at the German-speaking countries, where 
a conservative housing finance system (and incentives to invest in 
rental housing) has existed for decades. Although Chapter 2 shows 
that housing wealth inequality is indeed much smaller than tenure 
inequality in these countries, Chapter 5 shows that the tenure wealth 
gap in the German-speaking countries is among the largest in Europe. 
Those in rental housing are unable to accumulate as much savings 
as their counterparts in homeownership accumulate in housing 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   205 18-09-17   10:21
Chapter 6
206
wealth due to an over-representation of the previous tenure in urban 
environments and an over-representation of the latter tenure in 
rural surroundings. Furthermore is the tenure wealth gap larger in 
these countries due to investments of homeowners in (urban) rental 
housing. The historical example of decommodified homeownership 
in the Nordic countries in the decades following WWII, proves that 
a conservative housing finance system can co-exist alongside a large 
expansion of homeownership and a limited amount of housing wealth 
inequality (Bengtsson et al., 2013; Hedin et al., 2012). State subsidies for 
homeownership allow particularly lower-middle class households to 
enter homeownership without becoming heavily leveraged with debt. 
It contributes directly to a more equal distribution of wealth, without 
linking individuals to the global financial market, where the debts of 
lower socio-economic groups are transformed into assets of the rich. 
Chapter 4 shows that capital gains are a major source of housing wealth 
inequality in the Swedish context, and most likely in other European 
countries that experienced a comparable surge in house prices after 
the liberalization of housing finance as well, such as Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and the UK (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). The 
taxation of capital gains functions as a hedge against speculation, and 
socializes housing market gains, but is absent in nearly all European 
countries.
The socio-spatial polarization that has contributed to the 
increasing levels of housing wealth inequality is partly the outcome 
of a reorientation of local authorities in the sphere of spatial planning 
(Tasan-Kok and Baeten, 2011). Gentrification research has shown how 
the upgrading of neighborhoods has become increasingly state-led 
since the 1990s (Uitermark et al. 2007). Local authorities facilitate – 
or even organize – investments in centrally-located neighborhoods 
with the potential to become an attractive urban living environment 
for high-skilled (international) knowledge workers. The use of 
public funds is generally legitimized by the ideology that attracting 
‘talent’ will increase the city’s position in the urban hierarchy, 
which will eventually benefit the vulnerable population as well. 
Evidence from around Europe proves that state-led gentrification 
results in a more market-based sorting of individuals over urban 




space, even when it does not come accompanied by direct forms of 
displacement (Tammaru et al., 2015). Both local and national urban 
and regional planning initiatives can contribute to a reversal of this 
trend. Cities have policy instruments to accomplish a diversification 
of the housing stock in terms of tenure and house size. The creation 
or preservation of cost-rental housing in popular neighborhoods 
is one way in which local authorities can tackle the increasingly 
market-based spatial distribution of different classes and ethnic 
groups. Selective investments in the built environment have the 
capacity to alter housing market processes themselves. Strengthening 
neighborhoods with a consistently low socio-economic status might 
result in an influx of wealthier residents and contributes to wealth 
accumulation of lower-middle class homeowners. Although such a 
strategy might yield positive outcomes in terms of housing wealth 
equality, experiences from across Europe point out that recent 
government interventions are often unable to prevent a total change 
of the population afterwards. Hence, state-led gentrification is often 
criticized for contributing to socio-spatial inequality. Therefore, 
caution is needed when market pressure is used to promote socially 
just outcomes.
Finally, changes in the distribution and stability of income have 
an impact on the possibilities for housing wealth inequality and socio-
spatial inequality through the purchasing power on the housing 
market. Whereas housing policies and spatial planning policies are 
able to counter the tendency of increasing housing wealth inequality 
that arises from the housing market, only welfare state policies can 
counter the increase of housing wealth inequality that arises from 
the labor market. Globalization and welfare state retrenchment 
are mentioned as the main causes behind the U-turn regarding the 
development of the income distribution in the Western European 
welfare states (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Harrison and Bluestone, 
1990). Under pressure of increased international competition, one 
group of countries allowed the incomes of low-skilled workers 
to decline, whereas their employment became insecure in others 
(Bonoli, 2005). The approach of welfare states towards new social 
risks, like divorce, single parenthood and repetitive unemployment, 
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has a large impact on housing wealth accumulation among those 
who experience these negative life course events, is shown in Chapter 
3. Housing wealth inequality can be reduced when welfare state 
policies foster a more even distribution of income in a society and 
stabilize the income over the life course by normalizing permanent 
labor contracts and providing social protection against old and new 
social risks. After all, a stable and sufficiently high income is needed 
to be granted a mortgage to enter homeownership. Such welfare state 
reforms would especially be beneficial for younger birth cohorts and 
lower socio-economic groups that are most severely hit by the current 
wave of globalization and welfare state retrenchment. 
The most important message for policy makers might be that the 
current issue of housing wealth inequality cannot be solved through 
the implementation of new housing policies alone. It is a combination 
of labor market, spatial planning, financial and housing policies that 
might be able to counter the upswing of housing wealth inequality that 
took place from the 1980s onwards, in the long run. Current levels of 
housing wealth inequality that arise from large housing debts among 
certain social groups will disappear when incomes outpaces house 
price inflation in the long run. Therefore, it is however necessary to 
radically alter the current ‘contract between capital and labor’ in most 
of Europe.
Across the continent, the expansion of homeownership is 
legitimized by the idea that it is beneficial when wealth penetrates to 
lower socioeconomic strata. Although this dissertation is very critical, 
it should not be read as a criticism against this idea an sich. The main 
argument is that there are different strategies in which the state is 
able to stimulate homeownership, with all their own distributional 
outcomes regarding housing wealth. In other words, if a penetration 
of wealth into lower socio-economic strata is the main policy aim, 
a strategy that results in a more equal distribution of housing 
wealth might be more suited to do so.  Another reason to question 
to wealth consequences of the expansion of homeownership, is the 
effect of this process on the wellbeing and welfare of the lower- and 
middle class. When the expansion of homeownership co-occurs 
with a retrenchment of the welfare state, households need more 




wealth to cater for their own welfare needs. It is debatable whether 
the expansion of housing wealth counterbalances the reduction of 
transfer capital (social wealth) for the lower socio-economic groups, 
and whether a one-dimensional wealth portfolio (in which housing 
wealth is by far the largest source of wealth) is suited to do so. 
Limitations: a new research agenda?
This dissertation aims to contribute to a new research agenda on 
housing wealth inequality. In the introduction, housing wealth 
is decomposed into different dimensions. The housing tenure, 
purchase price and initial size of the mortgage determine housing 
wealth holdings at the moment of purchase, whereas the mortgage 
amortization, capital gains and losses, and historic transaction costs 
determine how the housing wealth holdings evolve over time. Housing 
wealth inequality is affected by institutions that (sometimes in an 
opposite fashion) impact upon these dimensions. In the empirical 
chapters of this dissertation, various theoretical links are established 
between institutional arrangements and different dimensions of 
homeownership. However, the internationally comparative surveys 
that are the main data sources for this dissertation only contain 
reliable information on total housing wealth holdings, and sometimes 
residential debts. In three chapters, housing wealth (the sum of all 
dimensions) is therefore used as the outcome variable. However, the 
international comparisons that are made in Chapter 2, three and five 
provide evidence for the impact of institutional arrangements on 
different dimensions of housing wealth. Two dimensions of housing 
wealth are studied in isolation: mortgage debts and capital gains and 
losses. In Chapter 2, mortgage debt inequality between occupational 
classes is shown for seven housing wealth accumulation regimes in 
Europe. To properly evaluate its impact on housing wealth inequality, 
a dynamic (longitudinal) perspective is needed, in which mortgage 
amortization is taken into account alongside the initial size of the 
mortgage and the current market value of the dwelling. Chapter 
4 studies the accumulation of capital gains over time, during a 16-
year period. Since this study is carried out in a non-international 
comparative fashion, it does not reveal the impact of different 
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approaches to housing and welfare on housing wealth inequality 
generated by differences in capital gains. However, it does show 
the impact of local and regional housing market dynamics that are 
impacted upon by the institutional context. In that respect, Sweden 
can be considered a critical case. Since the 1990s, it has one of the 
most liberal-governed housing markets in Europe.  Altogether, the 
results presented in this dissertation urge for more studies that 
research housing wealth inequality from a dynamic perspective, 
taking into account its accumulation process over time by using an 
internationally comparative research design, in order to reveal the 
impact of different institutional arrangements on the dimensions of 
housing wealth.
The studies that are part of this dissertation mainly have an 
international-comparative nature. By taking such a perspective, a view 
on individual agency sometimes disappears. It is important to keep in 
mind that it is individual behavior, motivated by different values and 
interests, which impacts upon the accumulation of (housing) wealth. 
In Chapter 2, it is shown that the social selectivity of homeownership 
has an impact on the distribution of wealth across occupational 
classes. Due to its descriptive nature, it is impossible to fully control 
for other factors that are associated with tenure choice and wealth 
accumulation. In Chapters 3 and 5, the selection of individuals into 
homeownership is assumed to be unproblematic in order to focus 
on the impact of institutional factors on the relationship between 
respectively divorce and wealth accumulation and tenure and 
wealth accumulation. However, one can assume that housing wealth, 
divorce and re-partnering are linked. For example, those with more 
(liquidated) housing wealth are more attractive partners and tend to 
re-partner more often. Similarly, the preference for renting or owning 
the primary residence might be associated with a bunch of individual 
preferences and characteristics that impact upon the accumulation 
of wealth as well. The above-mentioned selection issues do not play 
a central role in this dissertation due to the focus on explaining 
cross-country differences. Although these issues of selection do not 
have a large impact on the validity of the analyses, these individual-
level characteristics might be mechanisms behind housing wealth 




accumulation that are thus far overlooked. Longitudinal analyses 
with e.g. event-history models are able to overcome this shortcoming 
of the current dissertation. 
Housing wealth inequality is a generational experience, as is 
shown in Chapter 2. Households that are exposed to different socio-
economic, urban and housing policies, face different opportunities 
for the accumulation of housing wealth. The second and third chapter 
focuses on a population born before the year 1963. The youngest 
members of this cohort are the oldest ones that are exposed to the 
deregulation of housing finance and a more market-oriented approach 
to housing. However, additional research is needed to housing wealth 
inequality among younger cohorts since they are far stronger affected 
by the flexibilization of the labor market and the financialization of 
housing. Whereas house price inflation has capitalized into housing 
wealth for birth cohorts that bought into the market for owned homes 
during the process of liberalization, they translate into affordability 
issues for the younger birth cohorts. A similar argument can be 
made for tenants. Whereas the user-costs of housing have generally 
decreased for homeowners due to house price inflation, they have 
increased massively for tenants when rents are coupled to property 
prices. Due to the flexibilization of the labor market, it is increasingly 
difficult for younger households to obtain a mortgage to enter 
homeownership, which excludes them from wealth accumulation 
through homeownership. Future research should investigate whether 
the extreme advantageousness of homeownership regarding wealth 
inequality should be considered a period effect – and a direct result 
of the increase of socio-spatial inequality and an upswing in house 
prices – or a structural phenomenon, that is part of a new socio-
economic order.
The impact of institutional arrangements on socio-economic 
outcomes is generally considered at the national level. Welfare state 
research shows that national social policies, such as unemployment 
benefits schemes, impact upon the poverty rate on the national level. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5 in this dissertation follow a comparable approach 
by assessing the impact of different national systems of housing 
provisioning, housing finance regulations and welfare states impact 
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upon housing wealth inequality. However, the housing market, 
which is one of the main engines of housing wealth inequality, is 
organized much more locally. Over the past 20 years, the differences 
in house price development between the bigger metropolitan regions 
and small and medium-sized cities has become very large in many 
European countries (notable exceptions are Germany and Belgium), 
with the latter lagging behind.  Moreover, housing busts and booms 
are mostly local phenomena. Local house price developments are 
partly the outcomes of physical interventions, led by local government 
bodies. The privatization of social housing or urban restructuring are 
but two examples of these strategies. Future research would benefit 
from a sub-national approach to housing wealth inequality. Which 
local urban coalitions contribute to increasing levels of housing 
wealth inequality, and which ones succeed in mitigating the gap? 
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In de afgelopen vijftig jaar heeft het eigen woningbezit een snelle 
opmars gemaakt in Europa (Angellini et al., 2013). In de periode 
direct na de Tweede Wereldoorlog was het eigenwoningbezit al 
wijdverspreid in de landen aan de Middellandse zee (Allen, 2006), 
terwijl het merendeel van de Noordwest Europese huishoudens 
nog steeds in een huurhuis woonde (Kemeny, 1981). Gebaseerd op 
het geloof dat eigenwoningbezit bijdraagt aan een meer stabiele 
samenleving, waarin mensen een aandeel hebben in hun omgeving, 
hebben veel overheden de aantrekkelijkheid en betaalbaarheid van de 
eigen woning vergroot (Ronald, 2008). Eigenwoningbezitters zouden 
meer gebonden zijn aan hun lokale gemeenschap en arbeidsmarkt, 
het als vermeend effect dat de kans op revoluties en geweld in een 
samenleving met veel eigenaar-bewoners lager ligt (Engels, [1887] 
1970). In de decennia na WOII is het eigenwoningbezit opgestuwd 
door subsidies en fiscale voordelen in Noordwest Europa, terwijl het 
door de vingers zien van semilegale zelfbouw de motor is achter de 
groei van het eigenwoningbezit in Zuid-Europa. De toename van het 
aantal eigenaar-bewoners is niet alleen het resultaat van woonbeleid. 
De uitbouw van de welvaartsstaat en de daarmee gepaard gaande 
economische groei en stabiele inkomensontwikkeling gedurende les 
trentes glorieuses (1945-1975), heeft ervoor gezorgd dat een koopwoning 
in het bereik is gekomen van een steeds groter gedeelte van de 
bevolking.
Vanaf de jaren tachtig heeft een paradigmatische aard-
verschuiving plaatsgevonden in het sociale- en woonbeleid in Europa. 
Vanaf dat moment is de bouw en allocatie van woningen meer en meer 
aan ‘de markt’ overgelaten (Aalbers, 2015; Mau, 2015). De grotere rol van 
de markt is niet het resultaat van een veranderend idee wat betreft 
de wenselijkheid van een toename van het aantal koopwoningen, 
maar het gevolg van een veranderende configuratie van ‘de staat’ en 
‘de markt’. Met name in Noordwest Europa heeft een ruimhartige 
verstrekking van hypotheekleningen huishoudens met een lagere 
sociaaleconomische status op een jongere leeftijd de mogelijkheid 
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gegeven om een koopwoning te bemachtigen (Aalbers, 2008; Rolnik, 
2013). De uitbreiding van het eigenwoningbezit heeft consequenties 
voor het functioneren van de economie in het algemeen en de 
woningmarkt in het bijzonder. Vanaf de jaren tachtig van de twintigste 
eeuw tot de economische crisis van 2008, die begon op de woningmarkt 
van de VS, heeft bewoonbaar vastgoed (woningen en appartementen) 
gefunctioneerd als een soort spons voor internationaal kapitaal op 
zoek naar een winstgevende bestemming. In combinatie met een 
deregulering van de hypotheekmarkt, heeft dit woningprijzen enorm 
opgedreven (Fernandez et al., 2016). In een land als Nederland, waar 
al vroeg een heel liberaal hypotheekregime tot stand is gekomen, 
zijn reële woningprijzen verdrievoudigd sinds de jaren tachtig 
van de twintigste eeuw (Damen et al., 2016). In Duitsland, waar het 
hypotheekregime conservatief is gebleven, zijn de voor inflatie 
gecorrigeerde woningprijzen min of meer gelijk gebleven (OECD, 2014).
In het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw is het eigenwoningbezit 
op het Europese continent meer wijdverspreid dan op welk moment in 
de 20e eeuw dan ook. Dit betekent dat een groter deel van de bevolking 
dan ooit tevoren, in staat is om woonvermogen op te bouwen. 
Vermogensopbouw is een van de hoofdredenen waarom het kopen 
van een woning zo gestimuleerd is (DiPasquale en Wheaton, 1994). 
Woonvermogen kan gebruikt worden als onderpand voor asset-based 
welfare, waarbij huishoudens hun bezittingen inzetten om sociale 
risico’s op een individuele manier af te dekken (Doling en Ronald, 
2010). Hierdoor zijn eigenaar-bewoners in potentie goedkopere 
burgers voor de staat dan huurders. Kunnen we concluderen dat 
de uitbreiding van het eigenwoningbezit in de laatste decennia op 
een succesvolle manier lagere sociaaleconomische groepen in staat 
heeft gesteld om vermogen op te bouwen? Niet noodzakelijkerwijs. 
Dit is sterk afhankelijk van de manier waarop het eigenwoningbezit 
is gestimuleerd. In hoeverre mensen met een verschillende sociale 
achtergrond en levensloop in staat zijn om het eigendom van hun 
woning op te zetten in een aanzienlijk vermogen is afhankelijk van 
het volkshuisvestingsregime. 
Recent is een maatschappelijke discussie ontstaan over de grote 
vermogensongelijkheid in Europa. Het wordt steeds duidelijker dat 
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vermogensongelijkheid beschouwd moet worden als los onderdeel 
van de sociaaleconomische gelaagdheid van de samenleving, met 
andere onderliggende mechanismen dan inkomensongelijkheid. De 
toename van vermogensongelijkheid, zoals beschreven door Piketty 
(2014), wordt meer en meer beschouwd als een sociaal probleem. 
Terwijl het totale privévermogen in de meeste Europese landen 
na de Tweede Wereldoorlog rond 300% van het nationale inkomen 
schommelde, is deze ratio snel toegenomen na de financiële 
deregulering en veranderingen in de welvaartsstaat sinds de jaren 
tachtig van de twintigste eeuw. In het tweede decennium van de 21e 
eeuw zijn ratio’s van 600% tot 700% niet ongebruikelijk (Piketty, 2014). 
De snelle toename van vermogens kan bijna geheel verklaard worden 
door de sponswerking van bewoonbaar vastgoed in de laatste decennia, 
hetgeen zich heeft vertaald in opgeblazen woningprijzen. Dit plaatst 
de uitbreiding van het eigenwoningbezit in een nieuw daglicht en 
legitimeert de volgende overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag: “ Hoe ziet de 
woonvermogensverdeling eruit in Europese landen met verschillende 
volkshuisvestingsregimes, en hoe kunnen internationale verschillen 
verklaard worden uit een (interactie tussen) levensloop factoren en 
institutionele factoren?”.
Belangrijkste bevindingen
In de eerste plaats draagt deze dissertatie bij aan een betere 
conceptualisering van het begrip woonvermogen. Eerdere studies 
richtten zich alleen maar op de uitkomsten van het accumulatieproces 
van woonvermogen, door woonvermogen simpelweg te benaderen als 
de marktwaarde van de woning minus eventuele hypotheekschulden 
(zie bijvoorbeeld Di (2007) of Appleyard en Rowlingson (2010). In 
deze dissertatie wordt woonvermogen gezien als zes dimensies die 
samen het accumulatieproces representeren. Dit geeft ruimte om de 
herkomst van woonvermogensongelijkheid te achterhalen. We 
onderscheiden drie statische en drie dynamische dimensies van 
woonvermogen. De statische dimensies (eigendom, aanschafprijs 
en hypotheekschuld bij aanschaf) representeren de hoeveelheid 
woonvermogen op het moment van aankoop, terwijl de drie 
dynamische dimensies (hypotheekaflossing, vermogenswinst/ 
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verlies, transactiekosten) de ontwikkeling van de hoeveelheid 
woonvermogen door de tijd heen verklaren. Verschillende vormen van 
sociaaleconomisch, volkshuisvestelijk en ruimtelijk beleid hebben een 
afzonderlijke, en soms zelfs tegengesteld, effect op de bovengenoemde 
dimensies, en vormen de verdeling van woonvermogen over sociale 
klassen en leeftijdsgroepen.
Hoofdstuk 2 vangt aan met een overzicht van de eigendoms- 
ongelijkheid, woonvermogensongelijkheid en hypotheekschuld-
ongelijkheid in 16 Europese landen. In dit hoofdstuk worden vier 
beroepsklassen (laag, midden, hoog en zelfstandigen) uit twee 
leeftijdscohorten met elkaar vergeleken (geboren tussen 1930-1949 
en tussen 1950-1962). In alle onderzochte landen bezitten de hogere 
beroepsklassen significant meer woonvermogen dan de lagere 
beroepsklassen. Echter, de woonvermogensverdeling verschilt 
behoorlijk tussen de onderzochte landen. De twee leeftijdscohorten 
worden met elkaar vergeleken met het idee in het achterhoofd dat 
hun verschillen in hun woonsituatie (deels) te wijten zijn aan de 
condities waaronder zij de woningmarkt betraden (gemiddeld 
genomen maken Europeanen tussen hun 25e en 40e levensjaar de 
stap naar een koopwoning). De bovengenoemde cohortvergelijking 
werpt nieuw licht op beleidsveranderingen sinds de jaren tachtig 
van de vorige eeuw. Het oudere cohort heeft over het algemeen 
de stap naar een koopwoning gezet vóór de verruiming van de 
hypotheekmogelijkheden als een gevolg van de liberalisering van 
de hypotheekmarkt (in Noordwest Europa), of vóór de verkoop van 
sociale huurwoningen (in Zuid- en Centraal Europa), terwijl het 
jongere cohort over het algemeen hierna de woningmarkt betreden 
heeft. In Hoofdstuk 2 zijn de 16 onderzochte landen geclusterd in zeven 
‘woonvermogensaccumulatieregimes’, gebaseerd op de verspreiding 
van het eigenwoningbezit tot de jaren tachtig van de twintigste eeuw, 
en de veranderingen in de politieke economie in de periode tussen 
1980 en 2010. Tot de jaren tachtig kon Europa geclassificeerd worden 
in ‘eigenaar-samenlevingen’ rond de Middellandse Zee (zowel 
communistische als kapitalistische landen), ‘huurder-samenlevingen’ 
in Centraal Europa zowel communistische als kapitalistische landen) 
en een groep landen in Noord- en Noordwest Europa dat het pad 
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volgde van eigenwoningbezit-stimulering via subsidies en fiscale 
voordelen. De privatisering van sociale huurwoningen na de val ban 
het communisme heeft de politieke economie van een deel van de 
voormalige communistische eigenaar-samenlevingen (Hongarije, 
Slovenië) en huurder-samenlevingen (Tsjechië, Polen, Estland) 
veranderd. De deregulering van de hypotheekmarkt heeft het pad 
van een aantal landen dat al langer inzette op stimulering van het 
eigenwoningbezit (Nederland, Denemarken, Zweden), en van een 
enkele eigenaar-samenleving (Spanje) veranderd. Een deel van de 
landen heeft al deze veranderingen kunnen weerstaan: in een deel 
van de huurder-samenlevingen bleef de woningmarkt behoorlijk 
gereguleerd (Duitsland, Zwitserland, Oostenrijk), terwijl in een deel 
van de eigenaar-samenlevingen (Italië, Portugal) de familie een 
dominante rol bleef spelen in het verkrijgen van een woning. 
De stimulering van het eigenwoningbezit kan zowel in een gelijkere 
als ongelijkere verdeling van woonvermogen resulteren, afhankelijk 
van de politieke economie in het land. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat object 
subsidies voor betaalbare koopwoningen, zoals gebruikt in sommige 
Scandinavische landen, verbonden kunnen worden aan minder 
woonvermogensongelijkheid tussen beroepsklassen in het oudere 
geboortecohort, dat veelal de stap naar een koopwoning heeft gezet 
voordat deregulering haar intrede maakte op de hypotheekmarkt in de 
jaren tachtig van de twintigste eeuw. Een vergelijkbaar argument kan 
gemaakt worden voor de oudere generatie in de postcommunistische 
landen die geprofiteerd hebben van bouw van betaalbare (sociale / 
coöperatieve / publieke) huurwoningen wanneer ze de woningmarkt 
betraden, en de privatisering van dit vastgoed (tegen dumpprijzen) na 
de val van het communisme in de jaren negentig van de twintigste 
eeuw. De deregulering van hypotheekmarkt gaat samen met een 
ongelijkere verdeling van woonvermogen over beroepsklassen. Het 
heeft huishoudens met een lagere sociaaleconomische status, tot de 
economische crisis van 2007, de mogelijkheid gegeven om de stap naar 
een koopwoning te maken door het versoepelen van de hypotheek-
eisen en het aanbieden van grotere hypotheekleningen. Vooral 
huishoudens met een lage sociaaleconomische status blijven tot ver 
na het bereiken van de wettelijke pensioenleeftijd, zwaar belegd 
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met schulden. Ironisch genoeg zijn het dus landen in het ‘liberale 
woonvermogensaccumulatieregime’, waar het eigenwoningbezit 
als een middel tot vermogensopbouw gezien wordt, waar het 
eigenwoningbezit niet altijd een middel tot vermogensopbouw is 
voor huishoudens met een lagere sociaaleconomische status.
In hoofdstuk 3 ligt de nadruk op woonvermogensongelijkheid 
die voortkomt uit de levensloop in plaats van sociale klasse, zoals in 
hoofdstuk 2. Dit hoofdstuk richt zich op één van de meest voorkomende 
én ingrijpende negatieve gebeurtenissen die zich gedurende de 
levensloop kan voltrekken: een scheiding. Na een scheiding zal ten 
minste één van de echtgenoten een nieuw huis moeten zoeken. 
Eerdere studies hebben al laten zien dat dit (vooral voor vrouwen) 
vaak een huurwoning betreft. Toch is een merendeel van gescheiden 
individuen in staat om opnieuw naar een koopwoning te verhuizen 
voordat ze de pensiongerechtigde leeftijd bereiken. De resultaten 
van dit hoofdstuk wijzen uit dat zij die na een scheiding in een 
koopwoning blijven wonen, of later in de levensloop opnieuw een 
woning kopen na een periode in de huursector te hebben vertoefd, tot 
30% minder woonvermogen te hebben opgebouwd dat echtparen die 
nooit gescheiden zijn. Dit komt omdat zij vaak naar kleinere woningen 
verhuizen (soms door krapte op de woningmarkt en de wil om in de 
nabijheid van kinderen te blijven wonen) en door een verlenging 
van de hypotheekschuld. Hertrouwen blijkt een goede strategie 
om negatieve effect van een scheiding weg te poetsen. Het verschil 
tussen getrouwde en hertrouwde individuen zeer beperkt. Wel is het 
opvallend dat gescheiden vrouwen, controlerende voor inkomen, 
over het algemeen minder woonvermogen opbouwen dan hun 
mannelijke tegenpolen. In de laatste decennia is het negatieve effect 
van een scheiding op het opbouwen van woonvermogen afgenomen 
door de toegenomen arbeidsmarkt participatie sinds de jaren ’70. Voor 
mannen is het negatieve effect van een scheiding versterkt, met name 
omdat een dubbel inkomen in veel gevallen noodzakelijk is geworden 
om een woning te kunnen kopen.
Het negatieve effect van een scheiding op het opbouwen van 
woonvermogen verschilt behoorlijk tussen de landen die in Hoofdstuk 
3 vergeleken worden. Het negatieve effect is sterker in landen die het 
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gemakkelijker maken om opnieuw een koopwoning aan te schaffen. 
Het gaat hierbij vooral om landen met een gemiddelde omvang 
van het eigenwoningbezit waar de hypotheekverstrekking ruim is, 
zoals Zweden, Denemarken en Nederland. In deze landen kunnen 
gescheiden mannen en vrouwen met een lagere sociaaleconomische 
status opnieuw een koopwoning aanschaffen door de afbetaling 
van de woning vooruit te schuiven middels hypotheken met lange 
looptijden (de aflossingsvrije hypotheek als meest extreme voorbeeld). 
Bovendien is het gebruikelijk dat getrouwde stellen in deze landen, 
aangespoord door de liberale hypotheekverstrekking, wooncarrière 
maken en doorverhuizen naar grotere en duurdere koopwoningen, 
waardoor ze ‘weggroeien’ van gescheiden woningbezitters. Een veel 
kleinere kloof tussen het woonvermogen van gescheiden mannen en 
vrouwen en getrouwde stellen kan gevonden worden in conservatieve 
welvaartsstaten met uitgebreide alimentatie-regelingen (voor de 
vrouw/moeder). In deze landen is het ongebruikelijk dat vrouwen 
opnieuw een koopwoning aanschaffen, maar een aanzienlijk deel van 
de gescheiden vrouwen wordt in staat gesteld om in de voormalige 
echtelijke woning te blijven wonen. Zij die in hun koopwoning 
blijven wonen, zetten de opbouw van vermogen voort zoals dat voor 
de scheiding het geval was.
Hoofdstuk 4 benadert vermogensopbouw in de koopwoning als 
proces.  Terwijl de eerste twee empirische bijdragen aan dit proefschrift 
zich richten op het opgebouwde woonvermogen van ouderen 
(50-plussers), volgt dit hoofdstuk de verhuismobiliteit van Zweedse 
individuen geboren tussen 1970 en 1975, om in kaart te brengen hoe hun 
ruimtelijke- en woonbeslissingen bijdragen aan vermogenswinsten 
en verliezen (één van de dimensies van woonvermogensongelijkheid). 
Zweden wordt over het algemeen gezien als schoolvoorbeeld van 
een universele en sociaal-democratische welvaartsstaat, maar 
heeft sinds de jaren ’90 van de twintigste eeuw één van de meest 
liberaal-georiënteerde woonregimes van Europa. As een gevolg van 
de deregulering van de hypotheekmarkt en de privatisering van 
voormalige sociale woningbouw hebben Zweedse steden een enorm 
hevig proces van gelijktijdige gentrification én sociale neergang van 
buurten doorgemaakt. Dit heeft de sociaal-ruimtelijke ongelijkheid 
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in de Zweedse stad enorm doen toenemen. De woonkeuzes van 
mensen met een verschillende sociale achtergrond zijn de motor 
onder dit proces van sociale uitsortering. Huishoudens met 
een hoge sociaaleconomische status hebben door de ruimte 
hypotheekverstrekking en de verkoop van sociale huurwoningen 
de mogelijkheid gekregen in elkaars nabijheid te gaan wonen. 
Huishoudens met een lage sociaaleconomische status zijn naar 
andere buurten verhuisd omdat de influx van huishoudens met een 
hoge sociaaleconomische status de prijzen in andere buurten heeft 
opgedreven, hetgeen wonen in deze ‘betere buurten’ onbetaalbaar 
heeft gemaakt voor hen. Voor woningeigenaren in een buurt, is het de 
sociale status van de instroom van nieuwe bewoners die bepaalt hoe 
de status van de buurt zich ontwikkelt. De instroom van autochtone 
bewoners met een hoog opleidingsniveau gaat samen met stijgende 
woningprijzen. Op basis van Zweedse registerdata laat Hoofdstuk 
4 zien dat individuen die behoren tot de lagere inkomensdecielen 
significant minder vermogenswinsten hebben gemaakt op de 
woningmarkt tussen 1995 en 2010. Ook laten de resultaten in Hoofdstuk 
4 zien dat individuen met een migratieachtergrond significant 
minder vermogenswinsten hebben gemaakt op de woningmarkt dan 
autochtone Zweden. De lagere vermogenswinsten van allochtonen 
en individuen met een lage sociaaleconomische status zijn een 
gevolg van het feit dat zij onevenredig vaak woonachtig zijn in 
buurten waar het aantal bewoners met een migratieachtergrond of 
een laag opleidingsniveau hoog is. Belangrijker nog, ze wonen vaak 
in buurten waarvan de sociale status tussen 1995 en 2010 is gedaald 
(het aandeel allochtonen en individuen met een laag inkomen is 
toegenomen). In andere woorden: de veranderende ruimtelijke 
uitsortering van huishoudens over de stedelijke ruimte, die het 
gevolg is van decennialange liberaal-georiënteerde hervormingen 
op de woningmarkt, heeft de vermogenswinsten gepolariseerd, 
kan geconcludeerd worden wanneer autochtonen en allochtonen, 
en individuen met een hoge en een lage sociaaleconomische status 
vergeleken worden.
Het laatste empirische hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie gaat in 
op de verbinding tussen woonvermogen en financieel vermogen. 
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Alleen door de accumulatie van woonvermogen door verschillende 
sociale groepen te vergelijken met de accumulatie van financieel 
vermogen door diezelfde groepen, kan een uitspraak gedaan worden 
over het gevolg van de verdeling van woonvermogen voor de totale 
vermogensongelijkheid in verschillende landen. Als woonvermogen 
en financieel vermogen functioneren als communicerende vaten, 
kan verwacht worden dat het totale vermogen van huurders 
en kopers ongeveer gelijk is. Het vermogen is dan alleen op een 
verschillende manier opgepot. Omdat eigenwoningbezit onderdeel 
is van een op financiële zekerheid gerichte levensstijl, en omdat het 
eigenwoningbezit in veel landen (indirect) wordt gesubsidieerd, 
hebben eigenaar-bewoners, ook wanneer gecontroleerd wordt voor hun 
inkomen, meer vermogen dan huurders. Conclusie: woonvermogen 
en financieel vermogen functioneren niet als communicerende 
vaten. Dit betekent dat de woonvermogensongelijkheid tussen 
verschillende beroepsklassen (zie Hoofdstuk 2) en tussen mensen 
die een ingrijpende negatieve gebeurtenis (een scheiding) hebben 
meegemaakt en zij die dit niet hebben meegemaakt (zie Hoofdstuk 
3), niet (deels) opgeheven wordt door een grotere accumulatie van 
financieel vermogen door sociale groepen die weinig woonvermogen 
accumuleren.
De omvang van de kloof tussen huurders en kopers wat 
betreft vermogensopbouw verschilt sterk tussen landen met een 
verschillende welvaartsstaat regime en volkshuisvestingsregime. 
Historisch gezien bestaat er een verband tussen beide. In landen met 
veel eigenwoningbezit, zijn de pensioenen lager. Woningeigenaren 
hebben namelijk minder financiële ruimte om bij te dragen aan 
collectieve voorzieningen tijdens hun werkende leven (wanneer ze 
hun hypotheek afbetalen), en hebben minder inkomen nodig na 
de pensioengerechtigde leeftijd, wanneer ze de woning afbetaald 
hebben. Sinds de jaren tachtig is het eigenwoningbezit in een aantal 
landen gestimuleerd op een gefinancialiseerde manier, hetgeen 
geleid heeft tot een enorme toename van de woningschulden en 
een woningprijsexplosie. Deze schulden worden op hun beurt 
gedekt door de ruime pensioenpotten in deze landen. Het ligt 
voor de hand te denken dat de kloof tussen huurders en kopers 
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wat betreft vermogensopbouw groter is in landen waar het 
eigenwoningbezit minder gestimuleerd is. Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat 
dit niet noodzakelijkerwijs klopt. De grootste vermogenskloof kan 
gevonden worden in landen waar het eigenwoningbezit nauwelijks 
van overheidswege aangemoedigd is, en woningprijzen vrijwel gelijk 
zijn gebleven (Duitsland en Oostenrijk). In deze landen bouwen 
woningeigenaren snel vermogen op omdat het maximale leenbedrag 
laag is en de lening snel terugbetaald moet worden. Bovendien 
investeert een aanzienlijk deel van de woningeigenaren in tweede 
woningen die verhuurd worden. De kleinste vermogenskloof bestaat 
in de landen die het eigenwoningbezit op een gefinancialiseerde 
manier – en via subsidies – hebben gestimuleerd (Nederland, Spanje, 
Luxemburg, Cyprus). Dit heeft voornamelijk te maken met de beperkte 
aflossing van de woningschulden.
Wat betekent dit voor het woonbeleid?
De publicatie van van Piketty’s (2014) invloedrijke studie naar 
vermogensongelijkheid heeft in vele Europese landen geleid tot 
hevige politieke discussies. De uitkomst van deze discussies is dat in 
brede kringen wordt erkend dat vermogen steeds grotere gevolgen 
heeft voor de levenskansen van mensen. Vooral de levenskansen 
van de lagere sociaaleconomische groepen kunnen leiden onder een 
toename van de vermogensongelijkheid. Terwijl Europese linkse 
en sociaaldemocratische partijen zich van oudsher gericht hebben 
op inkomensherverdeling om een rechtvaardige samenleving op te 
bouwen, zou het tegengaan van vermogensongelijkheid wel eens een 
steeds grotere rol in een ‘nieuw links verhaal’ kunnen gaan spelen. 
Liberalen snappen het wel. Al decennialang is vermogensopbouw 
onder lagere sociaaleconomische groepen een stokpaardje van 
liberale politieke partijen. Het vormt de legitimatie van de golf van 
dereguleringen in financiële sector die heeft plaatsgevonden sinds 
deze partijen sinds de jaren tachtig van de twintigste eeuw steeds vaker 
regeringsverantwoordelijkheid genomen hebben, en heeft geleid 
tot de huidige niveaus van vermogensongelijkheid in Europa. In de 
nasleep van ‘het Piketty-debat’ is vaak benoemd dat het aanpakken van 
de extreem ongelijke verdeling van vermogen ingewikkeld is, omdat 
47018 Barend Wind.indd   236 18-09-17   10:21
237
Nederlandse samenvatting
het een hulpbron betreft die vrij over de wereld kan verplaatsen, 
naar een locatie waar veel rendement verwacht wordt. Het opheffen 
van kapitaalbeperkingen als onderdeel van het dereguleren van 
financiële markten in heel Europa heeft de effectiviteit van nationale 
oplossingen zoals een Tobin-taks (een belasting op financiële 
transacties, genoemd naar Nobel Prijswinnaar James Tobin) sterk 
ingeperkt. In het beleidsdebat is men erg snel over een essentiële factor 
heengestapt: de groei van de hoeveelheid kapitaal ten opzichte van 
het nationale inkomen is voornamelijk gedreven door een toename 
van het woonvermogen – een uiterst honkvaste vorm van vermogen. 
Het is daarom wellicht realistischer vermogensongelijkheid in de 
eerste plaats aan te pakken op de woningmarkt (woonvermogen is 
de grootste bron van vermogen voor de meeste huishoudens) dan op 
de financiële markt (hoewel de verdeling van financieel vermogen 
ontegenzeggelijk een stuk ongelijker is). Woonvermogen is direct 
verbonden aan een niet-verplaatsbaar object dat daardoor altijd 
binnen dezelfde jurisdictie blijft vallen. Aan de andere kant kan 
woonvermogensongelijkheid niet alleen via woningmarktbeleid 
opgelost worden. De hypotheekproducten die het voor veel mensen 
mogelijk maken om de stap naar een koopwoning te zetten, worden 
verkocht op de internationale kapitaalmarkt. 
De empirische hoofdstukken van deze dissertatie wijzen op vier 
mechanismen die verklaren waarom woonvermogensongelijkheid 
groter is in sommige landen dan in andere landen. In de eerste plaats 
vergroot een opwaartse prijsontwikkeling op de woningmarkt het 
potentieel voor een toename van de woonvermogensongelijkheid. 
Een stijging van de woningprijzen stelt zittende woningeigenaren 
namelijk in staat om hun vermogenswinsten te gebruiken om een 
volgende stap in hun wooncarrière te zetten, terwijl het potentiele 
kopers aanmoedigt om de markt voor koopwoningen te betreden. 
Normaal gesproken neemt de betaalbaarheid van een koopwoning af 
door het stijgen van de prijzen. Echter, de stijging van de woningprijzen 
in een aantal – vooral Noordwest Europese – landen is het gevolg van 
de deregulering van de hypotheekmarkt binnen een situatie van 
grote (indirecte) subsidies op eigenwoningbezit, hetgeen veroorzaakt 
dat eenzelfde groep potentiele kopers met een vergroot budget (door 
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de soepelere hypotheekverstrekking) op dezelfde woningen blijft 
bieden. Dit heeft een prijsopdrijvend effect. Ten tweede gaat de 
toename van hypotheekschulden gepaard met een toename van de 
woonvermogensongelijkheid. Een gefinancialiseerde toename van het 
eigenwoningbezit stelt lagere-middenklasse huishoudens in staat om 
de stap naar een koopwoning te zetten door de woonquote betaalbaar 
te houden door middel van een verlenging van de hypotheekduur. De 
hogere middenklasse, aan de andere kant, is in staat om de hypotheek 
sneller af te lossen en daarmee aantrekkelijkere voorwaarden af te 
dwingen. De combinatie van structureel opgeblazen woningprijzen 
en verhoogde hypotheekschulden bindt huishoudens rechtstreeks 
aan de financiële markt, waarvan ze afhankelijk zijn om in hun 
vraag naar woonruimte te voorzien. De hoge hypotheekschulden van 
de lagere middenklasse in landen waar het eigenwoningbezit op een 
gefinancialiseerde manier is gestimuleerd, kunnen bijdragen aan 
een vergroting van de algemene vermogensongelijkheid, wanneer 
deze schulden als vermogen op de balans van personen bovenin de 
vermogensverdeling komen te staan. Ten derde is de toename van 
de sociaal-ruimtelijke ongelijkheid, die veel Europese steden hebben 
doorgemaakt sinds de jaren tachtig van de twintigste eeuw, een drijvende 
kracht achter woonvermogensongelijkheid. De verhuisbewegingen 
die gepaard gaan met een meer markt-gestuurde uitsortering van 
individuen over de stedelijke ruimte, leiden tot een sterke toename 
van de woningprijzen in gentrification buurten en buurten waar de 
hoge sociaaleconomische status herbevestigd wordt, terwijl ze een 
negatieve prijsspiraal op gang brengen in buurten met een lage 
sociaaleconomische startpositie of een grote hoeveelheid allochtone 
bewoners. Lokale, door gemeenten gesubsidieerde ‘stedelijke groei 
coalities’, gericht op het aantrekken van internationale investeringen 
en hooggeschoolde arbeidskrachten faciliteren de toename van de 
sociaal-ruimtelijke ongelijkheid, en indirect vermogensongelijkheid. 
Ten vierde, een mechanisme dat doorheen het hele proefschrift 
is erkend als mechanisme onder woonvermogensongelijkheid, 
is de toename van inkomensongelijkheid die vooral universele 
welvaartsstaten heeft gekenmerkt sinds de jaren tachtig onder invloed 
van veranderend sociaal beleid. Wanneer de inkomensverdeling 
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gepolariseerd is, vertaalt dit zich in een polarisering van de koopkracht 
op de woningmarkt. Het inkomen (en de stabiliteit daarvan), bepaalt 
namelijk de omvang van de hypotheeklening die banken bereid zijn 
om te verstrekken, hoewel hierin aanzienlijke verschillen bestaan 
tussen landen, afhankelijk van de regulering van de hypotheekmarkt. 
Het inkomen bepaalt wat men uit kan geven aan de aanschaf van een 
woning. Het is daarom dat de lagere- en middengroepen in landen met 
een gelijkere inkomensverdeling duurdere woningen kunnen kopen 
– en als gevolg meer vermogen kunnen opbouwen. Dir verkleint op 
den duur de woonvermogensongelijkheid.
Als opgaande woningprijzen, een toename van de hypotheek-
schuld, een groei van de inkomensongelijkheid en stijging van sociaal-
ruimtelijke ongelijkheid de mechanismen zijn die de huidige verdeling 
van woonvermogen hebben gevormd, welke beleidsmaatregelen zijn 
dan geschikt om woonvermogensongelijkheid tegen te gaan? Een 
her-regulering van de hypotheekmarkt zal hoogstwaarschijnlijk de 
woningprijsontwikkeling temperen en de hoge woningschulden doen 
afnemen. Een bijkomend gevolg hiervan is dat het eigenwoningbezit 
buiten het bereik komt te liggen van een deel van de lagere 
middenklasse. Het gevolg van zo een beleidsomslag kan ingeschat 
worden op basis van een blik op de Duitssprekende landen in 
Europa, waar een conservatief hypotheek systeem, gecombineerd met 
prikkels om te investeren in huurwoningen, al decennialang bestaat. 
Nu woningeigenaren (juist) hier in toenemende mate investeren in 
huurwoningen in de steden (bijvoorbeeld voor studerende kinderen), 
ligt een toename van de woonvermogensongelijkheid ook hier op 
de loer. Hoofdstuk 5 zien dat de vermogenskloof tussen kopers en 
huurders hierdoor tot de grootste in Europa behoort. Het historische 
voorbeeld van gedecommodificeerd eigenwoningbezit in de 
Scandinavische landen in de decennia na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 
bewijzen dat een conservatief hypotheeksysteem kan samengaan 
met een flinke groei van het aantal koopwoningen, én beperkte 
woonvermogensongelijkheid (Bengtsson et al., 2013; Hedin et al., 
2012). Overheidssubsidies op eigenwoningbezit geven vooral lagere 
middenklasse huishoudens de mogelijkheid om de stap naar een 
koopwoning te zetten zonder enorme schulden aan te gaan. Deze 
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vorm van overheidssubsidies dragen daarom direct bij aan een 
gelijkere verdeling van vermogen, zonder individuen en huishoudens 
te verbinden aan de financiële markt, waar de schulden van de 
lagere sociaaleconomische groepen worden omgezet in vermogen 
voor de rijken. Hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat vermogenswinsten een 
belangrijke bron van woonvermogensongelijkheid zijn binnen de 
Zweedse context, en hoogstwaarschijnlijk ook in andere Europese 
landen die een vergelijkbare stijging van de woningprijzen hebben 
doorgemaakt na de liberalisering van de hypotheekmarkt, zoals 
Nederland, Denemarken, Ierland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. 
Vermogenswinsten worden vrijwel nergens belast, maar een 
dergelijke belasting zou woningspeculatie en een toename van de 
woonvermogensongelijkheid kunnen tegengaan.
De sociaal-ruimtelijke polarisering die heeft bijgedragen 
aan toegenomen niveaus van woonvermogensongelijkheid zijn 
gedeeltelijk het gevolg van een neo-liberale heroriëntatie van lagere 
overheden wat betreft ruimtelijke ordening (Tasan-Kok en Baeten, 
2011). Onderzoek naar gentrification heeft laten zien dat de recente 
golven van gentrification, sinds de jaren negentig van de twintigste eeuw, 
steeds meer worden veroorzaakt door overheidsbeleid (Uitermark et 
al. 2007). Lokale overheden faciliteren – en organiseren – investeringen 
in centraal gelegen buurten met een hoog potentieel om te veranderen 
in plaatsen met een aantrekkelijk hoog-stedelijk vestigingsklimaat 
voor hogeropgeleide (internationale) kenniswerkers. Het gebruik van 
publiek geld voor dergelijke doeleinden is doorgaans gelegitimeerd 
door een ideologie die het aantrekken van ‘talent’ noodzakelijk acht 
voor het verbeteren van de stad haar positie in de internationale 
stedelijke hiërarchie, hetgeen zich uiteindelijk zou moeten vertalen in 
een toename van de werkgelegenheid voor lagere sociaaleconomische 
groepen. Studies uit verschillende Europese landen bewijzen keer op 
keer dat staatsgeleide gentrification leidt tot een meer markt-geleide 
uitsortering van individuen over de stedelijke ruimte, zelf wanneer 
het niet direct leidt tot het gedwongen verhuizingen van inwoners met 
een lage sociaaleconomische status. Zowel lokale als landelijke vormen 
van ruimtelijk beleid kunnen bijdragen aan een omkering van deze 
trend. Steden hebben beleidsinstrumenten om hun woningvoorraad 
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te diversifiëren op basis van eigendom (koop of huur) en grootte. Het 
beschermen van sociale woningbouw, of betaalbare huurwoningen 
in populaire buurten is één van de manieren waarop gemeenten 
de steeds meer markt-gedreven verdeling van verschillende sociale 
klassen en etnische groepen over de stedelijke ruimte kan tegengaan. 
Bovendien hebben selectieve investeringen in de gebouwde omgeving 
hebben het in zich om processen op de woningmarkt fundamenteel 
te veranderen. Het versterken van buurten met een consistent lage 
sociaaleconomische status kan resulteren in een instroom van 
kapitaalkrachtige bewoners en een stijging van de woningprijzen, 
en daarom tot vermogensopbouw onder de zittende bewoners met 
een lagere sociaaleconomische positie. Hoewel zo een strategie een 
nivellerend effect zou kunnen hebben op de woonvermogensverdeling, 
laten ervaringen in verschillende Europese steden zien dat gemeenten 
meestal niet in staat zijn om een totale verandering van de bevolking 
tegen te gaan. Zo een vorm van overheids-gedreven gentrification is 
daarom sterk bekritiseerd voor haar bijdrage aan sociaal-ruimtelijke 
ongelijkheid.
Tenslotte hebben veranderingen in de verdeling en stabiliteit van 
arbeidsmarkinkomens een gevolg voor de koopkracht van verschillende 
sociaaleconomische groepen op de woningmarkt, en daarom op de 
woonvermogensverdeling. Terwijl middels woonbeleid en ruimtelijke 
ordeningsbeleid het gedeelte van de woonvermogensongelijkheid dat 
voortkomt uit het functioneren van de woningmarkt kan worden 
tegengegaan, kan alleen welvaartsstaatbeleid het gedeelte van de 
woonvermogensongelijkheid dat voortkomt uit het functioneren 
van de arbeidsmarkt tegengaan. Mondialisering en afslankingen 
van de welvaartsstaat worden genoemd als de belangrijkste oorzaken 
van de plotselinge toename van de inkomensongelijkheid vanaf de 
jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw in de meeste West-Europese landen 
(Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Harrison and Bluestone, 1990). Onder 
druk van de toegenomen internationale concurrentie is er één 
groep landen geweest die toegestaan hebben dat de inkomens van 
de laagstgeschoolden zouden dalen, terwijl een andere groep landen 
hebben toegestaan dat een schil van flexibele werkgelegenheid 
is ontstaan (Bonoli, 2005). De manier waarop de welvaartstaat 
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omgaat met nieuwe sociale risico’s zoals scheiding of terugkerende 
werkloosheid heeft een impact op de mogelijkheid om woonvermogen 
op te bouwen voor verschillende sociale groepen, wordt duidelijk uit 
Hoofdstuk 3. Een stabiel inkomen is noodzakelijk om de stap naar 
een koopwoning te zetten, omdat banken het risico op wanbetaling 
anders te hoog inschatten om een hypotheek te kunnen verstrekken. 
Twee vormen van sociaal beleid kunnen daarom bijdragen aan een 
gelijkere verdeling van woonvermogen: arbeidsmarktreguleringen 
die bijdragen aan normaliseren van vaste contracten en het verkleinen 
van inkomensverschillen, en welvaartsstaatarrangementen die 
inkomensstabiliteit garanderen wanneer oude en nieuwe sociale 
risico’s zich voordoen. Zulke vormen van beleid zouden vooral 
ten goede komen aan de jongere geboortecohorten omdat zij het 
zwaarst getroffen zijn door de huidige golf van mondialisering en 
welvaartsstaat-afslanking.
De belangrijkste boodschap voor beleidsmakers is dat het 
vraagstuk van de toenemende woonvermogensongelijkheid niet 
opgelost kan worden door middel van de implementatie van nieuwe 
vormen van woonbeleid alleen. Het vergt een combinatie van 
arbeidsmarkt-, ruimtelijke ordenings-, financieel en woonbeleid 
om de toename van de woonvermogensongelijkheid die heeft 
plaatsgevonden vanaf de jaren tachtig van de twintigste eeuw, op 
lange termijn te kunnen terugbrengen. Uiteindelijk kunnen de 
huidige hoge niveaus van woonvermogensongelijkheid, die deels 
voortkomen uit de hoge woonschulden van bepaalde sociale groepen, 
alleen geleidelijk verdwijnen wanneer de inkomens sneller groeien 
dan woningprijzen. Hiervoor is het echter noodzakelijk om het 
‘contract tussen kapitaal en arbeid’ grondig te herzien.
Over het hele continent is de uitbreiding van het eigenwoningbezit 
gelegitimeerd door het idee dat het gunstig is dat ook lagere 
sociaaleconomische strata vermogen kunnen opbouwen. Hoewel 
deze dissertatie zeer kritisch is op de uitkomsten van beleid dat 
op deze aanname is gestoeld, moet ze niet gelezen worden als 
een kritiek op het idee dat vermogensopbouw onder zwakkere 
sociaaleconomische groepen gestimuleerd moet worden an sich. Het 
belangrijkste argument dat in dit proefschrift gepresenteerd is, is dat 
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er verschillende strategieën bestaan om het eigenwoningbezit uit te 
breiden, met verschillende uitkomsten voor de vermogensopbouw 
van afzonderlijke sociale groepen. Met andere woorden, als 
vermogensopbouw onder de lagere sociaaleconomische groepen het 
beleidsdoel is, is een beleidsstrategie die resulteert in een gelijkere 
verdeling van woonvermogen waarschijnlijk het meest geschikt. Er 
is nog een reden om kritisch te zijn op beleid dat poogt bij te dragen 
aan de opbouw van vermogen in de lagere sociaaleconomische 
groepen door het eigenwoningbezit te stimuleren. De uitbreiding 
van het eigenwoningbezit kan dan gezien worden als onderdeel van 
een herstructurering van de welvaartsstaat, waarbij huishoudens 
geacht worden om in hun eigen sociale noden te voorzien 
door middel van hun woonvermogen. Het is echter de vraag in 
hoeverre de daling van sociaal kapitaal (aanspraken op sociale 
voorzieningen van de welvaartsstaat) wordt gecompenseerd door 
een stijging van het woonvermogen. Lagere sociaaleconomische 
groepen bouwen namelijk minder woonvermogen op, ervaren 
minder vermogenswinsten en hebben een meer eendimensionaal 
vermogensportfolio, waardoor het onwaarschijnlijk dat zij voldoende 
woonvermogen hebben om sociale risico’s op te vangen. Huurders, 
die helemaal geen woonvermogen opbouwen, ondervinden zelfs de 
gevolgen van een verkleining van de sociale zekerheid zonder dat zij 
(gesubsidieerd) vermogen kunnen opbouwen in een koopwoning. In 
de komende jaren zal het in toenemende mate een uitdaging worden 
om woonvermogensongelijkheid te beteugelen of te compenseren.
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Dankwoord
Het schrijven van een proefschrift is een eenzame bezigheid, toch heb 
ik er nooit aan gedacht om het bijltje erbij neer te gooien. Enerzijds 
omdat ik het voorrecht gehad heb me in de afgelopen vier jaar over 
een onwijs actueel- en politiek-beladen onderwerp te mogen buigen, 
anderzijds omdat ik met mijn vrienden en familie kon ontsnappen 
naar plekken ver buiten de academische wereld. Zij hebben mij, samen 
met vakgenoten van over de gehele wereld, geïnspireerd tijdens het 
schrijven van deze dissertatie. Hen wil ik via deze weg bedanken. Een 
aantal personen verdient extra aandacht.
Het allereerste zaadje voor dit proefschrift is al geplant op de 
middelbare school. Het was mijn favoriete aardrijkskundedocent 
Wim Hamers die me aanraadde Sociale Geografie te gaan studeren. 
Zijn mensenkennis heeft niet tekortgeschoten. Mijn interesse voor 
woonbeleid is verder aangewakkerd tijdens mijn opleiding Sociale 
Geografie en Sociologie. Graag wil ik Fenne Pinkster, Ineke Teijmant 
en Arjen Verweij bedanken die mij, tijdens het schrijven van mijn 
Masterscriptie, geïnteresseerd hebben voor het doen van sociaal-
wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Waar Arjen me een kijkje in de keuken 
heeft gegund op het ministerie waar het woonbeleid geformuleerd 
wordt, hebben Fenne en Ineke me geleerd om de sociaal-ruimtelijke 
uitkomsten kritisch tegen het licht te houden. Omdat het HOWCOME 
project, waar deze dissertatie deel van uitmaakt, vooral kwantitatief 
van aard is, heb ik vaak aan Fenne’s kwalitatieve benadering gedacht. 
Met veel plezier ben ik in verschillende landen buurten ingegaan, om 
de kwantitatieve uitkomsten voor mezelf een gezicht te geven. Ineke 
is op een nog directere manier de springplank, of zoals ze het zelf zou 
verwoorden: polsstok, naar mijn promotieplaats geweest. Ze schreef 
vlak na mijn afstuderen een aanbevelingsbrief waar ik het zelf niet 
droog bij kon houden. Ik ben ervan overtuigd dat haar warme woorden 
een belangrijke reden zijn waarom ik in Tilburg mocht langskomen 
voor een kennismaking. 
Ten tweede ben Caroline Dewilde en de rest van het HOWCOME 
team zeer erkentelijk. Caroline, ik heb het als een voorrecht ervaren 
dat ik vier jaar lang onderzoek heb mogen doen naar een onderwerp 
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dat me zo na aan het hart ligt. Wat betreft kwantitatief onderzoek 
kon ik klok en klepel nauwelijks van elkaar onderscheiden aan 
het begin van dit promotietraject. Je hebt me, door me telkens 
nieuwe aanknopingspunten mee te geven, de kans gegeven zélf 
kennis te verwerven en mezelf te ontwikkelen, zoals dat een echte 
mentor betaamt. Bovendien heb ik heel veel van je geleerd over het 
academische leven: publiceren, reviewen en departementspolitiek, 
we hebben er uren over gesproken. Stéfanie, vier jaar lang hebben 
we veel meer dan alleen een kamer gedeeld. Ik kon bij je terecht voor 
onderzoeks-gerelateerde vragen, maar ook voor relatieadvies: zeer 
succesvol. Ik ben heel erg gesteld geraakt op je openheid en eerlijkheid. 
Daarnaast wil ik de overige leden van het HOWCOME team, Philipp 
Lersch, Christa Hubers en Adriana Soaita bedanken voor de scherpe 
en gezellige team meetings waar we grote discussies over kleine 
wetenschappelijke details gevoerd hebben. Jullie inzichten hebben 
mijn kijk op de wereld voor altijd verrijkt. 
Ik vind het fantastisch dat mijn Amsterdamse vrienden me, 
tijdens mijn ballingschap in ‘de provincie’ trouw zijn gebleven.  Timo 
en Jorn, met jullie heb ik de meest bizarre avonturen beleefd die een 
welkome aanvulling vormden op het bureau-bestaan. Ik hoef maar te 
denken aan onze uren in een Iraanse politiecel, op een kameel in de 
woestijn van Radjastan, op een Armeense legerbasis, of op een filmset 
in Stefanovo, en er verschijnt een glimlach op mijn gezicht. Een net zo 
welkome bron van ontspanning vormden de vele hamburgeravonden 
met Aljosja, Jairo en Elias, a.k.a de Cevapi-boys. Onze filosofische, 
politieke en vunzige gesprekken betekenen een hele hoop voor me. 
Net zo memorabel zijn onze actieve excursies zoals paintballen of 
boomslingeren. Ik mag me gelukkig prijzen dat jullie er voor me zijn 
als er iets tegen zit, of om iets het te vieren als het meezit. 
Een proefschrift brengt je op plekken waar je nieuwe vrienden 
maakt. In de eerste plaats: Tilburg. Op een van de eerste PhD-drinks 
ontmoette ik Dino, die sindsdien mijn partner in crime is in het 
Tilburgse uitgaansleven. Ik kan me levendig herinneren hoe we 
samen met Ruslan bankbiljetten in de accordeon van de zigeunerband 
in No Sikiriki hebben geschoven. Net zo dierbaar is mijn herinnering 
aan het Oktoberfest in München waar we voor de verandering geen 
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rakija, maar bier gedronken hebben. Een andere locatie waar ik door 
het schrijven van dit proefschrift beland ben is Uppsala (Zweden). 
Ik ben heel content met het vertrouwen en de vrijheid die Caroline 
me gegeven heeft om mezelf en mijn onderzoek op deze plek verder 
te ontwikkelen. Mijn herinneringen aan Uppsala zijn voor altijd 
verbonden aan Dominic. Domo, je hebt me op sleeptouw genomen 
en kennis laten maken met alle geneugten van het Zweedse leven. 
Ik denk met heel veel plezier terug aan onze avonden in de nationer, 
een live optreden van Günther en onze excursies naar verstopplekken 
van dakloze Roemeense migranten. Bovendien vind ik het prachtig 
dat ik de geboorte van mijn kleine vriendin Valentina van zo dichtbij 
heb mogen meemaken. 
Tenslotte wil ik mijn ouders bedanken. Jullie hebben me vanaf het 
eerste begin gesteund in dit traject, en het maakt me intens gelukkig 
jullie trotse gezichten te kunnen zien tijdens de verdediging van dit 
proefschrift. In de afgelopen vier jaar kon ik altijd bij jullie terecht 
om te slapen op mijn ‘kermisbed’ wanneer ik terugkeerde naar 
Amsterdam. De weekendontbijtjes met verse broodjes waren alles 
wat ik nodig had om tegenslagen achter me te laten en weer een hele 
periode geconcentreerd te kunnen schrijven. Bovendien ben ik jullie 
dankbaar voor alle culturele bagage en het doorzettingsvermogen 
dat jullie me hebben meegegeven. Zonder jullie zou ik hier nooit 
beland zijn. 
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Over the past thirty years, a silent societal transformation has 
taken place across Europe: homeownership rates have increa-
sed rapidly, and the meaning of owning oneʼs home has chan-
ged. The upswing of homeownership rates in continental Europe 
is the result of government interventions and deregulations of 
mortgage- and housing markets, which encouraged (lower-inco-
me) households to enter homeownership at a younger age. 
Whereas housing was previously mainly defined by its shelter 
function, the market-driven expansion has increased the impor-
tance of its investment function, both for households and the 
economy at large. The significance of housing for the socio-eco-
nomic stratification has increased, but is still under-researched. 
This dissertation seeks to explain how institutional configurations 
generate or mitigate housing wealth inequality from an interna-
tional-comparative perspective. It gives insights in the impact of 
housing market dynamics on the organization of the life course 
and the consequences for housing wealth accumulation. Ultima-
tely, it presents an alternative view on one of the major political 
challenges of contemporary Europe
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